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The main thesis of this dissertation is that it is
compatible with American legal theory on legal rights and
legal right-holders to ascribe legal rights to non-human,
non-human made "natural objects" such as forests, rivers,
and seals, thesis (T)
.
The defense of (T) involves two
basic moves. One move is to defend (T) against objections
which are based on the historical positions in American
legal theory on what a legal right is and on who or what
can have legal rights. The other move is to defend (T)
against objections which do not presuppose any particular
historical position. Taken together, these two moves
establish that it is neither absurd nor unreasonable to
construe natural objects as legal right-holders.
The development of the argument for (T) by
chapters
is as follows. in Chapter I thesis (T) is
stated and the
two-move strategy for defending (T) is outlined.
In
V
Chapter II various concerns which motivate the move to give
natural objects legal rights are discussed. This discus-
sion shows how the issue "rights for natural objects" arises
and sets the stage for the main argument that natural ob-
jects could be legal right-holders.
The notions of a legal person and a legal repre-
sentative are discussed in Chapter III. This discussion
furnishes the basis for the argument, made repeatedly
throughout the dissertation, that theorists cannot hold
the positions they do and feel they must hold regarding
the doctrines of legal personality and legal representa-
tion and deny the possibility of ascribing legal rights to
natural objects.
In Chapter IV the notion of a legal fiction is
examined. It is argued that it is consistent with ac-
cepted legal theory on the nature, purposes and justifi-
cation for proper use of a legal fiction to suppose that
the notion of environmental personality is, or involves,
a legal fiction. Thus, even if ascription of legal
rights to natural objects is, or involves, a legal fiction,
the argument for (T) is not damaged by it.
The various positions in American legal theory
on
legal rights and legal right-holders are
discussed in
Chapters V and VI. In particular, eight
historical
vi
positions are identified. They are referred to as two
"strictly natural law positions" (The Moral Sense and Moral
Validation Positions) and six "non-strictly natural law
positions" (the Interest, Power, Claim, Rules, Prediction
and Correlativity Positions)
.
It is argued in Chapters VII and VIII that none of
the eight historical positions on legal rights and legal
right-holders poses a successful objection to (T)
.
Fur-
thermore, at least the favored Claim and Rules Positions
provide suggestions of specific legal rights natural ob-
jects might be said to have.
In Chapter IX remaining objections are stated and
defeated. These include objections which call into ques-





The case for (T) then is reviewed and
brought together in the Conclusion, Chapter X.
The defense of (T) provided may not dispel doubts
one might have about the desirability of giving natural
objects legal rights, since no attempt is made in the
dissertation to show that natural objects should ha\
e
legal rights. But it should dispel doubts one might have
about the possibility of ascribing legal rights to them.
It establishes that natural objects could be legal right-
holders .
Vll
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THE PROGRAMME OF THE DISSERTATION
Introduction
That there is an "environmental problem" is clear.
That action needs to be taken to combat the problem also
is clear. What is not so clear is the appropriate nature
and direction of remedies to the problem. What is dis-
puted, then, is how to solve the problem.
Many remedies have been proposed. Despite dif-
ferences between them, all point to the need for suppor-
tive legal principles to handle environmental policy. A
search for relevant legal mechanisms is underway. One
noteworthy feature of that search is that the various
legal maneuvers suggested or used construe the central
question "Who has, or should have, which legal rights as
environmental plaintiffs?" as a question about humans
and their legal rights. This is natural and to be ex-
pected. After all, basically legal systems are designed
to safeguard human interests and to adjudicate cases and
controversies between individuals assumed "equal before
the law." Legal relations (e.g., legal rights, duties,
powers and privileges) are construed as relations which
hold between persons. The familiar view is that
ultimately
1
2humans are the bearers of legal rights and legal duties.
Thus, a search for legal mechanisms to protect the natural
environment suggests the plausible move of expanding or
redefining the legal rights of humans in environmental
cases
.
That move may be very helpful. But there is
another possible move, one which represents a significant
departure from current environmental law. It is to construe
the natural objects themselves—forests 3 rivers s wildlife , etc .
—
or the natural environment as a whole 3 as having legal rights. This
unusual but promising tack has been proposed by Christopher
Stone in his provocative essay, Should Trees Have Standing?
Towards Legal rights for Natural Objects .''' Stone's thesis
is not simply that the law of standing ought to be liber-
alized to include natural objects as entities having legal
standing. He argues that natural objects themselves
should have legal rights.
Stone's proposal suggests an innovative legal means
for handling environmental litigation, an alternative to
means currently in use. Yet he claims that the move to
give natural objects legal rights is supported by conven-
tional legal scholarship. He argues that the history of
American law provides many examples of entities or classes
of entities who/which once had no legal rights yet now
are
3genuine legal right-holders. They are entities or classes
of entities to which the law has attributed legal person-
ality.
The attribution of legal personality to an entity
is an important juristic device for extending legal rights
to hitherto legally rightless entities. Stone argues that
the law ought to recognize natural objects as legal
persons, just as it has recognized as legal persons many
other non-human entities, e.g., corporations, ships and
trusts
.
A move to ascribe legal rights to natural objects
is a serious move. It is a move away from construing
humans only as legal right-holders where environmental
matters are concerned. It is motivated by many different
kinds of concerns— legal, political, economic, religious,
philosophical. Obviously any thorough defense or rebuttal
of Stone's thesis that natural objects should have legal
rights must address these various concerns. But if
Stone's thesis is to be taken seriously at all, it also
must be shown that natural objects oould be said to have
legal rights within the American legal framework.
To date no one has done that; no one has shown
that ascription of legal rights to natural objects is
compatible with the positions in American legal theory on
legal rights and legal right-holders. I intend to provide
such an argument in this dissertation. I will show that,
given the prima facie exhaustive positions in American
4
legal theory on legal rights and legal right-holders,
natural objects could be legal right-holders. By showing
that familiar legal concepts can be fitted to handle the
striking case of natural objects, the argument offered
here shows that a conceptual basis for giving natural
objects legal rights is available within the American
legal framework. In addition, the argument provided
defeats a whole set of reasonable objections to the move
to confer legal rights on natural objects--ob jections
based on theories of what a legal right is and on who or
what meaningfully can be said to have legal rights. As
such, the argument of this dissertation sets the stage
for any argument designed to establish Stone's thesis that
natural objects should have legal rights.
The Main Thesis of the Dissertation
The main thesis of this dissertation is that it is
compatible with American legal theory on legal rights to
ascribe legal rights to non-human, non-human made "natural
2
objects" such as seals, forests, streams and mountains,
thesis (T)
:
(T) Ascription of legal rights to natural objects
is compatible with American legal theory on
legal rights and legal right-holders.
5(T) is a thesis about the possibility of ascribing legal
rights within a particular legal system to a new class of
entities. It must be distinguished from another intui-
tively related thesis, thesis (S)
:
(S) Natural objects should have legal rights.
The distinction between the main thesis of the dissertation,
(T)
,
and thesis (S) is important to the argument of this
dissertation. The claim at (S) is that ascription of
legal rights to natural objects is desirable or justified
and ought to be implemented. The claim at (T) is that
ascription of legal rights to natural objects is possible,
given a particular legal framework. The truth and
defense of (T)
,
then, is independent of both the truth
and defense of (S)
.
As such, the defense of (T) provided
in this dissertation does not include arguments for (S) .
Appeal to the distinction between theses (T) and
(S) points to the basic difference between the account
provided here and the account provided by Christopher
Stone in Should Trees Have Standing? Stone's book
attempts to establish that natural objects should have
legal rights, thesis (S)
.
This dissertation attempts to
establish that natural objects could have legal rights,
thesis (T)
.
This basic difference is manifested in
several significant ways. First, the thrust of Stone's
book, quite unlike the thrust of this dissertation,
is to
6discuss concerns which warrant or justify the conferral
of legal rights on natural objects. Here, concerns under-
lying the move to give natural objects legal rights are
discussed just insofar as they do or might motivate,
rather than justify, that move. Second, the account
provided here includes a detailed, systematic analysis of
the notions of a legal right and a legal right-holder,
and of the attendant notions of a legal duty, legal
person and legal fiction; this is necessary for a defense
of (T)
.
Stone's account does not attempt any such
analysis; a defense of (S) does not require it. Third,
after cataloging and discussing the various positions in
American legal theory on legal rights and legal right-
holders, the reasonable basic kinds of objections to (T)
based on each position are stated and defeated in the
account provided here. In addition, several kinds of
objections which call into question the significance of
establishing (T) are stated and defeated. Accordingly,
the survey of basic kinds of objections to (T) provided
here is taken to be exhaustive .
4 In Stone's account,
where objections are considered, they are, for the most
part, objections to (S) only . 5 Furthermore, Stone's
treatment of them is not, and is not intended to be,
exhaustive of the kinds of objections which might be
raised against (S)
.
7These three specific differences between the
account provided here and Stone's account underscore the
basic difference between the two accounts, viz, that
Stone's book is a defense of thesis (S)
,
whereas this





this dissertation shows that it is
possible to speak meaningfully of non-human, natural
objects as legal right-holders. In effect, then, it
removes a host of objections to arguments in favor of
Stone's thesis, (S)
.
The Organization of the Dissertation
The defense of (T) provided in this dissertation
involves two basic moves. One move is to defend (T)
against objections to it which are based on the various
historical positions in American legal theory on legal
rights and legal right-holders. The other is to defend
(T) against objections which do not presuppose any of
the historical positions. These are objections which
could be advanced by theorists of any of the historical
positions. Thus, the first and second moves are aimed at
defeating the following two sorts of objections to (T)
,
respectively: "Legal rights are claims. But natural
objects cannot make claims. Thus, natural objects cannot
8have legal rights." "Legal rights are ascribable to moral
persons only. Since natural objects are not moral persons,
natural objects cannot have legal rights."
The chapter organization of the dissertation
roughly is as follows. The programme of the dissertation
is explained in Chapter I. In Chapter II, the various
concerns which motivate the move to give natural objects
legal rights are discussed. This discussion explains
how the issue "rights for natural objects" arises. In
Chapters III through VI, material necessary to the defense
of (T) against plausible objections to it is laid out.
In Chapters VII and VIII, the basic kinds of objections
to (T) based on the various historical positions in
American legal theory on legal rights and legal right-
holders are stated and defeated. Other objections are
stated in Chapter IX. The argument for (T) is reviewed
and brought together in the Conclusion, Chapter X.
The two-move strategy for defending (T) provided
in this dissertation may not dispel doubts one might have
about the desirability of, or justification for, giving
legal rights to natural objects, since it does not attempt
to show that one should give natural objects legal rights.
But it should dispel any reservations one might have about
the possibility or meaningfulness of ascribing legal rights
9to them within the American legal framework. Thus, the
defense of (T) should show that the position taken by
philosopher John Passmore in Man's Responsibility for
Nature is untenable:
The supposition that anything but a human
being has 'rights' is, or so I have suggested,
quite untenable.
^
It also should establish that the views of legal theorists
Hearn, Korkunov and Corbin, respectively, are incorrect:
...it is to men and not to things, whether





we have seen, only men who can be
to legal relations. 8
All jural relations are between persons,
either as individual or in groups. "Things"
do not have rights, and there is no "legal
relation" between a person and a thing.
By showing that it is neither absurd nor impossible to
give natural objects legal rights, this dissertation
renders unfounded any view which assumes otherwise.
CHAPTER I I
WHY GIVE NATURAL OBJECTS LEGAL RIGHTS?
Introduction
This dissertation is a defense of thesis (T) only.
It is not an attempt to show that one should give natural
objects legal rights, thesis (S)
.
Nonetheless, a brief
consideration of concerns which motivate the move to give
natural objects legal rights not only points to the
significance of establishing (T)
;
it also neatly puts into
focus how the issue "rights for natural objects" arises.
Moves to secure legal support for environmental
policy fall into two groups. One move involves giving
natural objects legal rights. I refer to it as "the
natural object move" or, simply, NOM. The other move does
not involve giving natural objects legal rights. I refer
to it as "a non-natural object move" or, simply, NONOM.
In this chapter I discuss those concerns which
have motivated or might motivate the natural object move,
NOM. Although many of these concerns also have motivated
or might motivate the alternative move, NONOM, no attention
is given to that move. Furthermore, no attempt is made
to discern whether any of the concerns motivating NOM
10
11
provides compelling grounds for granting natural objects
legal rights. As such, none of the arguments offered in
favor of NOM are assessed. The point of the discussion
simply is to outline the different sorts of answers
theorists do or might give to the question "Why give
natural objects legal rights?" and thereby to furnish an
effective backdrop for the main argument of the disser-
tation, viz., a defense of (T)
.
Concerns motivating NOM . Many concerns have motivated
NOM
—
prudential, economic, social (including psychologi-
cal, recreational and aesthetic concerns), religious,
moral, philosophical and legal concerns. Roughly, the
prudential and economic concerns focus on pollution and
resource depletion, the most visible target of environ-
mental policy. The others focus on broader issues, such
as the desirability of abandoning anthropocentric attitudes
toward the natural environment and the need for increased
understanding of biospherical relationships.
Prudential concerns . Prudential concerns implore
us to provide legal protection of the natural environment
so that future generations will have adequate resources
and natural areas for consumption. They call for "species
self-restraint" in resource allocation and use by appealing
12
to our self-interest, to "what's in it for us." In his
defense of NOM, Christopher Stone argues that
...the strongest case can be made from the
perspective of human advantage for conferring
rights on the environment.-^-
Thus, the concern that there be adequate protection of
natural objects now in order to guarantee their availabil-
ity and usefulness for future generations underlies NOM.
Economic concerns . Economic concerns are linked
closely to prudential concerns. Nearly all theorists
agree that legal regulation of resource use is necessary
to ensure future commodity production. Some argue that
legal means are necessary to help remedy important defects
in the allocation and valuation mechanisms of the market.
For example, it is argued that where pollution is an
"external diseconomy," i.e., a cost not included in an
industry's production costs and presently borne by indivi-
duals or groups in addition to those generating the
pollution, legal constraints on pollution activity are
needed to guarantee cost-internalization by producers.
Where non-economic or "social" costs (e.g., injury to
health imposed on individuals by pollution activity) are
incurred, legal devices are needed to guarantee that these
costs are weighed in the balancing of interests between
the injury ("cost") to individual plaintiffs and the
13
social utility ("benefit") of the production activity.
Such economic concerns have motivated NOM.
Defenders of NOM argue that costs to natural objects
themselves, and not merely costs to humans, should be
included in interest balancing and in damage calculations.
The rationale is that natural objects themselves are
injured by pollution and resource use activities. By
making natural objects legal right-holders, one provides
a legal means for natural objects to seek legal remedies
for damages to them, for injury to natural objects to be
taken into account in granting relief, and for the relief
awarded to benefit the natural objects directly. As we
shall see, these three legal-operational advantages of
awarding natural objects legal rights are the cornerstone
of Stone's argument that natural objects should have legal
rights
.
Social concerns . Various social concerns— inter-
related psychological, recreational and aesthetic con-
cerns—also have motivated NOM. Psychological concerns
focus on the untoward effects of unchecked environmental
degredation on humans. One view advanced is that the
presence of untamed nature is essential for our emotional
well-being. Sidney Wolinsky argues that a justification
for NOM might be based on the psychological concern that
14
"the world of nature may serve as an antidote to our
culture's most prevalent problem—alienation ." 3
One might frame other psychological concerns in
support of NOM along lines suggested by Kant and Bentham.
Kant argues that since cruelty to animals may induce in
us a callousness toward human suffering, we have a duty
not to be cruel to animals . 4 Bentham argues against
cruelty to animals on the grounds that animals are cap-
able of suffering . 5 Suppose it is desirable to discourage
callousness toward the suffering of animals by imposing
legal sanctions for cruelty to animals. One might argue
that the conferral of legal rights on at least some
natural objects (e.g., animals) is one effective way of
checking such abuse legally.
Many theorists have argued that humans need
places to walk, hike, canoe, fish, picnic and the like.
These social concerns underlie J. S. Mill's argument
against unlimited increase of population and wealth. In
his Principles of Political Economy Mill argues that
humans need, and ought to have, places of solitude in
"the presence and grandeur of natural beauty." The need
for, and desirability of preserving such places constitute
part of Mill's argument against unchecked population
expansion and economic growth.
15
Mill
' s concern is shared by contemporary theorists
who argue that the worth of natural objects as invaluable
sources of inspiration and as irreplacable aesthetic
wonders provides a reason for implementing NOM. For
instance, in his dissenting opinion in Sierra Club v.
Morton, Justice Douglas cites the need to protect "all the
aesthetic wonders of this beautiful land" from "the bull-
7dozers of progress" as a reason for supporting NOM.
Religious concerns . Several theorists base their
support of NOM on religious concerns. Some appeal to
the attitude that "nature is sacred" in their arguments
for making certain kinds of behavior toward natural
objects subject to legal, as well as moral, sanction.
Some call for "a new religion," "a new ethic," "a land
ethic," an ethic to replace the anthropocentric attitude
that humans have full rein to exploit nature's bounty at
will, in their support of NOM. For example, Christopher
Stone argues that by giving natural objects legal rights
a change in the view that nature exists only for humans
g
might be accomplished.
Ecosophic concerns . Arne Naess describes an
"ecosophy" as a "philosophy of ecological harmony and
equilibrium. Borrowing Naess's terminology, ecosophic
concerns are at the heart of the rationale for the National




purposes of this Act are: To declare a
national policy which will encourage productive
and enjoyable harmony between man and his
environment; to promote efforts which will
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment
and biosphere and stimulate the health and
welfare of man; to enrich the understanding
of the ecological systems and natural resources
important to the Nation; and to establish a
Council on Environmental Quality.
The function of the Council on Environmental Quality is to
guarantee that "presently unquantified environmental
amenities and values may be given appropriate considera-
tion in decision making."
Similar ecosophic concerns have led several
theorists to urge giving natural objects themselves the
legal rights to seek their own protection. For example,
in Sierra Club v. Morton, Justice Douglas cites the need
to "protect nature's ecological equilibrium" and to
ensure that all forms of life and all the values of an
ecological group are represented in environmental cases
as reasons why "environmental issues should be tendered
by the inanimate object itself. Justice Douglas goes
on to suggest two other ecosophic concerns motivating
NOM: the need to prevent the destruction of species we
know nothing about, and the need to increase our scienti-
fic understanding of the natural environment. His
illustration of the importance of these ecosophic con-
cerns to NOM is engaging:
17
A teaspoonful of living earth contains 5 million
bacteria, 20 million fungi, one million protozoa,
and 200,000 algae. No living human can predict
what vital miracles may be locked in this dab
of life, this stupendous reservoir of genetic
materials that have evolved continuously since
the dawn of the earth. For example, molds
have existed on the earth for about 2 billion
years. But only in this century did we unlock
the secret of the penicillins, tetracyclines,
and other antibiotics from the lowly molds,
and thus fashion the most powerful and effective
medicines ever discovered by man... When a
species is gone, it is gone forever. Nature's
genetic chain, billions of years in the making,
is broken for all time. 12
Moral and philosophical concerns . Moral and
philosophical concerns surface in connection with other
concerns motivating NOM. For example, underlying certain
prudential and economic concerns is the assumption that
present generations have a "duty to prosperity" to con-
serve natural resources. Bentham's injunction against
cruelty to animals rests on the assumption that it is
wrong to inflict unnecessary pain on beings capable of
suffering. Mill's argument against unlimited increase in
population and wealth is grounded in his famous "greatest
happiness principle." Some religious concerns are based
on the view that humans ought to revere all forms of life,
and some ecosophic concerns are based on the view that it
is wrong to destroy species. Arne Naess makes explicit
this link of ecosophic concerns to normative principles
when he states,
18
To the ecological field-worker, the equal right
to live and blossom is an intuitively clear and
obvious value axiom. Its restriction to humans
is an anthropocentrism with detrimental effects
upon the quality of humans themselves . 13
However
,
sometimes NOM is endorsed outright by
appeal to moral and philosophical principles. For example,
so-called "principles of diversity" (e.g., the principle
that it is better to maintain a multiplicity of life
forms than not) have been invoked to show that, e.g., a
species ought not be destroyed and that the moral and
legal onus always is, or should be, on humans who destroy
to justify their actions. Clarence Morris appeals to
such principles to show that a presumption in favor of
the natural, akin to the presumption of innocence in
criminal law, provides a reason for supposing that
14
natural objects should have legal rights.
Despite differences between the various moral and
philosophical concerns motivating NOM, a concern which
underlies each of them is that
There would have to be something a bit wrong
with a legal system freely given over to
questions like whether the shirts really were
burned at the laundry but which refuses to
allow a judge to determine whether the
society's most precious assets can be
destroyed forever.
Supporters of NOM argue that giving natural objects legal
rights is one way to insure their protection.
19
Legal concerns . The most complete account of why
natural objects should have legal rights is given by
Christopher Stone in Should Trees Have Standing ? Stone
identifies three specific legal-operational advantages
which legal right-holders have and natural objects, as
non-legal right-holders, lack:
They are, first, that the thing can institute
legal actions at its behest ; second, that in
determining the granting of legal relief, the
courts must take injury to it into account;
and, third, that relief must run to the
benefit of it
.
According to Stone, all three advantages
...go towards making a thing count jurally
—
to have a legally recognized worth and dignity
in its own right, and not merely to serve as a
means to benefit "us" (whoever the contemporary
group of right-holders may be ).!”7
Stone's illustration compares a society, S^, in which a
master can collect reduced chattel damages from someone
who has beaten his slave, with a society, S 2 , in which
the slave can institute the proceedings himself, for his
own recovery. Stone argues that though neither society
leaves wholly unprotected the slave's interests in not
being beaten, the slave has these three operationally
significant advantages in S 2 that it lacks in S^.
According to Stone, to say natural objects do not,
but ought to, have legal rights is to emphasize these
three legal-operational advantages which natural objects
20
lack but ought to have. Since in large part Stone's
argument for NOM turns on his discussion of these three
advantages, a few remarks on each are appropriate.
The advantage of allowing natural objects to
initiate legal actions on their own behalf involves giving
natural objects legal standing. 'Legal standing' refers
to a plaintiff's capacity to maintain legal action in a
particular instance. Usually "standing to sue" refers to
the capacity to sue where more than the plaintiff's own
interest is involved. Parties having legal standing may
invoke the judicial process to initiate suits, or to seek
review on the correctness of an official action, an
agency decision, or a court ruling.
A move to give natural objects legal standing has
certain legal advantages over moves to liberalize present
laws of standing which do not involve giving natural
objects any legal capacities as plaintiffs. First, it
provides a basis for saying that they have certain legal
rights, e.g., the rights to initiate suits, to seek re-
dress in their own behalf, to seek review of a court
ruling. Second, it provides a mechanism for ensuring
that natural objects receive certain benefits, e.g.,
legal awards in injunctive settlements. Third, it provides
a legal means for challenging environmental activity which
21
does not require showing "injury in fact" to human
interests, economic or otherwise.
The last point deserves elaboration. There are
three customary criteria for standing: the existence of a
genuine dispute, the assurance of adversariness
,
and a
conviction that the party whose standing is challenged
will adequately represent the interests he/she asserts. 18
However, often it has not been clear in environmental
litigation what conditions must be met for an environ-
mental plaintiff to have standing. At one time the
invasion of a "legally protected interest" was required. 18
But, in the important Data Processing Case (1970)
,
the
Supreme Court rejected the legal interest test and de-
clared a new, two-part test for standing: the plaintiff
must assert that "the challenged action caused him injury
in fact, economic or otherwise," and that "the interest
sought to be protected ... [is ] arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
20
constitutional guarantee in question." The Data Pro-
cessing case expanded the notion of "interests" to endorse
non-economic interests--aesthetic , recreational and con-
servational interests--as a sufficient basis for injury.
In Sierra Club v. Morton (1972) , the Supreme Court up-
held that non-economic interests could be the basis for
requisite injury, but it warned that "injury in fact
22
requires that the party seeking relief has suffered an
injury. Since the Sierra Club had not alleged that it or
its members had been injured personally, the court ruled
that the Club did not have standing. Like Justice Douglas,
Justice Blackman argued in his dissenting opinion that
the traditional concept of standing ought to be expanded
to enable an organization like the Sierra Club to litigate
21
environmental issues. Both suggest that the customary
three criteria of standing ought to be expanded to include
the fourth condition that the litigant be one who speaks
22knowingly for the environmental values he asserts.
The denial of standing has been a serious obstacle
to environmental plaintiffs seeking court relief. Some
theorists suggest that by giving natural objects them-
selves legal standing, a route is provided for bypassing
the often circuitous, cumbersome task of establishing
"injury in fact" to humans when the real issue at hand is
some injury to some natural objects.
The second legal advantage right-holders have that
non-right-holders lack is that recognition of injuries to
them are taken into account in adjudicating the merits of
a controversy. In environmental cases, typically only
injuries to identifiable humans are considered and bal-
anced. What is not included is any damage or "cost" to
23
natural objects themselves. By making natural objects
right-holders
, costs to natural objects would be
included in damage calculations. Stone argues that one
way to measure damage to natural objects is to calculate
the "costs of making the natural object whole." He
writes
,
The costs of making a forest whole, for example,
would include the costs of reseeding, repairing
watersheds, restocking wildlife—the sorts of
costs a Forest Service undergoes after a fire.
Making a polluted stream whole would include
the costs of restocking with fish, water-fowl,
and other animal and vegetable life, dredging,
washing out impurities, establishing natural
and/or artificial aerating agents, and so forth . 23
If "costs" or damages to natural objects are recognized,
then injury to them could be balance in granting legal
relief
.
The third legal advantage right-holders have is
that they are the beneficiaries of favorable judgments.
In the present system, if a plaintiff repairian wins a
damage suit for water pollution, cash benefits go to the
repairian. The decision whether or not to use the relief
to "clean up" the water is a matter left to the repairian.
In a legal system in which natural objects had legal
rights and were beneficiaries of favorable judgments, cash
awards would go to them, to repair damages to them or to
otherwise "benefit" them.
24
Underlying Stone's argument in favor of NOM is the
view that it simply is not the whole picture to construe
environmental problems as problems of human needs and
preferences only, and to construe environmental costs and
benefits as costs and benefits to humans only. In a legal
system which implemented NOM, one must address the ques-
tions "what is the cost to the environment itself?" "What
damages to it must be balanced?"
An altogether different legal concern motivating
NOM is that it is conceivable that environmental cases
could arise which properly are construed as involving only
natural objects, i.e., where no human activity, interest
or injury is involved, at least in any direct or legally
significant way. In such cases, the appropriate descrip-
tion of the legal situation would be that it concerns a
case and controversy between natural objects. Were the
legal machinery available for doing so, legal action
could be brought by one natural object against another.
For example, suppose that in some isolated place,
unoccupied by humans, an animal species A is threatened
with extinction because of the overpopulated presence of
animal species B, A's natural predator. Where previously
there had been a natural balance between them, there no
longer is one. Perhaps the present imbalance resulted
from prior human activity. Hunters may have killed a
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significant portion of the population of A though not of
B. In addition, suppose that there is no "injury in fact"
to any humans by the threatened existence of species A,
except perhaps the "remote" injury to humans incurred by
the possible extinction of the species. In the present
system, it is unlikely that favorable judgments for
animals of species A would be forthcoming. One reason for
this is that present court practice is to discourage
environmental litigation by parties only remotely injured,
by disallowing proof of damages to those parties. Parties
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must show "proximate cause." In our example, any humans
who brought suit as environmental plaintiffs would be
likely to fail this "proximate cause" test. It is an
example of a case where a "judgment of remoteness" is
likely
.
The legal situation would be quite different if
the animals of species A had some legal rights against
the animals of species B. The legal representatives of
animal of species A could initiate court action on their
behalf against the animals of species B. To borrow
Justice Douglas's phrase, they could "sue for their own
preservation." A favorable legal judgment in an injunc-
tive settlement could provide sufficient funds and human
energy to safeguard their survival.
This example raises many difficult issues. Who
26
are the legal representatives of the species? Is each
species to have a single representative, or is a single
agency to stand for all? Nonetheless, if plausible, it
illustrates that legal situations could arise where the
relevant environmental problem is, and correctly is con-
strued as being, between natural objects. The concern
that a legal means be available to handle such cases
might motivate NOM.
Another legal concern motivating NOM is that
giving natural objects legal rights could speed up the
process of preserving or protecting those objects. Suppose
an industry's activity threatens to pollute a river. By
giving natural objects legal rights, legal representatives
of the natural objects could bring suit against the in-
dustry based on considerations of actual or potential
injury to the river itself. This could be done in the
absence of any regulation enjoining such activity or of
any evidence of possible injury in fact to any humans.
Although administrative or legislative enactment might
eventually forestall such activity, ascription of legal
rights to natural objects could hasten the process.
Much is at stake by granting or refusing to grant
legal rights to natural objects. By conferring legal
rights on natural objects one plugs into a whole system of
rights which can be much more powerful and efficacious
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than anything which might be warranted by policy consider-
ations alone. For example, if a river has a right to seek
redress for damages to it caused by the presence of toxic
pollutants, then persons and institutions (industries,
agencies, courts, governments) may be required to spend
much time, energy and money to secure that right, e.g., by
cleaning up the river, constructing treatment facilities
to handle waste, or restocking the river with fish. Mere
considerations of social policy or of human interest may
justify only limited preventive measures.
Summary
Many concerns motivating NOM have been offered.
Each provides an explanation of how the issue "rights for
natural objects" arises and a reason why theorists have or
might argue for awarding legal rights to non-humans,
natural objects. No attempt has been made to assess these
reasons or to identify the disadvantages of giving natural
objects legal rights. Thus, the question whether one




LEGAL PERSONS AND LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES
Introduction
The argument of this dissertation is that ascrip-
tion of legal rights to natural objects is compatible with
American legal theory on legal rights, thesis (T) . To
establish (T) one must show that none of the prima facie
exhaustive positions on legal rights within the American
legal framework raises a successful objection to (T)
.
Although the positions on legal rights and legal right-
holders differ greatly, in many cases my argument in de-
fense of (T) makes essentially the same move. It is that
theorists cannot hold the positions they do and feel they
must hold regarding legal persons and legal representatives
and deny the possibility of ascribing legal rights to
natural objects. This move is straightforward. However,
in the context of law and in the case of natural objects,
it involves coming to terms with some knotty concepts,
principles and arguments. It requires considering in
detail each position on legal rights and legal right-
holders, and defeating a whole set of objections to (T)
based on them. Nonetheless, the purpose of chiseling away
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at the different positions is always the same, namely, to
show that attempts to exclude natural objects as possible
legal right-holders fail.
In this chapter I discuss the notions of a legal
person and a legal representative. I argue that there is
a reasonable, prima facie case for describing natural
objects as legal persons whose legal affairs could be
conducted by legal representatives. In the next chapter,
I discuss the notion of a legal fiction. I argue that no
noxious legal fiction is involved in describing natural
objects as legal persons. The arguments of these two
chapters lay the groundwork for arguments in succeeding
chapters that attempts to exclude natural objects as legal
right-holders are unsuccessful.
The Notion of a Legal Person
Traditional legal theory assumes that legal rights
and duties are ascribed to persons. But not all humans
always have been recognized by law as legal right-holders.
At different times women, racial minorities, children and
mentally incompetent persons have not been. Furthermore,
often entities other than individual humans have been
recognized as legal right-holders, e.g., corporations,
nation-states, churches, funds, trusts, idols. What, then,
is the legally relevant notion of a person according to
which all legal right-holders are "persons"?
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What is a legal person? In law and in legal theory, a
distinction is made between the notions of human person-
ality (or, a human or "natural" person) and legal
personality (or, a legal person) . Often this distinction
is put by saying that the expressions 'person' and
'personality' have both a philosophic sense or use and a
legal sense or use. In its philosophic sense or use,
'person' designates rational beings, moral agents,
"choosers." In its legal sense or use, 'person' desig-
nates entities or units which the law recognizes as having
legal rights and bound by legal duties. Setting aside
discussion of the concept of human personality, or the
philosophic view of persons, just what is the concept of
legal personality, or the legal view of persons?
The standard definition of a legal person is that
it is "a right and duty bearing unit," "the subject of
legal rights and duties." Some (e.g., F. K. von Savigny)
loosen this definition by defining a legal person as
simply the subject or bearer of a legal right. Others
(e.g., A. Kocourek) loosen the definition by defining a
legal person as a right or duty bearing unit, an entity to
which the law attributes a capacity for legal rights or
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duties. Some legal theorists offer expanded versions of
the standard definition. For example, T. E. Holland
defines a legal person as "such masses of property or
groups of human beings as are in the eyes of the law
capable of rights and liabilities, in other words, to
which the law gives a status." F. Pollock defines it as
"a subject of duties and rights which is represented by
4one or more natural persons." Nonetheless, the standard
view is that a legal person is the subject of legal rights
and legal duties.
Who or what can be a legal person? It is common to
classify legal persons in the following way : 5 (a) ordinary
individual humans, i.e., adult men and women with legally
sufficient mental capacities; (b) non-ordinary individual
humans, e.g., children, infants, mental incompetents; (c)
juristic persons, e.g., corporations, nation-states; (d)
animate non-humans, e.g., animals; (e) inanimate non-
humans, e.g., ships, idols. Legal persons fitting the
descriptions given at (a) and (b) are "natural persons;"




One important feature of the legal view of persons,
then, is that it admits that individual humans may be genuine
F. Pollock states the legal view succinctlypersons
.
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when he claims that in law, "a person is such not because
he is human, but because rights and duties are ascribed
to him. "
^
Legal persons as mere legal constructions
. Legal theorists
generally regard the notion of a legal person as a mere
juristic, technical notion. Hans Kelsen describes it as
"a juristic construction" which must be distinguished from
the notion of a physical or natural person. Kelsen argues
that it is a tautology that only legal persons exist within
the law. ^ G. W. Paton puts the same point slightly dif-
ferently :
Legal personality is a particular device by
which the law creates units to which it
ascribes certain powers ... legal personality
remains, in essence, merely a convenient
juristic device by which the problem of
organizing rights and duties is carried
out . ^
The notion of a legal person is an artificial creation of
the law, a convenient juristic device whereby entities are
created or recognized and to which the law ascribes
certain legal advantages and disadvantages.
To regard the notion of legal personality ulti-
mately as a technical legal construction is not to regard
it as a wholly contrived, novel or insignificant notion.
It is not a wholly contrived notion since in ordinary
speech, groups or units often are personified and treated
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as having a continuity and identity separate from that of
any particular individual members. For example, we speak
of property "belonging to the Club," of contracts "made
with the University," of actions "brought by the Govern-
ment." In common parlance, it is the Club, the University
or the Government, taken as a whole or unit, and not any
individual members thereof, which is said to own property,
make contracts, or bring and defend actions. They are the
entities or units to which rights and duties are attributed.
Where the law recognizes these units as legal persons, it
endows them with a definite legal capacity for exercising
and vindicating their rights, or for safeguarding their
property
.
Nor is the notion of legal personality the novel
development of an advanced, highly complex legal system.
In early Roman law, in the interval between the death of
the ancestor and the assumption of the inheritance by the
heir, the estate or "hereditas " of the deceased was
treated as a legal person. By personifying the estate,
the law provided a way to have the estate represented
during the time when no natural person actually owned the
estate. Similarly, in order to have some person who could
represent the claims of the public, Roman law created the
legal person the "fiscus" or "treasury." It was proper
legal talk to speak of property belonging to the estate
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and of money belonging to the public treasury. The case
is the same in modern law. It is proper to speak, e.g.
,
of contracts made with a firm, or of liabilities of a
corporation, where the rights and duties spoken of actually
are attributed to the firm or corporation and not to
members of the firm or corporation. The firm or corpora-
tion is the legal person in such cases.
Furthermore, the device of awarding legal person-
ality is an important juristic device, since it permits
the law to recognize and create legal right and duty
bearing units where the property and legal relations of
individual humans is not relevant or at issue. For
example, it permits recognition of municipal governments,
administrative offices, professional societies, religious
organizations and trading corporations as having legal
capacities and a continuous legal existence which are not
necessarily dependent upon the existence of any specific
human beings. Of course, many of the legal capacities of
these artificial persons differ from those of natural
persons. There are acts which artificial persons are
incapable of performing, or which the law does not recog-
nize as their having the capacity to perform, e.g., marry-
ing or authorizing a crime. Still, the device of ascribing
legal personality to entities or units is a helpful and
accepted legal instrument for handling the legally
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relevant affairs of non-humans.
What emerges as the most striking feature of the
notion of legal personality is that the existence of
natural persons is neither a test of legal personality,
nor a condition for ascribing legal personality. Since
the creation of legal persons always is a matter of
positive law and regulation, legal personality can be, and
has been, awarded to non-humans. The views of Paton,
Holland and W. Markby, respectively, emphasize this point:
It is socially and economically false, as well
as legally untrue, to say that only individual
men can be the bearers of legal rights. 10
An artificial person may, however, also
exist without being supported by any natural
persons. It may consist merely of a mass of
property, of rights and of duties, to which
the law chooses to give a fictitious unity
by treating it as a 1 universitas bonorum .
'
The most familiar example is a ' hereditas
'
^
before it has been accepted by the heir...
A juristic [legal] person is generally an
aggregate of real persons, but there is no
difficulty in creating an imaginary person
which does not contain any real person.-*- 2
The Notion of a Legal Representative
A legal person is a legal right and duty bearing
unit, created or recognized by law, to which the law
ascribes certain legal capacities. Given that some legal
persons are "artificial persons," how are their legal
affairs conducted? The answer is the same for all legal
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persons, natural as well as artificial persons. It is
always and only one or more natural persons who manage the
legal affairs of legal persons. These natural persons are
the legal person's legal representative or agent.
The doctrine of legal representation
. What I shall refer
to as "the doctrine of legal representation" is the
doctrine that a duly-appointed or authorized agent legally
is empowered to act in the name of, and on behalf of, the
legal person it represents, and thereby to secure or safe-
guard the property, legal rights or other legal relations
of the represented legal person. This agent is always a
natural person or persons. When the agent acts in the
name of, and on behalf of, the entity it represents, its
acts, within limits specified by law, are imputed to the
represented entity itself, and the rights secured or
safeguarded are the rights of the represented entity.
The legal representative or agent . Natural persons em-
ployed to do an act or acts for another are called
"agents." Usually, an agent is employed for the purpose
of bringing the employer into legal relation with a third
party. A general principle of agency is that the act
of an authorized legal agent done in the name of, and on
behalf of, another (the principal) has the same legal
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effects or results as if the principal had done the act.
This principle holds whether the principal is a natural or
an artificial person. Unless the legal conditions specify
otherwise, the principal is bound directly by the acts of
the agent. In general, if the agent acts within the
specified terms of its authority, he/she is not personally
liable for contracts made in the principal's name.
There are many forms of representation or agency.
A familiar one arises for purposes of business convenience.
Paton says of this form of agency,
An agent (in this sense) is one who acts as a
conduit pipe through which legal ralations
flow from his principal to another. Agency is
created by a juristic act by which one person
(the principal) gives to another (the agent)
the power to do something for and in the name
of the principal so as to bind the latter
directly . -*-4
The guardianship method of legal representation is
another form of agency. Legal guardians are appointed to
represent the wills of infants and to take effective steps
in safeguarding their property and wealth. In The Law of
Guardian and Ward , H. B. Taylor describes a guardian as
. . .a person to whom the law has entrusted the
custody and control of the person or estate,
or both, of an infant, whose youth, inexperience,
and mental weakness disqualify him from acting
for himself in the ordinary affairs of life.
Suits brought by and against infant wards are brought in
the name of the ward. The guardian is considered the
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"statutory agent of the ward."
In general, the guardianship method of legal
representation provides for the care, protection or super-
vision of persons and their property where the persons are
unable, for one reason or another, to manage their own
a^a ^-rs * addition to its use in the case of infants
and minors, the guardianship approach is used to handle
the legal affairs of "legal incompetents," natural persons
who are de jure unable to conduct their ordinary affairs.
Their incapacity may be by reason of old age, disease,
weakness of mind, or other cause ." 16 Courts are empowered
to appoint someone guardian (or, "conservator," "committee")
for legal incompetents.
Another form of agency is the trusteeship. Typi-
cally, a trustee is a natural person to whom property is
1
7
committed for the benefit of others. For example, when
a corporation becomes bankrupt, courts often appoint a
trustee to oversee the corporation's affairs and to report
on it to the court at the appropriate time.
Legal representatives for non-humans . Appeal to the
doctrine of legal representation explains how non-humans
can be said to act as legal right and duty bearing units.
Even theorists who suppose that having a will or having a
capacity to act is a necessary condition of having legal
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rights typically concede that it is a condition which non-
humans could be said to satisfy. As long as there is some
natural person empowered to act as legal agent for the non-
human legal person, the legal person is said to have a
will or to have a capacity to act.
The discussions of legal personality offered by
theorists J. C. Gray and W. Markby serve as illustrations
of this point. Gray argues that even though only humans
have real wills, "idiots," horses, steam tugs and corpor-
ations are or could be legal persons, having legal rights:
The step [of attributing a will to an entity]
is as hard to take and no harder, whether he,
she, or it be an idiot, a horse, a steam tug,
or a corporation. Neither the idiot, the
horse, the steam tug, nor the corporation has -
a real will; the first three no more than the
latter
.
Whether the thing to which the will is attributed is an
actual entity (e.g., a man, a ship, a dog) or a "juristic
entity" (e.g., a corporation), the entity attributed the
will is the legal right-holder.
Similarly, Markby argues that corporations satisfy
the condition of having the capacity to act insofar as
there is a legal representative to perform the acts of
the corporation it represents. He states,
This is so clear, that when a corporation is
created the capacity to act need not be
specially granted. So far as it is possible
that acts should be done through a representative
it will be presumed that a corporation may do
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those acts, provided that they are consistent
with the purposes for which the corporation
was created.
This account of the doctrine of legal representa-
tion suffices to show that there is nothing bizarre,
unusual or sneaky about speaking of legal representatives
making claims on behalf of, and in the name of, the
entities they represent. The doctrine provides a familiar,
accepted legal means for protecting, securing or gaining
recognition of rights for entities who/which are not
themselves capable of doing so. They may be incapable of
actually making demands because of their peculiar circum-
stances (e.g., infants and mental incompetents); or, they
may be legally ineligible to make demands or inititate
legal transactions (e.g., juveniles); or, they may be
recognized legally as empowered to make demands or conduct
legal affairs only through specifiable legal agents (e.g.,
corporations) . Whatever the reason for appointing a legal
representative for an entity, it is the represented entity
who/which is said to have the rights or duties in question.
Natural Objects as Legal Persons
Could natural objects be legal persons? Obviously,
a full defense of the claim that natural objects could be
legal persons requires showing that they could be said to
have legal rights and to bear legal duties. As such, that
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defense is possible only after the notions of a legal
and a legal duty, and the attendant notions of a
legal right-holder and a legal duty-bearer, are discussed.
Still
,
what has been said so far provides a prima facie
case for describing natural objects as legal persons.
First, legal persons are entities recognized or
created by positive law; they need not be moral persons,
rational agents or "choosers." Second, legal precedent
exists for recognizing non-humans as legal persons. Some
theorists suppose that these two features of the notion of
a legal person constitute sufficient grounds for awarding
legal personality to at least some natural objects. For
example, Paton writes,
[The law] says that certain things shall be
units for the purposes of the law, and that
these units shall possess the capacity of
being parties to the claim-duty and power-
liability relationship. It would be absurd,
but not impossible, for the law to award
2 qlegal personality to trees, sticks, or stones.
Paton cautions that the law must adapt the device of legal
personality to the nature of the recipient, whereby
differences between, e.g., natural persons, corporations
and natural objects would be taken into account. But he
concedes that natural objects could be legal persons.
Legal persons which are "artificial persons" can
perform legal transactions only through their legal
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representatives; they are not the sort of entity which,
under any circumstances, could make claims on their own
behalf. Appeal to the doctrine of legal representation,
then, provides both an explanation and a legal justifica-
tion for describing non-moral, non-rational entities as
genuine legal right-holders. Extension of that doctrine
to cover the case of natural objects would provide an
acceptable legal means for gaining recognition of natural
objects as legal right-holders.
Christopher Stone argues that the law should
appoint legal guardians for natural objects. If present
statutes fail to provide sufficient grounds for such a
move, he suggests enacting special environmental legisla-
21tion to permit the move. In his dissent in Sierra Club
v. Morton, Justice Douglas gives Stone's proposal serious
endorsement
:
Permitting a court to appoint a representative
of an inanimate object would not be significantly
different from customary judicial appointments
of guardians ad litem
,
executors, conservators,
receivers or counsel for indigents
.
Of course, to say that ascription of legal person-
ality to natural objects is plausible is not to say that
natural objects would or should be awarded the same legal
capacities as humans or as other artificial persons. Nor
is it to say that the rights of all natural objects would
or should be the same. The rights of communal natural
43
objects such as lakes may be very different from the
rights, if any, of natural objects on private land.
Furthermore, as with other legal persons, a natural
object's legal capacities for performing legal acts
through its legal representative would be limited by the
purposes for which its legal existence is recognized.
Recognition of some specific legal rights for natural
objects would not amount to a "no holes barred" position
on ascription of legal rights to them. The legal capa-
cities of natural objects may be much more limited than
those of humans, and may be different in some respects
from those of other artificial persons.
Despite differences between natural objects as
legal persons and other legal persons, presumably many of
the tasks of the appointed legal representatives of
natural objects would be the same as those of legal repre-
sentatives generally. These would include "protective
tasks," such as representing the natural objects at
administrative hearings on environmental quality standards,
"litigation tasks," such as bringing legal action on
behalf of the natural object, and "administrative tasks,"
such as overseeing any funds created in the name of the
natural objects, particularly where natural objects are
beneficiaries of monetary awards.
Determining whether the guardianship form or some
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other form of legal agency is best suited to the case of
natural objects involves solving many practical problems.
Who qualifies as a guardian for natural objects? What
procedures should be followed in applying for and creating
guardianships for natural objects? What criteria should
be used for determining when a natural object should be
recognized as a legal person? But such problems basically
are tactical ones. They bear on the question whether, and
if so, how, one should award legal personality to natural
objects. Solving them is not necessary to showing that
natural objects could be awarded legal personality. The
possibility of making natural objects legal persons rests
on showing that the notions of a legal person, a legal
representative, a legal right and a legal duty pose no
insurmountable obstacles. What has been said here provides
a prima facie case for that view.
Objections
There are three reasonable objections to describing
natural objects as legal persons. The first is that a
damaging legal fiction is involved in describing them as
legal persons. The second is that it is incompatible with
theories of legal rights and legal duties to so describe
them. The third is that the argument for so describing
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them rests on a faulty analogy between natural objects and
corporations. Since the first two objections are handled
in subsequent chapters, only the third is discussed here.
The third objection is that natural objects cannot
be legal persons because ascription of legal personality
to them mistakenly assumes a strict analogy between natur-
al objects and corporations. It seems to be a fairly
plausible objection. Is it telling against (T)
?
Suppose the argument for saying that natural
objects could be legal persons does assume an analogy
between corporations and natural objects. Does the
analogy fail? Certainly there are important differences
between corporations and natural objects. Corporations
are comprised of individual humans. They are created by
humans expressly for special purposes, which purposes
allegedly serve human interests. Unlike natural objects,
their very existence is presumed to be a matter of posi-
tive law and regulation. But there are also important
similarities between them. Neither corporations nor
natural objects are moral persons, rational agents, enti-
ties having an actual will or a capacity to act; they are
not themselves decision-makers, choosers, entities having
23
actual wants, desires or interests. Corporations are
presumed capable of performing acts, expressing a will or
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having interests just insofar as the acts, will, or
interests of their legal agents or of the individual humans
which comprise them are attributed to the corporation.
Furthermore, their capacity for performing legal acts is
restricted by the explicit purposes for which their legal
existence is recognized.
One might point out here that corporations and
individual humans are dissimilar in just these respects.
Humans are moral persons, rational agents, decision-
makers, choosers; they are carriers of actual wants,
desires and interests. Unlike corporations, individual
humans have an independent capacity to act. Still, both
humans and corporations are or can be legal persons. Thus,
while there are these important differences between corpor-
ations and individual humans, they do not suffice for
withholding ascription of legal personality to corporations,
while awarding legal personality to humans. Stated differ-
ently, with regard to the question of who or what can be a
legal person, they are not legally relevant differences.
The case of natural objects is like that of cor-
porations in this respect. Like corporations, and unlike
individual humans, natural objects are not, or typically
are not considered to be, moral persons, rational agents,
choosers. But this alone does not establish that they
cannot be legal persons.
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Suppose the objection is that, on the balance, the
legally relevant dissimilarities between corporations and
natural objects outweigh the legally relevant similar-
24lties. In order to provide the strongest possible case
against (T)
,
suppose this is true. Does this show that
natural objects cannot be legal persons?
I think not, for several reasons. For one thing,
ultimately the argument provided in this dissertation for
saying that natural objects could be legal persons does
not rest simply on a presumed analogy between natural
objects and corporations. It involves two quite distinct
arguments. The first, already laid out, is that commonly
accepted legal theory on the notions of a legal person and
a legal representative permits the description of natural
objects as possible legal persons. Since funds, idols and
ships may be or have been legal persons, use of the
example of corporations is an instructive, though not the
only, illustration of non-human legal persons. The second
argument, laid out in subsequent chapters, is that it is
compatible with American legal theory on legal rights (and
legal right-holders) and legal duties (and legal duty-
bearers) to describe natural objects as legal right and
duty bearing units, i.e., as legal persons. Taken together,
these two arguments constitute the case for saying that
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natural objects could be legal persons. Thus, although
the analogy to corporations may be helpful, the case for
describing natural objects as legal persons does not stand
or fall on it.
For another thing, even the most significant
snence between corporations and natural objects does
not constitute sufficient grounds for withholding ascrip-
tion of legal personality to natural objects. This
difference is that corporations are comprised of individual
humans. It would constitute sufficient grounds only if it
were true, or accepted as true, that only humans and
aggregates of humans could be legal persons. Indeed, this
view has been advocated. In a series of articles on the
juristic person, G. T. Deiser argues that "personality is
an attribute of humans or of groups of humans acting as a
unit for the attainment of a common end." For Deiser,
yc
the juristic person is "the collective will of the group."
But, Deiser' s view contrasts markedly with the favored
view that other than individual humans and groups of
humans can be legal persons. Paton argues that animals
27have been legal persons in some systems. Gray argues
2 8
outright that animals can be legal persons. 0. W.
Holmes grants that ships in admiralty could sue and be
2 Q
sued. J. Austin argues that there have been cases where
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land "is erected into a legal or fictitious person . 1,30
The commonly accepted view, then, is that a legal person
need not be an individual human or a group of individual
humans. Thus, even if there is this difference between
natural objects and corporations, it is not a difference
which determines whether or not natural objects can be
legal persons.
Granting that one important feature of corporations
is that they are created to serve human purposes, does
this generate a legally significant difference between
them and natural objects? The usefulness of natural
objects for human purposes is a given. Making natural
objects legal persons need not affect their general use-
fulness to humans for economic or non-economic activities.
A river may be awarded rights against industrial polluters
yet have only limited rights against canoeists. A forest
may have specific rights against lumber companies, e.g.,
the right to receive some form of compensation for
lumbering activities, without having a right to disallow
all lumbering whatsoever. A private landowner may have a
right to cut down trees on his/her property even though
some trees (or a stand of trees) not on privately owned
property have rights against being cut down. The point is
that the use of natural objects may continue to serve
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human purposes even though some natural objects have legal
right-holder status.
Thus, even if one assumes that there are some
legally relevant differences between natural objects and
corporations, this does not show that natural objects
cannot be legal persons. Furthermore, the argument for
saying that natural objects could be legal persons does
not depend on a strict analogy between them and corpora-
tions. For these reasons, the objection to describing
natural objects as legal persons misses its mark.
Summary
It has been argued that the objection that natural
objects cannot be legal persons because they are not like
corporations fails on three counts. First, it assumes
incorrectly that the case for so describing natural objects
rests on a strict analogy between natural objects and
corporations. Second, even if there are legally relevant
differences between natural objects and corporations,
these differences do not establish that natural objects
cannot be legal persons. Third, there are important,
legally significant, similarities between natural objects
and corporations.
The discussion of the notions of legal personality
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and legal representation in this chapter sets up the
argument, made repeatedly throughout the dissertation,
that theorists cannot hold the positions they do hold
regarding these notions and deny the possibility of
awarding legal personality to natural objects. Therefore,
it provides a pr ima facie case for describing natural
objects as legal persons.
CHAPTER I V
LEGAL FICTIONS
In all fields of law, lawyers and legal theorists
roake statements they know or assume are false but which,
stated as pretenses or conceits, have an undeniable utility.
For example, often it is said that "the plaintiff -is deemed
to have knowledge of the law" when, clearly and in fact,
he/she does not, or that "the grantee of a gift is presumed
to have accepted the gift" when it is evident he/she has
not. These statements are called "fictions."
In this chapter I discuss the notion of a legal
fiction. I then argue against a rather powerful objection
to (T)
,
what I call "the Legal Fiction Objection." I
conclude that even if ascription of legal rights to natu-
ral objects is or involves a legal fiction, it is or
involves one which is not damaging to the case for (T) .
The Notion of a Legal Fiction
Much has been written about the legal fiction.
Perhaps the single, most comprehensive account of legal
fictions is given by Lon Fuller in his book Legal Fictions
There Fuller discusses the notion of a fiction, the motives
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which give rise to the legal fiction, and the indispensa-
bility of fictions in law. Citing a wide range of opinions
and providing helpful examples from the sciences and philo-
sophy, as well as from law. Fuller provides a well-docu-
mented account of the legal fiction. The discussion of
the legal fiction provided here is largely a compendium of
Fuller s views, insofar as those views are relevant to the
defense of (T)
.
No attempt is made to assess the particu-
2lar details of Fuller's account.
What is a legal fiction? In Legal Fictions
,
Fuller defines
a legal fiction as follows:
A fiction is either (1) a statement propounded
with a complete or partial consciousness of its
falsity, or (2) a false statement recognized as
having utility.
3
Fuller distinguishes a fiction from a true statement, a
lie and an erroneous conclusion. A statement which is
literally true, or which the author believes to be true,
is not a fiction. A fiction is not intended to deceive
and, hence, is not a lie. Since a fiction is adopted by
its author with at least partial knowledge of its falsity,
it is not an erroneous conclusion. A fiction is an expe-
dient but "consciously false" assumption.
According to Fuller, in actions of trover, a state-
ment alleging that a defendant found a chattel which he/
she actually took by force is a fiction. So, too, in
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actions arising under the "attractive nuissance doctrine,"
the statement that a defendant invited children to visit
his/her premises when he actually was ignorant of their
presence and activities is a fiction. ^ They are literally
false statements which treat certain facts as present (e.g.,
that a defendant found a chattel or invited children onto
his/her premises) when, in fact, they are not present.
The form of the legal fiction
. The ordinary legal fiction
construes a fact or event A as present when it is not. It
has two forms, the "assumptive" and the "assertive" forms.
The "assumptive" or "as if" form is the construction that
event or fact A is treated as if it were B when, in fact,
it is not B. For example, a typical description of juris-
tic persons (e.g., corporations) is that the law treats
them as if they had wills of their own, or as if they had
an independent capacity to act, when, in fact, they do not.
The acts of a corporation's legal representatives are
treated as if they were the will of the corporation itself,
when, in fact, they are not. The "assertive" or "is" form
of the fiction is the construction that event or fact A is
B when, in fact, it is not B. This is the form used when
the description of the corporation is simply that it has a
will or a capacity to act. Here, the view is not that
corporations actually have human wills or have an indepen-
dent capacity to act, but that a will or capacity to act
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has been attributed to them.
The distinction between these two forms of the fic-
tion is a structural or grammatical one. it makes no sub-
stantive difference whether a fiction is of the assumptive
or the assertive form.
Generally the pretenses involved in legal fictions
are about non-legal facts and events which are regarded as
having legal consequences. An illustration is from what
Fuller calls probably the boldest fiction to be found in
modern law—the 'attractive nuissance doctrine'." 5 A land-
owner generally is liable for failure to use due care to-
ward 'invitees," those whom he/she has permitted, expressly
or impliedly, to come on his/her land. A landowner owes
no duty to "trespassers." This fact is stated by saying
that a landowner has a duty of care to "invitees," though
not to "trespassers." Where a court decides that a defen-
dant "is deemed to have invited" a plaintiff to use his/
her premises, even though the defendant may be ignorant of
the plaintiff's presence, it treats the plaintiff as an
"invitee" rather than as a trespasser. Here a pretense is
made concerning the actual facts and events, making the
defendant liable for failure to use due care.
Could there be pretenses about legal relations,
e.g., about legal rights and legal duties? Could statements
about them be legal fictions? Fuller's answer is fairly
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clear. If, when treated by the courts, an alleged (or,
’pretended," "assumed") legal right or legal duty actually
is enforced, then it is a real right or duty. Stated in
general terms, "a legal relation, accurately described and
actually enforced
,
cannot with utility, be regarded as a
fiction . "
^
Suppose a legal representative, Brown, signs a con-
tract in the name of the Starship Corporation, according to
which Smith owes the corporation $1,000 for services ren-
dered. If, on action brought by the corporation against
Smith, a court upholds the corporation's claim to $1,000,
then the corporation has a legal right against Smith and
Smith has a legal duty to the corporation. If the state-
ment 'Smith owes the Starship Corporation $1,000' accur-
ately describes the legal situation, and if the courts
actually enforce the corporation's right to receive $1,000
from Smith, then the statement is not a fiction. However,
if the statement fails to describe accurately the situation
(e.g., if the acts performed by Brown were performed in an
unofficial capacity) and courts fail to recognize the cor-
poration as right-holder, then the statement is false. Ac-
cording to Fuller, some such false statements deserve to be
called fictions, viz., those which are misleading or inac-
curate descriptions of legal relations.
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The purposes for which legal fictions are used . Fuller
discusses the purposes or functions of the legal fiction in
terms of the motives from which they proceed. The general
purpose of any legal fiction is "to reconcile a specific
legal result with some premise or postulate ." 7 According
to Fuller, the legal fiction of corporate personality basi-
cally is intended to preserve the premise that only persons
can have legal rights. The legal result of allocating
legal capacities to corporations is reconciled with that
premise by treating corporations, for certain purposes, as
if they were natural persons.
Sometimes the use of a legal fiction is aimed at
escaping the consequences of a specific legal rule.^ In
attractive nuissance doctrine, the rule that landowners
have no duty to use care toward trespassers is circumvented
by adopting the fiction that a plaintiff was invited onto
the landowner's property.
A legal fiction may have a persuasive or an exposi-
tory function. The "persuasive" or "emotive" function is
intended to induce a conviction that a given legal result
is appropriate, desirable or just. The "expository" or
"descriptive" function is intended as a "convenient short-
hand, " describing in fictitious terms a legal situation
which allegedly could be described, however awkwardly, in
non-f ictitious terms. In some cases, a fiction may waiver
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between a purely expository and a purely persuasive func-
tion. A fiction which was intended originally to persuade
may be retained for its expository function.
One way to distinguish between the persuasive and
expository functions of fictions is in terms of whether or
not changes have occurred in the meaning of the relevant
expressions used in the fiction. With persuasive fictions,
the linguistic change has not occurred; with expository
fictions, it almost always has occurred. Since "finding"
does not mean "taking," and "inviting" does not mean "at-
tracting, the fictions that a defendant is presumed to
have found, or is deemed to have invited, a plaintiff are
persuasive fictions.
Types of legal fictions
. Fuller discusses two basic types
of fictions, the "historical" and the "non-historical
"
fictions. He describes these, just as he describes the
functions or purposes of fictions, in terms of the motives
from which they arise.
The "historical" or "creative" fiction is intended
to introduce a change into the law. Its function basically
is persuasive. Fuller gives four specific motives from
9
which it arises, only one of which is discussed here. It
is what Fuller calls "the motive of intellectual consider-
ations." In a particular case, often a judge or legislator
may want to introduce a change or reform into the law
59
and yet feel unable to explain the principle or concept on
which the change is based in non— fictitious terms.
Fuller’s example of an historical fiction adopted
because of intellectual considerations again is from at-
tractive nuissance doctrine. Suppose a young girl is in-
jured while playing on a turntable maintained by a railway
on an unfenced lot. A suit is brought on her behalf a-
gainst the railway. Is the railway legally responsible
for the injury? For any number of reasons, the presiding
judge may feel the case is more like that of the "invitee"
than that of the trespasser, even though, in Fuller's
words, "it is clear that this child was legally a ’tres-
passer'." On what principle should the judge's opinion
be based? The judge may be unable to settle on a clear
principle stated in non-fictitious terms. Instead, the
judge may state simply that the defendant is deemed to
have invited the plaintiff onto the land. The judge's in-
tent is not to conceal the fact that he/she is making law;
nor is it to prevent discommoding current notions. The
judge simply may know no other personally acceptable way
to resolve the case. According to Fuller, this is an exam-
ple of an historical fiction adopted out of intellectual
considerations. It illustrates how a new situation is
made "thinkable" by converting it into familiar terms.
Unlike the historical fiction, the "non-historical
"
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or abbreviatory " fiction is not adopted in order to intro-
duce a change into the law. Sometimes it is adopted for
purposes of expounding already existent doctrine; sometimes
it is adopted as a vestige of an earlier historical fiction
which retains its expository function. in either case, its
function basically is expository. They are called "abbre-
viatory fictions" because their general purpose is "to
inconvenient circumlocution" which would be necessary
if the fiction were abandoned. 11
Fuller's example of a non-historical or abbrevia-
tory fiction concerns the legal capacities of ships. In
several court cases, legal proceedings against ships have
been construed as proceedings "against the vessel for an
offense committed by the vessel." Citing the following
quote from Justice Holmes, Fuller attributes to Holmes an
appreciation of the function of the abbreviatory fiction:
A ship is not a person. It cannot do a wrong or
make a contract. To say that a ship has committed
a tort is merely a shorthand way of saying that
you have decided to deal with it as if it had
committed one, because some man has committed
one in fact... The contrary view would indicate
that you really believed the fiction that a
vessel had an independent personality as a
fact behind the law. 13
By treating the ship as if it were a person, one can speak
of offenses "committed by the ship," even though, properly
speaking, it is natural persons who actually have committed
the offenses. Presumably (Fuller is not clear here) the
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abbreviatory fiction is treating the ship as a person, cap-
able of committing a tort. Use of the fiction dispenses
with the need "for a lengthy repetition of the legal conse-
quences" of natural persons committing torts. 14 Presum-




Live and dead fictions . According to Fuller, there are
live and dead fictions. He writes:
A fiction dies when a compensatory change takes
place in the meaning of the words or phrases
involved, which operates to bridge the gap that
previously existed between the fiction and the
reality. 1°
In a live fiction, this change in the meaning of key ex-
pressions in a fiction has not occurred.
One way to test whether a fiction is alive or dead
is to determine whether or not the relevant statement in-
volves a pretense. Live fictions, unlike dead ones, still
contain the element of pretense. If, when correctly for-
mulated, a statement is of the form 'A is legally treated
as if it were B' when, in fact, A is not B, the fiction is
live; if, when correctly formulated, a statement is of the
form 'A is B' or 'In a technical legal sense, 'A is B,' then the
fiction is dead. To use one of Fuller's examples, in the
action of trover, if "taking" just meant "finding" in some
technical legal sense, then, where a defendant takes a
chattel by force, the statement 'The defendant found the
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chattel' would be a dead fiction. Since 'finding' does not
(yet) mean "taking," the statement remains a live fiction.
According to Fuller, the death of a fiction is a
process which is going on all the time. it is the process
whereby a change in the meaning of key expressions in-
volved in the fiction occurs; the expressions acquire a new,
non-f ictional meaning. This process is not confined to
the law. It takes place "in the whole of our language ." 17
It occurs wherever metaphorical language is used. In
ordinary language or in literature, some metaphors are
alive (i.e., are used and accepted with an awareness that
they are substitutes for their literal equivalents) ;
others are dead (i.e., have been used so often that they
are used and accepted without awareness that the words
used are not literal) . As such, diminution of the fiction
from law often means only substituting dead metaphors
- , . 18for live ones.
Recall that Fuller describes the "non-historical
"
and "historical" fictions in terms of the motives from
which they arise. The non-historical fiction basically
has an expository function, and typically is adopted for
purposes of expounding existent legal doctrine. The his-
torical fiction basically has a persuasive or emotive
function, and is adopted in order to introduce a change
into the law. These two basic types of fictions also could
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be described in terms of the purpose of any metaphors in-
their use . Metaphors may be used for their ex-
pository purpose only, as "convenient shorthand" for what
might be expressed, however cumbersomely
,
in literal terms,
as a plain statement of fact. Metaphors also may be used
for the sake of their emotive powers only; their function
is persuasive. Any metaphor involved in the non-histori-
ca l fiction basically has an expository function, while
any metaphor involved in the historical fiction basically
has an emotive or persuasive function.
According to Fuller, use of metaphors having
emotive power is desirable. Their use helps
...to keep the form of the law persuasive.
Metaphor is a traditional device of persuasion.
Eliminate metaphor from the law and you have
reduced its power to convince and convert. ^
In particular, use of metaphor as a persuasive device be-
fits the historical or "creative" fiction; it is a fiction
intended to induce a conviction that a given legal result
is desirable or just.
This discussion suggests that fictions are not
simply false statements; rather, they are literally false
statements. Fuller actually concedes this when he states
that "a fiction is frequently a metaphorical way of ex-
pressing a truth." His discussion of the types and
functions of legal fictions is further evidence that he
thinks fictions often are true statements, on a
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metaphorical or figurative reading. Thus, it seems fit-
ting to construe Fuller as maintaining that legal fictions
are literally false statements, and not, simply, false
statements, as he suggests initially.
Is the use of legal fictions inevitable, desirable, or
justified ? Fuller argues that there are two distinct
methods for accomplishing a wholesale elimination of fic—
tion from the law, "rejection" and "redefinition." A
fiction is rejected when its use is discarded entirely,
e.g., by a statute or court decision declaring that hence-
forth certain actions shall be allowed without the allega-
tions which formerly involved making pretenses.
Suppose corporate personality is (still) a legal
fiction. The fiction could be eliminated in either of
two ways. It could be rejected by a ruling that, hence-
forth, actions brought by corporations shall be allowed
without the pretense of corporate personality. Or, it could be
redefined if a change in the meaning of 'person' occurred
such that, in a technical legal sense, the meaning of
'person' includes the designation of other than individual
human beings as persons. Both methods provide a way of
eliminating the fiction of corporate personality. Stated
differently, both would make the fiction of corporate
personality a dead fiction.
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Fuller argues that it is neither possible nor de-
sirable to eliminate fictions from law by a wholesale pro-
cess of rejection or redefinition. He grants that it is
conceivable that fictions could be redefined so that state-
ments of the form 'A is B' are substituted for statements
of the form 'A is treated as if it were B.' But he argues
that
...such a wholesale process of redefinition could
not be carried out. One cannot introduce sweeping
changes in linguistic usage by an arbitrary fiat;
. . .And even if it were possible, the proposal
ought not to be carried out because it would only
result in encumbering the language of the law
with a grotesque assemblage of technical concepts
lacking the slightest utility. 21
His verdict is the same for the proposal to reject all
legal fictions:
This is also impossible, and inadvisable if it
were possible. It is inadvisable because to
reject all of our fictions would be to put legal
terminology in a straight jacket--f ictions are,
to a certain extent, simply the growing pains
of the language of the law. It is impossible
because fiction, in the sense of a "strained
use of old linguistic material," is an inevi-
table accompaniment of progress in the law
itself and this progress can scarcely be ex-
pected to wait out of deference for the tastes
of those who experience an unpleasant sensation
at the sight of words browsing beyond their
traditional pastures. ^2
By fitting new law into existent legal categories, by pro-
ceeding analogically from old cases to new cases, use of
the legal fiction helps to account for and facilitate what
legal theorists often call "the growth of the law." To
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discard them all would be "to put legal terminology into a
straight jacket " and prevent that growth. The proper solu-
tion, according to Fuller, is to reject some and redefine
others
.
If the use of legal fictions is inevitable and
desirable, how is it justified? For many legal theorists
that use of the legal fiction is expedient and necessary
for the growth of the law is sufficient justification. For
example, Jhering writes:
. . .the fiction can have a certain justification
as the first step toward the mastery of a new
thought, in a situation of theoretic necessity.
Better order and easy mobility with the fiction,
than disorder and stagnation without it! 22
It is easy to say, 'Fictions are makeshifts,
crutches to which science ought not to resort.'
So soon as science can get along without them,
certainly not! But it is better that science
should go on crutches than to slip without them,
or not to venture to move at all. 2 ^
However, Fuller's account is different. He locates the
justification for using legal fictions in social and econo-
mic policy considerations:
A doctrine that is plainly fictitious must seek
its justification in considerations of social
and economic policy; a doctrine that is non-
fictitious often has a spurious self-evidence
about it. 2 5
If legal fictions are here to stay, is there any
precept or test for their proper use? Fuller's answer is
by way of a quote from Vaihinger: " The fiction must drop
2 6
out of the final reckoning." The dropping of the fiction
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amounts to a rejection or redefinition of a legal fiction.
Likened to a scaffolding, Fuller describes a fiction as a
helpful, necessary device ensuring the growth of the law
which, ultimately, must be removed
.
27
While at any time
use of a particular fiction may be unavoidable, desirable
and justified, its proper use requires recognition that,
ultimately, it could be eliminated.
Summary
. To review, a fiction is a literally false state-
ment which either has a certain utility, or is propounded
with awareness of its falsity. Fictions may be stated in
assertive or assumptive form. They may be live or
dead. Their function may be persuasive or expository. In
general, the purpose of the legal fiction is to reconcile
a legal result with some premise. In particular, the pur-
pose of the historical fiction is to introduce some change
into the law; the purposes of the non-histor ical fiction
are to expound an already existent legal doctrine, or to
avoid an inconvenient circumlocution. The historical legal
fiction proceeding from intellectual considerations attempts
to make new law "thinkable" by converting it into familiar
terms. The use of the legal fiction is considered neces-
sary, desirable and justified.
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The Legal Fiction Objection to (T)
The Legal Fiction Objection to (T) is that (T) is
false because the statement that natural objects have or
could have legal rights either is itself a legal fiction or
involves a legal fiction. In this section I show that if
there is a legal fiction involved in ascribing legal rights
to natural objects, the argument for (T) is not damaged by
it.
Suppose, as one disjunct of the objection claims,
it is a legal fiction to say that natural objects have or
could have legal rights. What does this mean?
One interpretation of the claim is that there are
no such things as rights, and, hence, no such things as
rights which natural objects could be said to have. The
fiction is treating rights as if they were real things,
when they are not. The pretense involved in the legal
fiction is about the legal rights attributed to natural
objects, and not about the non-legal facts and events which
give rise to those rights.
However, if this is all that is meant by saying
that the statement 'Natural objects have or could have
legal rights' is a legal fiction, the case for (T) is se-
cure. It amounts to saying that the case for ascribing
rights to natural objects is no better, but no worse, off
than a case for ascribing legal rights to any entity
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whatsoever. It generates no objection to (T) in particular.
Furthermore, it conflicts with the widely accepted view
that there are non-f ictitious legal rights, viz., those
which courts actually enforce. Finally, it departs from
the standard view that the pretenses involved in legal fic-
tions concern non-legal facts and events. For these three
reasons, the first interpretation of the claim that it is a
legal fiction to ascribe legal rights to natural objects
does not pose any reasonable objection to (T)
.
A second interpretation of the claim that it is a
legal fiction to ascribe legal rights to natural objects is
more likely. It is that ascription of legal rights to
natural objects is merely a convenient shorthand for des-
cribing a legal situation which, when filled out properly,
describes some humans as having the rights at issue. This
interpretation could be expanded along either of two lines,
one suggested by Fuller and one suggested by Markby. The
line suggested by Fuller is that the fiction is an "abbre-
viatory fiction." Like the fiction of the personality of
ships, it is a shorthand way of saying that the law treats
natural objects as if they had legal rights when, in fact,
they do not. The pretense involved is the assumption that
natural objects themselves have or could have legal rights;
it is actually only humans who have or could have legal
rights. The line suggested by Markby is that the
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description of natural objects as legal right-holders is
figurative language only; it fails to describe the legal
situation accurately. The rights spoken of as "belonging
to natural objects" really attach to natural persons who
successively are owners of the natural objects, or who have
a legally recognized interest in them.
Is this interpretation of the first Legal Fiction
Objection disjunct, whether along the lines suggested by
Fuller or those suggested by Markby, damaging to (T) ? I
think not. Consider the Markby line first. In his discus-
sion of an estate which is held liable for a debt, Markby
makes clear what it is to describe the legal situation
figuratively or literally. The language is figurative if
the statement that the estate is liable is intended to as-
sert and define the liability of any natural persons who
successively are owners of the estate. There is no legal
person "the estate" to which the liability attaches. The
language is literal if the statement is intended to iden-
tify the status of the estate itself as a legal right or
duty bearing unit. There is a legal person "the estate" to
which the liability attaches. By allowing that an estate
may be a legal right-holder, Markby allows that not all
talk of legal rights for non-humans is mere figurative
language. Thus, on the Markby view, one can speak liter-
ally and correctly of legal rights for non-humans.
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The line suggested by Fuller is that the statement
Natural objects have or could have legal rights' is an
abbreviatory or non-historical fiction. Recall that the
non-his tor ical fiction, unlike the historical fiction, is
not used to introduce a change into the law. Typically,
it is used to expand existent doctrine in terms which,
however awkwardly, could be stated in non-f ictitious lan-
guage. But, if the personality of natural objects is a
legal fiction, it is an historical legal fiction. Its
adoption would be intended to reform the law such that nat-
ural objects could be recognized as legal right-holders.
Thus, according to Fuller's account of abbreviatory fic-
tions, it is false that the statement 'Natural objects
have or could have legal rights ' is an abbreviatory fic-
tion; it is not a "convenient shorthand" for describing an
existent legal situation.
What about the other Legal Fiction Objection claim,
viz., that ascription of legal rights to natural objects
involves a legal fiction? Is it damaging to (T) ?
Recall that, according to Fuller, the general pur-
pose of any legal fiction is to reconcile a specific legal
result with some premise. The legal fiction of corporate
personality was (is) intended to reconcile ascription of
legal rights to corporations with the premise that only
"persons" can have legal rights. Presumably, the legal
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fiction involved in ascription of legal rights to natural
objects would be treating them as if they were humans,
natural persons, when they are not. if any pretense is
involved, it is to reconcile ascription of legal rights to
non-humans with the assumption that only persons can have
legal rights. I shall call the alleged fiction of the
personality of natural objects the "fiction of environmen-
tal personality.
"
Suppose, then, that ascription of legal rights to
natural objects involves the fiction of environmental per-
sonality. Still, this does not furnish an argument against
(T)
.
The five point discussion which follows shows that
what is involved in saying that environmental personality
is a legal fiction is compatible with accepted legal theory
on the nature, purposes and justification for correctly
using legal fictions. It shows that, even if there is a
legal fiction involved in ascription of legal rights to
natural objects, the case for (T) is not damaged by it.
First, a legal fiction is a literally false state-
ment, either propounded with awareness of its falsity, or
recognized as having a certain utility. The statement that
natural objects are humans, natural persons, is false, known
to be false and not propounded with the intention of de-
ceiving anyone into thinking otherwise. Its utility is
that its adoption would permit one to construe natural
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objects as having certain legal capacities. Thus, there
is nothing unusual about describing the personality of nat-
ural objects as a legal fiction.
Second, the function of the alleged fiction of
environmental personality basically is persuasive, viz.
,
to convince that ascription of legal rights (or of legal
capacities generally) to natural objects is appropriate,
desirable or just. Its function is neither to describe
an existent legal situation, nor to provide a convenient
shorthand for delimiting the rights of humans. Thus, its
function is not expository. The persuasive function of the
fiction of environmental personality is an instance of a
legitimate and important function of legal fictions. Its
use is consistent with accepted purposes for proper use
of legal fictions.
It is important to note that while the fiction of
environmental personality may contain or imply the liter-
ally false proposition that natural objects are humans
(natural persons)
,
it does not follow straightway that
natural objects cannot have legal rights. This is because
it is not a necessary condition of having rights that an
entity is an individual human (a natural person) . Further-
more, the fiction of environmental personality does not
by itself imply the proposition that natural objects can-
not be legal persons. In fact, the main reason to adopt
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the legal fiction of environmental personality would be to
award natural objects legal personality. Thus, while it
may be literally false that natural objects are persons
(i.e., humans, natural persons)
,
I hope to show that it is
literally true that natural objects can be legal persons.
Use of the fiction of environmental personality may be
construed as a metaphorical or figurative expression of
a truth, viz.
,




Third, the fiction of environmental personality is
an example of an important kind of fiction, viz., the
"historical" or "creative" fiction. Since historical fic-
tions are intended to introduce a change into the law,
there is nothing objectionable about invoking the fiction
of environmental personality for that purpose.
The adoption of the fiction of environmental per-
sonality most likely would proceed from what Fuller calls
"motives of intellectual considerations." A judge or
legislator may want to award certain legal rights to nat-
ural objects yet be hard-pressed to base a decision to do
so on any principle stated in non-fictitious terms. The
judge or legislator may assert simply that, for certain
purposes, the law deems natural objects to be persons, or
treats them as if they were persons, when they are not.
Like other historical fictions proceeding from intellectual
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considerations, adoption of the fiction of environmental
personality would allow a new legal situation to be made
thinkable by construing it in familiar terms.
In Should Trees Have Standing ? Christopher Stone
points out that it once was unthinkable to construe corpor-
ate bodies (e.g., the church, the state, modern corpora-
tions) as persons. So, too, it may seem unthinkable to
construe natural objects as persons. Use of the historical
legal fiction provides an expedient, accepted legal device
for fitting new cases to old doctrines and thereby making
them "thinkable." As an example of an historical fiction,
use of the fiction of environmental personality would be
an acceptable way to introduce new law in the guise of old
law, making the new law "thinkable," without altering the
form of existent legal doctrine.
Fourth, ultimately the fiction of environmental
personality could be eliminated either by the method of
rejection, whereby the pretense of personality would be
discarded altogether, or by the method of redefinition,
whereby it would be allowed that in a technical legal
sense, natural objects are persons. Since it is elimin-
able, its use need not obstruct later development of dif-
ferent legal concepts and principles to handle legal pro-
tection of natural objects. Furthermore, its eliminability
ensures that the precept "The fiction must drop out of the
76
final reckoning" is preserved. Therefore, use of the fic-
tion of environmental personality satisfies the test for
proper use of a legal fiction.
One might object that the definition of 'person'
never could allow for natural objects as persons, and,
hence, that the legal fiction of environmental personality
may not be eliminable. In this connection it is interest-
ing to point out that to early jurists, the notion that an
artificial entity which exists only in law could have "its"
own rights was bizarre. Many theorists objected to ex-
tending the notion of a person to corporations. Fuller
argues that those who hold that the notion of corporate
personality necessarily is or involves a legal fiction
must assume that a future change in the meaning of 'person'
is impossible, that the meaning of 'person' in a techni-
cal legal sense never could include artificial persons.
Presumably, the same assumption underlies the objection
that the fiction of environmental personality may not be
eliminable. The assumption simply is untenable. It is at
least conceivable that a linguistic change in the meaning
of 'person' could occur such that the notions of corporate
30
and environmental personality are not fictions.
Fifth, legal fictions are considered necessary
legal devices for ensuring the growth of the law. For
some, this feature of the legal fiction provides sufficient
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justification for its use. For these theorists, an argu-
ment justifying adoption of the fiction of environmental
personality could be framed along the same lines as those
used for justifying adoption of legal fictions generally.
For others, most notably Fuller, the justification must be
found in considerations of social and economic policy. It
was shown earlier (in Chapter II) that many defenders of
the natural object move, NOM, suppose that just such con-
siderations justify ascription of legal rights to natural
objects. The same considerations could be offered for
justifying adoption of the fiction of environmental
personal ity
.
These five reasons establish that adoption of the
fiction of environmental personality would be compatible
with legal theory on what a legal fiction is, the purposes
for which legal fictions are used, and the justification
for using them. Taken together they show that the case for
(T) is not damaged by the Legal Fiction Objection.
However, another, different reason for saying that
(T) withstands the Legal Fiction Objection deserves men-
tion. One might argue that it makes no substantive differ-
ence to the legal right-holder status of natural objects
whether or not attribution of personality to them is or in-
volves a legal fiction. The notion of corporate personal-
ity provides a case in point. Some theorists defer from
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arguing whether or not a corporation is a real entity on
the grounds that, for purposes of ascribing legal capa-
cities to corporations, it makes no difference whether a
corporation is a real or a fictitious entity. For example,
J. C. Gray writes:
...I shall not attempt to answer the question
whether corporations are realities or fictions,
because to do so is unnecessary for my purposes
...Whether the corporation be real or" fictitious
,
the duties of other persons towards it and the
wills which enforce the rights correlative to
those duties are the same. The law is admin-
istered, and society is carried on in precisely
the same way on either theory. 31
M. Wolff agrees:
If all juristic persons are treated as if they
have wills of their own and are capable of
acting, it makes no material difference whether
you say, "they are real animate beings with
wills of their own, and so on," or whether you
say, "some of them may be and some certainly
are not, but the law treats them all as if
they were . " 32
Presumably these theorists would say something sim-
ilar about environmental personality. If, for specific
purposes, the law treats natural objects as if they were
persons, then, even if "fictitious persons," they are still
endowed with certain legal capacities, including legal
rights. They would argue that it makes no substantive
difference to the legal right-holder status of natural ob-
jects whether they are moral persons, or whether the law
merely treats them as if they were moral persons.
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Summary
It has been shown that, if the notion of environ-
mental personality either is itself a legal fiction, or in
volves a legal fiction, it is or involves one which poses
no special problem for the case for (T)
.
Use of the al-
leged fiction of environmental personality is compatible
with accepted legal theory in the nature, purposes, and
justification for correctly using legal fictions. Conse-




THE AMERICAN LEGAL TRADITION
This dissertation is a defense of the thesis that
ascription of legal rights to natural objects is compatible
with American legal theory on legal rights, thesis (T) . To
establish (T) one must show that none of the prima facie
exhaustive positions on legal rights and legal right-holders
within the American legal tradition presents a satisfactory
objection to (T)
.
As such, a discussion of the American
legal tradition is relevant to the defense of (T) only in-
sofar as it is helpful in identifying and clarifying the
various positions in American legal theory on legal rights
and legal right-holders.
The aim of this chapter is twofold: first, to por-
tray the American legal tradition as a tension between nat-
ural law and legal positivist theories of the nature of
law; second, to determine whether an analogous natural law-
legal positivist tension characterizes theories of legal
rights. Not only does the discussion provided here clarify
the extent to which theories of law correlate with theories
of legal rights; it also helps to carve out the area of





of law which do not figure in any theory of legal rights do
not generate any pertinent objections to (T)
.
The Two Positions on Law
There are two competing positions on the nature of
law within the American legal tradition: natural law and
legal positivism. 1 The central controversy between natural
law theorists and legal positivists is the nature of the
^-®l3.tion between positive law and morality. While they
agree that the development of American law has been influ-
enced profoundly by conventional morality, they disagree
about the nature of the connection between positive law
and morality generally. Is positive law which fails to
satisfy some moral criterion binding? Can unjust laws be
valid? Is there a sharp distinction between the moral and
legal spheres? There is a clear split between natural law
theorists and legal positivists on these issues.
As used here, a theory is a "natural law theory"
if, and only if, it affirms that the relation between pos-
itive law and natural or moral law is a necessary, and not
merely contingent or accidental, one and that the nature
of that connection is given by appeal to moral principles.
A theory is a "legal positivist theory" if, and only if, it
denies that there is a necessary connection between posi-
tive law and morality. Thus, all and only natural law
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theorists affirm, and all and only legal positivists deny,
the Law Necessity Thesis given at (1)
:
(1)
There is a necessary connection between
positive law (or, law as it is) and
morality (or
,
law as it ought to be) and
the nature of what connection is givenby appeal to natural law or moral prin-
ciples.
(The Law Necessity Thesis)
There is some disagreement among natural law
theorists about what (1) means. Sometimes (1) is inter-
preted as a thesis about the validation of positive law,
( 2 ) :
(2) All and only positive law which conforms
to natural or moral law is valid.
(The Law Validation Thesis)
Sometimes (1) is interpreted as a thesis about the non-
autonomy of the legal and moral realms, (3)
:
(3) There is no strict separation between
positive law and morality.
(The Law Non-Separation Thesis)
Natural law theorists who hold (2) hold that positive law
which violates certain natural law or moral conditions is
invalid. Those who hold (3) hold that positive law is a
species of morality.
There also is some disagreement among natural law
theorists about which entailment relations hold between
theses (1) , (2) , and (3)
.
What they agree upon is that
only natural law theorists hold (2) and (3), and that a
natural law theorist's endorsement of (2) or of (3) is
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taken to be an endorsement of (1). Thus, the commonly
accepted view is that each of (2) and (3) provides a suffi-
cient condition of a natural law theory, and that each
implies (1)
.
The characterization of natural law and legal posi-
tivism provided here is in terms of (1) only: all and only
natural law theorists affirm (1) , while all and only legal
positivists deny (1) . Three features of this characteri-
zation deserve mention. First, this characterization is a
minimal condition account of natural law and legal posi-
tivist. It captures what is agreed upon by theorists of
both camps as the central issue of their controversy.
Second, it leaves open the states of (2) and (3) as neces-
sary conditions of a natural law theory. While it is non-
controversial whether only natural law theorists affirm (2)
and (3), it is controversial whether all natural law
. 2theorists affirm (2) and (3). The characterization given
here allows that a natural law theorist might concede the
validity of "bad law" or grant some sort of distinction
between positive law and morality. Third, the characteri-
zation of these two theories in terms of (1) only permits
the inclusion of two distinctively American positions with-
in the traditional, dichotomous division of theories of
law. They are American legal realism and American socio-
logical jurisprudence. Although acknowledged as having a
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positivist bent, these two positions typically are not in-
cluded in discussions of the natural law-legal positivist
controversy on the nature of law.
Notice that the characterization of legal positi-
vism as a denial of (1) does not mean that legal positi-
vists hold that laws cannot be morally evaluated or that
one should frame positive law without concern for moral
considerations. Nothing intrinsic to the legal positivist
position prevents a positivist from advocating the use of
moral principles to resolve such questions as "What are
tests of the moral value of law?" and "Why ought people
obey the law?" Their view simply is that is the province
of jurisprudence— law conceived in factual, and not in
normative, terms— to answer the questions "What makes a
law valid?" and "What is law?" A positivist rejects the
view that a law which conflicts with some natural law or
moral principle is invalid and, thus, not really law.
To illustrate this point, consider the issue
whether the laws of the Nazi regime were genuine laws. As-
suming Nazi law was "bad law," a legal positivist would
maintain that it was law nonetheless. On the other hand,
most natural law theorists would maintain that Nazi law
so deviated from the standards of morality that it failed
3
to achieve the status of law.
Could a legal positivist ever accept conformity to
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a natural law or moral condition as a condition of validity
of positive law? Suppose that in a particular legal system,
conformity to a natural law or moral principle is itself
one of a set of necessary legal conditions of validity
acknowledged by that system
.
4 in such a case, natural law
theorists and legal positivists need not hold different
views on the status of positive law which fails to conform
to one of the natural law conditions. If a natural law
condition is itself one of the legal conditions of validity
of positive law, then a law failing to satisfy this condi-
tion is, in virtue of its failure to satisfy one of the
necessary conditions of legal validity, not really law.
Now take a different case. Suppose that in addition to all
legal conditions of validity there is added a non-legal,
natural law or moral condition. Then a natural law theo-
rist might hold that a putative law which satisfies all
the legal conditions of validity but not the additional
natural law or moral condition is invalid, not really law.
This position would be unacceptable to a legal positivist.
What is suggested here is that the general issue of
the relation between descriptive and normative propositions
is at the core of the natural law-legal positivist contro-
versy. The positions of A. P. d'Entreves and J. S. Mill
nicely illustrate this point. Natural law theorist
d'Entreves defines natural law as "the attempt to bridge
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the chasm between is and ought
, between 'fact' and
'value'." 5 According to d'Entreves, natural law is the
doctrine that law is a part of ethics; they are not auto-
nomous spheres. 6 He argues that "Perhaps the best des-
cription of natural law is that it provides a name for the
point of intersection between law and morals." 7
The early utilitarian J. s. Mill attacked natural
law for confusing the descriptive and prescriptive senses
of 'law' and for making the fundamental mistake of deriving
prescriptive statements about what law ought to be from
descriptive statements about what law actually is.^ it is
precisely this blurring of the distinction between "is" and
ought in law that is unacceptable to legal positivists.
The positions of d'Entreves and Mill point out that the
issue of the relation between descriptive and normative
propositions underlies the natural law-legal positivist
controversy on the nature of law.
The natural law-legal positivist split on the na-
ture of law turns on the issue of the relation between
positive law and morality. The Law Necessity Thesis, (1).
Take a look now at what some natural law theorists and
legal positivists actually say.
The natural law position . The most famous expression of
the classical natural law view is given by St. Thomas
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Aquinas. Aquinas writes:






. .Every humanlaw has just so much of a nature of law as it isderived from the law of nature. But if in any
ut departs from the law of nature, it is
no longer a law but a perversion of law. 9
Aquinas' endorsement of the Law Necessity Thesis, (1), is
based on his endorsement of the Law Validation Thesis, (2).
Contemporary non-Thomist natural law theorists such
as A. P. d'Entreves, Philip Selznick and Lon Fuller each
endorse the Law Necessity Thesis, (1). For example, con-
sider Fuller's position. Fuller's endorsement of (1) is
based on an endorsement of (3). In fact, Fuller's endorse
ment of (3) is the backbone of his definition of 'natural
law' and 'legal positivism'. He writes:
By legal positivism I mean that direction of
legal thought which insists on drawing a
sharp distinction between the law that is
and the law that ought to be. . .Natural law,
on the other hand, is the view which denies
the possibility of a rigid separation of
the ij; and the ought
,
and which tolerates a
confusion of them in legal discussion. There
are, of course, many 'systems' of the natural
law. But what unites the various schools of
natural law, and justifies bringing them under
a common rubric, is the fact that in all of
them a certain coalescence of the is_ and the
ought will be found.-*- 9
It is in terms of his endorsement of (3) that Fuller en-
dorses (1) .
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The legal positivist position
. The British legal philoso-
pher John Austin denies each of (1), (2) and (3). Austin
argues that there is a sharp distinction between law and
morality, between law as it is and law as it ought to be.
He writes:
The existence of law is one thing; its merit ordemerit is another
. Whether it be or be not is
inquiry ; whether it be or be not conformable
to an assumed standard, is a different inquiry. ii
Neither the existence nor the validity of positive law is
in any way dependent on the existence of natural law or on
conformity to natural law or moral principles. Austin
proposes a criterion of validity of positive law in terms
of a law's derivation, explicitly or implicitly, from the
sovereign. His "command" or "imperative" theory of law is
a rejection of both the Law Validation and the Law Non-
Separation Theses, and, ultimately, of the Law Necessity
Thesis, (1)
.
A more recent formulation of the legal positivist
position is given by Hans Kelsen. Kelsen writes:
Much traditional jurisprudence is charac-
terized by a tendency to confuse the theory of
positive law with political ideologies disguised
either as metaphysical speculation about justice
or as natural-law doctrine. It confounds the
question of the essense of law— that is, the
question of what the law actually is—with the
question of what it should be. It is included
more or less to identify law and justice.
Kelsen' s "pure theory of law" presumes a clear distinction
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between questions of empirical law, or law as it actually
is, and questions of "transcendental justice," or law as
it ought to be. 13 Kelsen's view is that the validation of
positive law is given by proper enactment, and that the
concept of law has no moral connotation whatsoever. 14 His
rejection of natural law is a rejection of all three nat-
ural law theses, (1), (2), and (3).
Austin s and Kelsen's views are representative of
the mainstream legal positivist position, often identified
as "analytical" or "mechanical" jurisprudence. The two
distinctively American positions, American legal realism
and American sociological jurisprudence, also fit into the
legal positivist camp, although there are grounds for
distinguishing them from the analytical jurisprudence of
Austin and Kelsen. For one thing, American legal realism
and sociological jurisprudence arose largely as a reaction
against both the formalist approach of analytical legal
positivists and the metaphysically riddled theories of
natural law. Legal realists and sociological jurists were
concerned with discussing law by reference to publically
discernible patterns of behavior and to practices of
judges and other public officials, rather than by refer-
ence to abstract principles, whether moral or legal prin-
ciples. For another thing, the intent of American legal
realists and sociological jurists was neither to eliminate
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ethical considerations from discussions of positive law, as
the analytical legal positivists tended to do, nor neces-
sarily to include them, as natural law theorists did. Their
intent was to remove ethical considerations from what they
viewed as factual concerns only— for legal realists, what
courts are likely to do; for sociological jurists, what
interconnections actually hold between legal institutions,
precepts and decisions, and other social phenomena.
Still, like mainstream legal positivists, American
legal realists and sociological jurists insist upon the
elimination of ethical considerations from factual legal
concerns. They view law and morality as autonomous realms.
Furthermore, they agree with mainstream legal positivists
that while the justification of positive law may fall
strictly within the realm of morality, the validation and
existence of positive law does not. Their view is that
the relations which hold between positive law and morality
are contingent merely. For these reasons, American legal
realism and American sociological jurisprudence here are
taken to be legal positivist positions.
American legal realism and American sociological
jurisprudence are two closely aligned positions. Theorists
identified with one school often are identified with the
other as well. For example, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Walter
Wheeler Cook, Jerome Frank, Herman Oliphant and Benjamin
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Cardozo have been referred to both as legal realists and
as sociological jurists. Some theorists even describe
sociological jurisprudence as a form of legal realism.
Hermann Kantorowicz, for example, characterizes "the soci-
ological school of law" as the school which adopts the
formal postulate of legal realism that "legal science is
ftot a. rational but an empirical science
.
1,16
Despite similarities between them, however, the
emphasis of the two positions differs. American legal
realists explain the nature and function of law in terms
of generalizations about the way certain people (judges,
legislators, public officials) act. They view law as con-
cerned with descriptive statements of what courts do or
are likely to do. The following smattering of quotations
from 0. W. Holmes, W. W. Cook and K. N. Llewellyn, respec-
tively, illustrates the basic American legal realist
position
:
What constitutes the law?... The prophecies of
what the courts will do in fact, and nothing
more pretentious, are what I mean by the law. 16
...lawyers, like the physical scientists, are
engaged in the study of objective physical
phenomena As lawyers we are interested in
knowing how certain officials of society--
judges, legislators, and others—have behaved
in the past, in order that we may make a
prediction of their probably behavior in the
future . I"7
What these officials [officials of the law]




the law itself ?
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The legal realist's emphasis on "behavior analysis" and on
laws as "judicial decisions" reflects their view that the
proper description of law, legal relations and legal sy-
stems is stated in factual, descriptive terms.
American sociological jurisprudence attempts "to
infuse legal policy and decision making with the perspec-
tives, thoughts and specific knowledge of the social dis-
ciplines, including history, psychology, sociology, and
economics." 9 The sociological jurist's approach to the
study of the nature of lav; is to describe the interactions
which occur between law and legal institutions, as social
phenomena, and other social phenomena. They hold that the
proper method of legal study is the social scientific
method, a method alleged to be evaluatively neutral. Ac-
cording to natural law theorist Philip Selznick, this
scientific method assumes an empirical, rather than a
normative, concept of law:
Social scientists are accustomed to treating
norms and ideals as facts. But they are dis-
inclined to evaluate those facts. To engage
in evaluation, it is thought, will inevitably
involve the social scientist in the preconcep-
tions of his own society and his own time;
moreover, any tendency to break down the wall
of separation between fact and value is in-
tellectually dangerous. This point of view
has created a mood favorable to legal positivism
and opposed to a normative concept of law. For
the latter the legal system is more than a set
of related norms to be treated as inassessable
factual givens . 21-1
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According to Selznick, reliance on the scientific
method is what sets sociological jurists against natural
law theorists. Fuller makes even a stronger claim. He
argues that the popularity of legal positivism generally,
and not just of sociological jurisprudence, is owed largely
to the popularity of the scientific method.
^
Among the names frequently associated with American
sociological jurisprudence are those of Roscoe Pound and
Benjamin Cardozo. The following quotes by Pound and
Cardozo, respectively, reveal the sociological jurist's
emphasis on viewing law in its social context:
Sociological jurists now insist on the unity of
the social sciences, and the impossibility of
a wholly detached, self-centered, self-sufficing
science of law. They insist that the legal order
is a phase of social control and that it cannot
be understood unless taken in its whole setting
among social phenomena. 22
Courts know today that statutes are to be
viewed, not in isolation or in vacuo
,
as pro-
nouncements of abstract principles for the
guidance of an ideal community, but in the
setting and the framework of present-day con-
ditions, as revealed by the labor of econo-
mists and students of the social sciences
in our own country and abroad. 23
Thus, there is a clearly identifiable natural law-
legal positivist controversy on the question of the rela-
tion between law and morality. Is there an analogous
split among legal theorists on the question of the relation
between legal rights and non-legal, natural or moral
rights?
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The Two Positions on Legal Rights
All and only natural law theorists affirm the Law
Necessity Thesis, (1). Do all and only natural law the-
orists also affirm a rights thesis corollary to (1)
,
the
Rights Necessity Thesis given at (4)?
(4) There is a necessary connection between
legal rights and non-legal rights (natural
or moral rights) and the nature of that
connection is given by appeal to natural
law or moral principles.
(The Rights Necessity Thesis)
Suppose (4) is interpreted either as a thesis about the
validity of legal rights, (5)
,
or as a thesis about the
nonautonomy of legal rights, (6)
:
(5) All and only legal rights which are based
on natural or moral law are valid.
(The Rights Validation Thesis)
(6) There is no strict separation between
legal rights and non-legal rights
(natural or moral rights)
.
(The Rights Non-Separation Thesis)
Do all natural law theorists affirm, and all legal positi-
vists deny, (5) and (6)?
If there is a clear natural law-legal positivist
split on the nature of rights analogous to the natural law-
legal positivist split on the nature of law, then American
theories of legal rights can be characterized as either
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natural law or legal positivist theories, depending on
whether or not they affirm (4). Furthermore, if there is
a natural law-legal positivist split on the nature of
rights, an adequate defense of the main thesis, (T)
,
would
require exploring the interconnections between the the-
ories of law and the theories of rights to determine
whether, directly or indirectly, a theory of law generates
a reasonable objection to (T)
,
a thesis about legal rights.
Thus, the question whether all and only natural law theo-
rists affirm (4) is significant here.
Counter to what one might expect, theories of legal
rights do not separate neatly into two dichotomous groups--
natural law theories, accepted by all and only natural law
theorists, and legal positivist theories, accepted by all
and only legal positivists. This is because not all nat-
ural law theorists accept the Rights Necessity Thesis, (4)
.
Although all natural law theorists accept the Law Necessity
Thesis, (1) , and, hence, all construe the connection be-
tween law and morality as a necessary one, not all accept
the Rights Necessity Thesis, (4), and, hence, not all con-
strue the connection between legal and non-legal rights as
a necessary one. On the issue of rights, then, there is
not the sharp division between natural law theorists and
legal positivists that there is on the issue of law.
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The emergence of theories of human or moral rights
in the twentieth century which bear little, if any, resem-
blance to the eighteenth century theories of natural rights
illustrates this point. So-called natural rights theories
gained prominence in the eighteenth century. They posited
that "all men" have certain inherent rights of which they
cannot be deprived upon entering civil society. Included
among these alleged inalienable rights were the rights to
life, liberty, happiness, and property. These "natural
rights" were described as rights which a human has in vir-
tue of those characteristics that are specifically and
universally human. As Jacques Maritain puts it, "the
human person possesses rights because of the very fact that
.
,
. 2 4it is a person.
"
The eighteenth century natural rights tradition af-
firmed that there are rights ("natural rights") humans have
because they are persons, and that the nature of the rela-
tion between them and legal rights is given by appeal to
natural law principles. Sometimes the claim was that only
legal rights based on natural law were valid. Sometimes
the claim was that legal rights and non-legal rights are
not distinct kinds of rights. In any case, the eighteenth
century natural rights tradition was a natural law tradi-
tion which endorsed the Rights Necessity Thesis, (4), as
well as the Law Necessity Thesis, (1).
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Modern theories of human or moral rights are strik-
ingly different. Unlike the theories of natural rights of
the eighteenth centry, they are endorsed by legal positi-
vists and natural law theorists alike. This is because
they, unlike their eighteenth century counterparts, are not
coupled with theses about the natural law basis of all
rights. Natural law theorist Lon Fuller, for example, re-
jects the enghteenth century theories of natural rights
and suggests that his natural law position on law does not
presuppose any such theory of natural rights:
...I should like to have it understood at the
outset that any compliments which may here be
cast in the direction of natural law are not
addressed to the doctrine of natural and
inalienable rights. This warning would
probably be unnecessary if it were not for
the fact that we have got into the habit of
identifying these two notions and assuming
that some conception of the natural rights
of man must lie at the heart of every system
of natural law... I am not advocating the
doctrine of natural rights,.... 25
It is because a natural law theorist may advocate a modern
theory of moral rights without thereby advocating an
eighteenth century version of natural rights that one can-
not describe all natural law theorists as maintaining the
Rights Necessity Thesis, (4).
This does not mean that theories of legal rights,
unlike theories of law, cannot be characterized at all
among natural law-legal positivist lines. All legal
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positivists deny (4) and all who affirm (4) are natural law
theorists. what is not the case is that only legal positi-
vists deny (4), or equivalently, that all natural law theo-
rists affirm (4)
.
Thus, although there is not the clear-
cut split between natural law theorists and legal positi-
vists on legal rights that there is on law, one can cap-
ture what split there is by separating those theories which
endorse (4) from those which do not. As I shall use the
terms, a strictly natural law theory of legal rights" is
one which endorses the Rights Necessity Thesis given at
(4); a "non-stric tly natural law theory of legal rights"
is one which denies (4). Thus, only natural law theorists
subscribe to strictly natural law theories of legal rights,
while both natural law theorists and legal positivists
subscribe to non-strictly natural law theories.
Summary
Insofar as there is a natural law-legal positivist
controversy on legal rights analogous to the natural law-
legal positivist controversy on law, it centers on the
Rights Necessity Thesis, (4). Only natural law theorists
subscribe to (4), while both natural law theorists and
legal positivists deny (4)
.
"Strictly natural law theories"
affirm (4), and, hence, are held by natural law theorists
only; "non-strictly natural law theories" deny (4), and,
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hence, are held by both natural law theorists and legal
positivists. The distinction between strictly and non-
strictly natural law theories of rights captures what
there is of a natural law-legal positivist split on the
nature of legal rights. As such, any objection to the
main thesis, (T)
,
based on a natural law theory of law
which is not also a strictly natural law theory of legal
rights can be dismissed at the outset as not pertinent to
the defense of (T)
.
CHAPTER V I
THEORIES OF LEGAL RIGHTS AND LEGAL
RIGHT-HOLDERS: THE POSITIONS
In this chapter I discuss the pr ima facie exhaus-
tive positions in American legal theory on legal rights
and legal right-holders. The programme is to describe
each position and then, after offering comments or criti-
cisms of each, to pinpoint just what is asserted by each
position. This provides the basis for determining, in
subsequent chapters, what the objections to the main
thesis, (T)
,
based on each position are, and whether any
is successful.
The Theories of Legal Rights
Strictly natural law theories . In the previous chapter,
a "strictly natural law theory of legal rights" was charac-
terized as one which endorses the Rights Necessity Thesis,
(4) . It affirms that there is a necessary connection be-
tween legal and non-legal rights, the nature of which is
given by appeal to non-positive law principles. Basically,
there are two strictly natural law theories of legal rights.
One is a definitional position; the other is not. Al-
though each affirms (4)
,
only the definitional position
100
101
involves claims about the meaning of 'legal right.'
The Moral Sense Position
. What I shall call "the
Moral Sense Position" on legal rights is a strictly natural
law theory of legal rights which defines 'legal right' in
moral terms. It endorses proposition (7):
(7) The meaning of 'legal right' is given in
moral terms.
It fits squarely in the camp of strictly natural law theo-
ries because it unpacks the necessary connection between
legal rights and non-legal rights alleged at (4) in terms
of a univocal, moral sense of 'right.' Moral Sense Posi-
tion advocates argue that legal rights and non-legal rights
both are rights in a moral sense.
Traditionally, strictly natural law definitions of
'legal right' are associated with the views of the seven-
teenth century jurists Grotius and Pufendorf. 1 According
to Grotius, a right is:
A moral quality of a person making it possible
to have or to do something lawfully [justly]. 2
Pufendorf offers a similar definition:
[Right is] an active moral power, belonging to
a person, to receive something from another as
a matter of necessity. 2
For Grotius and Pufendorf, legal rights are moral qualities
or powers recognized and secured by a politically organized
society. Because they define 'right' generically in moral
terms, they are Moral Sense Position theorists.
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The Thomists Ryan and Boland are contemporary ad-
vocates of the Moral Sense Position. They argue:
right in the moral sense of the term may bedefined as an inviolable moral claim to somepersonal
.
good
. When this claim is created, asit sometimes is, by civil society it is a posi-tive or legal right; when it is derived from
man's rational nature it is a natural right. 4
For them, all rights are moral claims. Legal rights
and "natural rights" are rights "in the moral sense of the
term.
"
Whether legal rights are defined as moral quali-
ties, moral powers, or moral claims, the definition of
'legal right' is given in moral terms. Both legal and
non-legal rights are rights in a generic, moral sense of
"rights." This is the Moral Sense Position on legal
rights
.
The Moral Validation Position . The other strictly
natural law theory of legal rights is what I shall call
"the Moral Validation Position." It affirms the Rights
Validation Thesis given at (5) : All and only legal rights
which are based on natural or moral law are valid. It
seldom is made clear by advocates of this position just
what it means to say that rights are "based on" natural or
moral law. Presumably, the view is that natural or moral
law principles either provide the test for identifying, or
the mark of, a valid legal right, or provide the justifi-
cation for proper ascription of rights. As such, the Moral
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Law Validation Position is a position on valid legal
rights, rather than a position on legal rights per se
.
Nearly all, if not all, Moral Law Validation Posi-
tion theorists concede that legal rights formally "origin-
ate in the state," i.e., in legislative and judicial en-
actment. What they deny is that positive law provides the
criterion of validity of rights, legal or otherwise. This
distinction between the source and the validity of rights
is found in the discussion by natural law theorists Neill
and Rommen of "human rights" which also are legal or posi-
tive rights:
Human rights can have no foundation other than
natural law. Legally, of course, they come from
the state, but if a legal 'right' is truly to be
a right it must be based on natural law—which
is only another way of saying that it must be
based on man's very nature ... Thus the soundest,
the only foundation of those human rights so
flagrantly violated today is natural law.^
Thus, the Moral Validation Position defends the
Right Necessity Thesis, (4), by appeal to the Rights Vali-
dation Thesis, (5)
.
It is the view that natural or moral
law provides the criterion of validity of both legal and
non-legal rights.
I have stated that there are two strictly natural
law theories of legal rights, the Moral Sense and the
Moral Validation Positions. Defenders of these two posi-
tions typically invoke a two- (or more) kind doctrine of
rights for distinguishing between legal rights and non-legal
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rights. However, occasionally a theorist argues that there
really is only one kind of right, namely moral rights.
This is the position of natural law theorist G. H. Smith,
for example:
But obviously the distinction between moral andle?al rights cannot be sustained; for ex vi
termini
,
all rights are moral rights, and~here
cannot be a right of any other kind.®
Smith's view is a clear endorsement of the Rights Non-Sep-
aration Thesis, (6). Does it represent a third strictly
natural law position on legal rights?
I think not, on any of three reasonable construals
of his view. On one construal, Smith's position is that,
properly speaking, there are not legal rights. But then
Smith's position is not a strictly natural law position on
legal rights, since it fails to affirm the Rights Necessity
Thesis, (4 )
.
On a second contrual, Smith's position is that
there are legal rights, but that 'legal right' is defined
in terms of moral rights. What would it mean, then, to
say that all rights are moral rights? Usually the expres-
sion 'moral right' is used to pick out a kind of right
different from legal rights. But this cannot be Smith's
view since he does not endorse a two-kind doctrine of
rights. Apparently, on this construal his view is that to
say "all rights are moral rights" is to say "all rights are
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rights in a moral sense." Legal rights, then, are rights
m a moral sense. But on this contrual of Smith's view,
it simply reduces to the Moral Sense Position, and does not
constitute a separate, third position on legal rights.
On a third construal of Smith's position, to say
that legal rights are a kind of moral right is to specify
that a necessary condition of an entity's having legal
rights is that it have, or be capable of having, moral
rights. However, so construed, Smith's position is not a
strictly natural law position on legal rights, since it is
consistent with this position to deny the Rights Necessity
Thesis, (4)
.
It is a position on legal right-holders
which could be endorsed by both natural law theorists and
legal positivists.
Thus, none of these three construals of Smith's
position renders it an alternative, third strictly natural
law position on legal rights. If there are plausible ob-
jections to the main thesis (T) based on the view that
there are only moral rights, they are handled properly as
objections issuing from either the Moral Sense Position or
a non-strictly natural law position on legal right-holders.
They do not require separate treatment.
Non-strictly natural law theories . A non-strictly natural




As I contrue the American legal
tradition, there are six non-strictly natural law positions
on legal rights. Stated in the order in which they are
discussed here, they are the Interest, Power, Claim, Corre-
lativity
, Rules, and Prediction Positions.
The Interest Position
. The Interest Position on
legal rights was made famous by Jhering, who defined a
legal right as a legally protected interest. A more recent
defense of the Interest Position has been offered by F. K.
H. Maher. He argues that all rights, and not just legal
rights, are interests:
We recognize that right is an 'umbrella word.
'
Therefore we should not use it except in its
most general sense of any interest or advan-
tage recognized by law. 7
Maher's position might be described alternatively
as an Advantages Position view, since he restricts the use
of 'right' in its most general sense to "the interest or
advantages recognized by law." Another legal theorist,
J. Stone, also describes rights as advantages, viz., ad-
vantages conferred by law in order to protect de facto
ginterests. For our purposes, the Interest Position is
taken to include the view that legal rights are advantages.
The Power Position. The American legal realist
J. C. Gray argues that a right is not an interest, as
Jhering and others had thought; rather, it is the means by
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which an interest is secnrpHu ed. Gray s own view is that legal
^-icfhts are powers. He states:




C. K. Allen's definition of 'legal right'
merges the two notions of an interest and a power. He
argues that both notions are "inherent in the notion of
right and are in no sense mutually exclusive."'^ Allen's
view is an amended version of Gray's position:
The essence of legal right seems to me to be
not legally guaranteed power by itself, nor
legally protected interest by itself, but
the legally guaranteed power to realize an
interest . 11
The Power Position on legal rights has been attri-
buted variously to Hobbes, Spinoza, Winscheid, Savigny
and T. H. Green. Often it is advanced as a corollary to
a general view of rights as powers. For example, Green
argues that a right generally is "a power claimed and re-
cognized as contributing to a common good." He argues
that legal rights are powers actually recognized by civil
society, and natural rights are powers which should be
. 1
7
recognized by civil society.
Sometimes the Power Position is advanced as a view
about the derivation of all other legal concepts, including
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the concept of a legal right. The contemporary theorist
G. Goble, for example, argues that since the basic legal
concept is power
,
all other legal concepts are derived from
and defined in terms of the concept power. His definition
of 'legal right' is a clear statement of the Power Posi-
tion :
[
1 Right ' is, by definition] the power of a person
to initiate that sequential combination of powers
and acts involved in obtaining a judgment against
another person. 14
Some theorists argue that legal rights are the
"capabilities to claim an act from another," 15 or the "cap-
acity in one man of controlling, with the assent and assis-
1tance of the State, the acts of others." The view of
legal rights as capabilities or capacities is considered
here to be a Power Position view.
The Claim Position . J. Feinberg offers a repre-
sentative view of legal rights as claims. He defends a
two-kind doctrine of rights according to which legal rights
and moral rights are rights in the generic sense of "valid
claims." Arguing that validity is justification within a
system of rules or principles, Feinberg describes legal
rights as claims justified by appeal to civil rules, and
moral rights as claims justified by appeal to moral rules
17
or the principles of an enlightened conscience.
H. J. McCloskey offers what he takes to be an
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alternative to the Claim Position on legal rights. His
view is that rights are entitlements, "entitlements to do,
have, enjoy or have done." 18 Whether legal, moral, social
institutional or in games, rights are entitlements of some
kind
.
However, for our purposes, the Entitlement Position
is included within the Claim Position on legal rights.
There are two reasons for this inclusion, one positive and
one negative. The "positive" reason is that claim theo-
rists sometimes describe the Entitlement Position as a
version of their own position. For example, Feinberg ar-
gues that the view of rights an entitlements is accomo-
dated by the view of rights as claims:
All rights seem to merge entitlements to do,
have, omit, or be something with claims against
others to act or refrain from acting in certain
ways. In some statements of rights the enti-
tlement is perfectly determinate (e.g., to play
tennis) and the claim vague (e.g., against some
vague group of potential or possible obstructors)
;
but in other cases the object of the claim is
clear and determinate (e.g., against one's
parents)
,
and the entitlement general and in-
determinate (e.g., to be given a proper up-
bringing) . If we mean by "entitlement" that
to which one has a right and by "claim" some-
thing directed at those against whom the right
holds (as McCloskey apparently does)
,
then we
can say that all claim-rights necessarily in-
volve both, though in individual cases the one
element or the other may be in sharper focus. 19
According to Feinberg, entitlements to do, have, enjoy or
have done are, or entail, "claims to." Arguing that claims
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are both "claims to" and "claims against," Feinberg con-
cludes that the Entitlement Position is subsumed under the
Claim Position on legal rights.
Of course, McCloskey would not be happy with this
classification of the entitlement view. Arguing that rights
are rights to and not rights against, and that claims es-
sentially are claims against, McCloskey denies that rights
are claims. A legal right may provide the grounds for a
claim, or indirectly may give rise to claims, but it does
not consist primarily in such claims . 20
Suppose one allows that claims may be either "to"
or "against," as Feinberg argues. Then, setting aside
other difficulties with McCloskey' s account, an appeal to
a distinction between "claims against" and "entitlements
to" does not establish that rights are not claims, as
McCloskey assumes. If anything, it helps to substantiate
the view that rights are claims.
The "negative reason" for including the Entitlement
Position within the Claim Position on legal rights is that,
for our purposes, nothing relevant to a defense of (T) is
sacrificed by doing so. The rationale for considering
these positions on legal rights at all is to defend (T)
against objections based on them. But, as will be shown,
on McCloskey' s view, the main objection to giving non-
Ill
humans legal rights is that they cannot have interests or
possess anything, since this objection is handled appro-
priately with other Interest Position Objections to (T)
,
one need not treat his Entitlement Position separately in
order to provide a thorough defense of (T)
The Correlativity P osition
. Very often a position
on legal rights is advanced in conjunction with the view
that legal rights and duties are correlative, the main tenet
of the Correlativity Position. For example, the famous
twentieth century jurist Wesley Hohfeld suggests that the
word 'claim' be substituted as a synonym for 'right' and
then argues that a "claim-right" (a right in its "limited
and proper meaning") is the correlative of a legal duty . 21
Hohfeld s version of the Correlativity Position is that
when legal right' is used properly, the relation expressed
as A s legal right against B is, without loss of meaning,
expressed alternatively as B's legal duty to A. Rights
" str ictu sensu , " i.e., claim-rights, are the correlatives
of legal duties. Hohfeld distinguishes them from other so-
called "rights"--privileges
,
powers and immunities--in terms
of his now well-known schema of jural opposites and correla-
tives :
Jural (right privilege power immunity






Hohfeld's description of rights as the correlatives
of duties follows the positivist tradition of Austin.
Austin's view is that a person has a legal right when some-
one else is obliged by law to do or forbear toward that
22person. Austin endorsed the Correlativity Position view
that legal rights properly so-called are the correlatives
or legal duties:
Every legal right supposes a duty incumbent on
a party or parties other than the party entitled...
If that corresponding duty be the creature of a





. The position that an adequate
account of legal rights must involve the notion of a legal
rule is the Rules Position. Sometimes, it is advocated in
conjunction with another position on legal rights. For
example, Feinberg links the notion of a legal right with
legal rules in his characterization of rights as valid
claims. Since validity is justification within a system of
rules or principles, and rights are valid claims, legal
rights are claims justified within a system of legal rules
or principles. By extension, to have a legal rights is to
have a claim against someone, where the recognition of the
claim as valid is called for by some set of government le-
, , . , 24gal rules or principles.
Sometimes the Rules Position is advocated by it-
self. For example, Benn and Peters argue that statements
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including the expressions 'rights' and 'duties' prescribe,
within a system of rules, how persons shall behave in re-
lation to one another:
To say that X has a right to £ 5 is to imply that
there is a rule which, when applied to the case
of X and some other person Y, imposes on Y a
duty to pay X £ 5 if X so chooses. 25
Statements attributing legal rights are treated as stating
or applying legal rules. The position of Benn and Peters
is that 'right' has meaning only in the context of rules. 26
Sometimes the Rules Position is offered as an al-
ternative to any position which attempts to define 'legal
right.' For example, H. L. A. Hart argues that "legal
words can only be illustrated by considering the conditions
under which statements in which they have their character-
27is tic use are true." Insisting on the futility of at-
tempting to define 'legal right,' Hart's approach is to
explain what a legal right is by giving the sufficient con-
ditions for the truth of statements of the form 'X has a
legal right' in terms of rules:
(a) There is in existence a legal system;
(b) Under a rule or rules of the system some
other person Y is, in the events which
have happened, obliged to do or abstain
from some action;
(c) This obligation is made by law dependent
on the choice either of X or of some
other person authorized to act on his
behalf so that either Y is bound to do
or abstain from some action only if X
(or some authorized person) so chooses
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or alternatively only until X (or such
person) chooses otherwise. 28
Hart adds that a statement of the form 'X has a legal
right' is used to draw a conclusion of law in a particular
case which falls under such rules.
_fre Prediction Position . The Prediction Position
is a distinctively American legal realist-sociological jur-





nothing but a prediction that if a man does or
omits certain things, he will be made to suffer
in this or that way by the judgment of the court.
^
To determine what a right is, Holmes would have us ask two
questions: What are the facts about the group in question?
What are the consequences attached by the law to the group?
A right is just "a consequence attached by the law to one
or more facts which the law defines.
Like Holmes, Llewellyn argues that statements as-
cribing rights are factual statements that in a given situ-
ation certain court action is likely. He writes:
I should like to begin by distinguishing real
"rules" and rights from paper rules and rights.
The former are conceived in terms of behavior;
they are but other names, convenient shorthand
symbols, for the remedies, the actions of the
courts. They are descriptive, not prescriptive,
except insofar as there may occasionally be
implied that court ought to continue in their
practices. "Real rules," then, if I had my
way with words, would by legal scientists be
called the practices of the courts, and not
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"rules" at all. And statements of "rights"
would be statements of likelihood that in agiven situation a certain type of court actionloomed in the offing. Factual terms. No more . 31
The Prediction Position, then, is that rights are conceived
in terms of behavior, and that statements about rights are
predictive statements about judicial or official behavior.
other views about legal rights . Two other views about
legal rights deserve mention. The first, encountered al-
ready in connection with Hart's view, is that the attempt
to define 'legal right' is misguided or futile. Hohfeld,
for example, maintains that since definitions of fundamen-
tal legal terms such as 'right' are " sui generis ," attempts
at formal definitions of them always are unsatisfactory, if
not totally useless. He assumes that his procedure of ex-
plaining legal relations by organizing legal concepts in a
scheme of jural opposites and correlatives replaced the
need for definition.
The second view is that rights have no independent
reality. For some, this amounts to describing rights and
duties as "fictitious entities." For example, Bentham
argues that:
An act is a real entity; a law is another. A
duty or obligation is a fictitious entity con-
ceived as resulting from the union of the two
former. A law commanding or forbidding an act
thereby creates a duty or obligation. A right
is another fictitious entity, resulting out of
a duty.
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For others, this amounts to describing rights as represen-
tations of the mind, purely psychological phenomena lack-
ing objective reality. Talk of rights is not to be taken
I
literally.
This second view is associated most often with the
Scandinavian legal realists Hagerstrom, Olivecrona and
Lundstedt. But sometimes it is associated with American
realists, particularly with Holmes and Llewellyn.
Their position that the notion of a right is analyzed in
terms of facts and behavior sometimes is construed as a
position which denies the independent reality of entities
called "rights." If the entities cannot be analyzed in
terms of facts and behavior, then "they" are not rights
at all.
These two views, the "no definition view" and the
"no such thing as rights" views, may have been maintained
within the American legal tradition. Since if they have
been, the views of those theorists who endorse them are re-
presented adequately in terms of the six non-strictly nat-
ural law positions on legal rights already discussed,
there is no need to treat them here as separate positions.
Theories of Legal Right-Holders
Two basic approaches in legal theory are used to
analyze the notion of a legal right-holder. One is to ana-
lyze it in terms of one of the eight historical positions
117
on legal rights. The other is to analyse it in terms which,
though compatible with some of those positions, do not pre-
suppose any specific one.
Theories of legal right-holders based on the first
approach unpack the notion of a legal right-holder by in-
voking one of the eight historical positions on legal
rights. Where a position offers a definition of 'legal
right,' this is done by substituting the definition or some
equivalent expression for all occurrences of 'legal right'
in statements of the form 'X has a legal right.' For in-
stance, if the definition proposed is "a legally protected
interest, then 'X has a legal right' is logically equi-
valent to 'X has a legally protected interest.' If 'legal
right' is defined as "power," then to have a legal right
is to have a power.
Where a position on legal rights is not a defini-
tional position, or where the proposed analysis of 'legal
right' does not substitute directly into statements of the
form 'X has a legal right, ' there is more leeway in ren-
dering the notion of a legal right-holder in terms of the
notion of a legal right. For example, on Feinberg's ver-
sion of the Rules Position, to say that X has a legal right
is to say that there is a governing legal rule or set of
legal rules such that official recognition of X's claim as
valid is called for by that rule or set of rules. On
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Holmes's Prediction Position view, to say that X has a legal
right is to predict that, if certain facts which the law
defines transpire, then certain consequences (e.g., reme-
dies, sanctions) determined by the courts which affect X
will follow.
The second approach to unpacking the notion of a
legal right-holder does not presuppose any particular his-
torical position on legal rights. Typically it involves
an independent set of necessary conditions for an entity,
X, correctly to be said to have legal rights. The two
most familiar of these are what I call the "Moral Person
Position" and the "Moral Rights Position." According to
. .
*
the Moral Person Position, to have legal rights an entity
must be a moral person, i.e., be subject to moral law, be
rational, be capable of choice, or have a will. According
to the Moral Rights Position, to have legal rights an en-
tity must have moral rights. The first position empha-
sizes the nature of the right-holder; the second empha-
sizes the nature of the rights which legal right-holders
have. Although sometimes the Moral Rights Position is
assumed to be a version of the Moral Person Position, for
our purposes they are treated as separate positions.
Other less frequently advanced positions cite as
necessary conditions for X's having legal rights any of
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the following: X is capable of possessing things; X is
capable of movement; X is a member of a community; X has a
soul; X is capable of being party to a lawsuit. Each of
these views is a non-historical position on legal right-
holders.
The Historical Positions on Legal Rights
and Legal Right-Holders
In this section I offer comments and criticisms of
the eight historical positions on legal rights and legal
right-holders. The discussion attempts to clarify just
what is asserted by each position and to identify those
theses which generate reasonable objections to the main
thesis, (T) . Some positions (e.g., the Claim Position) are
discussed in detail; others (e.g., the Moral Sense Posi-
tion) are not. In general, the more detailed discussions
are of those positions which are most widely accepted in
American legal theory.
The strictly natural law theories .
The Moral Sense Position . The Moral Sense Position
endorses the Rights Necessity Thesis, (4), by construing
the connection between legal rights and non-legal rights
as a conceptual one. Both are rights in a moral sense of
'rights.' It is a rock-bottom position, not accomodated
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by any of the other historical positions on legal rights.
It is the only distinctively natural law definitional pos-
ition on legal rights.
The Moral Sense Position is an unpopular position.
It has been the target of unwaivering criticism by both
legal positivists and natural law theorists. Legal positi-
vists criticize it for its failure to keep separate the fac-
tual and moral realms. Natural law theorists criticize it
for its failure to recognize non-moral senses of 'right.'
Both legal positivists and natural law theorists object to
the suspicious metaphysics typically adduced to support
arguments for a univocal, moral sense of 'right.' As a
consequence, very few theorists would take seriously objec-
tions to (T) based on the Moral Sense Position, even if it
could be shown that natural objects cannot meaningfully be
said to have rights in any moral sense of the term.
In order to be clear about what counts as a Moral
Sense Position Objection to (T)
,
this position must be dis-
tinguished clearly from the Moral Person and Moral Rights
Positions. The latter are not strictly natural law posi-
tions; nor do they provide an analysis of 'legal right.'
While Moral Sense Position theorists may endorse both the
Moral Person and the Moral Rights Positions, their view
neither entails, nor is entailed by, those positions.
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Th_e Moral Validation Position
. The Moral Validation
Position is that all valid legal rights are based on natural
or moral law. it is a "validation" position because it as-
serts that the mark, test, or justification for ascription
of valid rights is given by natural law or moral principles.
The distinctive feature of this position is that it is a
view on the validity of rights, and not on the nature or
analysis of rights per se . Unlike the other positions, it
does not presuppose any particular theses about the analysis
of 'legal right' or the conditions under which statements of
the form 'X has a legal right' are true. It remains to be
seen whether it generates any objection to the main thesis,
(T) .
The non-strictly natural law theories .
The Interest Position . Critics have argued per-
suasively that the Interest Position is unacceptable because
it fails to distinguish between the means of securing a
thing and the thing secured. Legal rights are not them-
selves interests, as Jhering and others have argued, but
are among the devices of a legal order for securing
interests
.
Distinctions between different meanings of 'inter-
est' or different kinds of interests have surfaced in
attempts to salvage the Interest Position. Defenders
distinguish between "de facto interests," what an entity,
X, actually desires, wants or likes, "prudential interests,"
what it is to X's advantage to have, and "de_ jure inter-
ests," advantages or concerns which, on moral grounds, X
ought to have.
However, these distinctions fail to rescue the Int-
erest Position from criticisms of it. If rights are not
themselves interests, then they are neither a specific kind
of interest, nor interests in any specific sense of 'in-
terest. This point is borne out by considering a few ex-
amples. In the case of "de facto interests," a person may
want to rob a bank, though no corresponding legal right
exists; and a person may have a legal right to sue a land-
lord, while lacking any desire to do so. Similarly for
"prudential interests." It may be to an employer's advan-
tage to hire female workers at lower salaries than their
male counterparts, even though the employer has no legal
right to do so; and a defendant may have a legal right to
a court-appointed attorney, though it is to his/her dis-
advantage to be represented by such attorneys, especially
if the courts and attorneys it appoints are corrupt. The
case of "de jure interests" fares no better. It may be
that a slave ought to have certain advantages, e.g., edu-
cational opportunities and social security, even though in
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fact he/she lacks any such legal right; and someone may
have a legal right to sue a destitute elderly person even
though, on moral grounds, it is suspect whether this is an
advantage or concern which he/she ought to have or pursue . 33
These examples show that attempts to define 'legal right'
as an interest are not rejuvenated by invoking a three-
fold distinction between senses of 'interest' or kinds of
interests
.
If the view of legal rights as interests fails,
then so does the more refined view of legal rights as in-
terests which the law recognizes, delimits and secures,
whether the law secures them for themselves (as F. K. H.
Maher contends) or for the purpose of protecting other
interests (as J. Stone contends). The Interest Position
view which i_s plausible is that legal rights are, or are
among, the chief legal means for protecting, delimiting
and securing interests.
The view of legal rights as the chief legal means
for securing interests is not, however, a definitional
view. Suppose that in a pre-industrial society, a bow and
arrow constitutes the chief means for securing food. Or,
suppose, as often is alleged, that hard work is the chief
means to success. In neither case is a definitional view
advanced. It may be that one way to identify a bow and
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arrow is to test its effectiveness in procuring food, or
that a mark of success is that it was bred of hard work.
But it is quite odd, and I think, false to say that 'bow
and arrow' and 'hard work' just mean "the chief means for
securing food or "the chief means of securing success,"
respectively. By analogy, it may be the mark of identifi-
cation, or test, of a legal right that it secures some in-
terest; or, it may be an explanation of why rights are
"valuable commodities" that they are the chief legal in-
strument for protecting human interests. But this is quite
different from saying that 'legal right' just means "in-
terest" or "the chief legal means for securing interests."
The significance of the Interest Position is not
as a definition of 'legal right. ' Rather, its signifi-
cance is that it provides a commonly accepted test for
justifying ascription of legal rights, one which captures
a familiar use of 'legal rights' by lawyers. In creating
rights and resolving disputes involving rights, lawyers
often ask "What interests are at stake here?" "What inter-
ests would be served, overlooked or compromised by taking
this action?" The Interest Position does highlight the
fact, so familiar to lawyers, that operationally signifi-
cant differences result for subjects recognized as having
legally relevant interests, or on whom legally relevant
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advantages are conferred.
In fact, it is just these operational advantages
which legal right-holders have and non-legal right-holders
lack that lawyer Christopher Stone sought to isolate in his
use of the terms 'legal right' and 'holder of legal
rights. In Should Trees Have S tand ing? Stone writes:
First and most obviously, if the term [legal
^ipht] is to have any content at all, a.n entity
cannot be said to hold a legal right unless and
until some public authoritative body is pre-
pared to give some amount of review to actions
that are colorably inconsistent with that
"right .
"
...But for a thing to be a holder of legal
rights
,
something more is needed than that
-"
some authoritative body will review the actions
and processes of those who threaten it. As I
shall use the term, "holder of legal right,"
each of three additional criteria must be
satisfied . . . They are, first, that the thing can
institute legal action at its behest ; second,
that in determining the granting of relief,
the court must take injury to it into account;
and, third, that relief must run to the benefit
of it . 34
When Stone states that natural objects are not, but should
be, legal right-holders, he means to emphasize these three
specific legal advantages which the natural environment
lacks but ought to have. To use Julius Stone's termino-
logy, they are advantages which the law recognizes, delim-
its and secures for the purpose of protecting other inter-
ests or claims, which advantages natural objects do not
(yet) have.
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What is important here about C. Stone's account is
not whether his analysis of 'legal right' is correct, but
that he adopts an Advantages Position view of legal rights
and legal right-holders to defend the view that natural ob-
jects can, and should, have legal rights. Since the Advan-
tages Position is taken here to be a version of the Inter-
®st Position, if Stone is correct, then at least one ver-
sion of the Interest Position accomodates thesis (T)
.
The Power Position
. Like the Interest Position,
the Power Position is unpopular as a definitional position.
Critics have argued successfully that rights are not powers
because one may have powers to do what one has no legal
right to do, and one may have legal rights one is power-
less to enforce. One may have the power to kill someone
in the absence of any corresponding legal right; and, if
the courts are corrupt, one may have the legal right to a
fair trial but no power to obtain a trial or to ensure that
it is "fair .
"
Advocates of the Power Position might counter that
legal rights are hypothetical powers only, i.e., powers a
person would have if the courts and authorities acted in
accordance with law. But to this critics have a damaging
reply. As S. I. Benn puts it:
But this would be the same as saying that his
rights are the powers he would have if he had
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his rights. Rights, in other words, may explain
why persons have the powers they do, but they
are not identical with powers. 35
Even the distinction between "positive powers,"
powers actually possessed or available, and "normative pow-
ers," powers one ought to have or which one would be just-
ified in asserting, is unhelpful in showing that rights are
powers. A riparian may have the legal right to challenge
a corporate polluter even though, in fact, he/she lacks the
"positive powers" to exercise that right. Such might be
the case if the riparian were financially destitute and un-
able to avail himself/her self of the legal machinery pro-
vided for initiating action against the polluter. In cases
of civil disobedience, one may be morally justified in
breaking a law, and, hence, be said to have certain "nor-
mative powers," even though one has no legal right to
break a law. Thus, although legal rights may presuppose
certain powers of legal right-holders, they neither are
identical to, nor necessarily imply, powers.
The most promising recourse for the Power Position
theorist is to withdraw the definitional claim and to
assert instead the weaker claim that often legal rights
secure, guarantee or create legal powers. The strength of
this restatement is that it is a concession to critics that
the relation between rights and powers is not a defini-
tional one which, nonetheless, preserves the familiar,
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lawyer's notion of the relation between legal rights and
legal powers. in ordinary legal usage, legal powers are
associated both with rights of representatives (e.g., a -
gents, trustees, guardians, lawyers, public officials,
public bodies) and with rights arising out of contractual
agreements (e.g., the "right or power of attorney"). They
are associated with rights conferred on persons because of
their special legal status, function or circumstances.
These powers sometimes are called "special rights" or "del-
egated rights." The powers of a trustee to act on behalf
of the testator, of a landlord to evict a tenant, of a
policeperson to make an arrest, of a court to issue war-
rants are examples lawyers use of these
. special or dele-
gated rights. The restatement of the original Power Posi-
tion view in terms of the weaker claim that often legal
eights secure, guarantee or create legal powers captures
this ordinary lawyer's view of the relation between legal
rights and legal powers.
One weakness of this restatement is that it con-
flicts with the Hohfeldian view, widely accepted among
legal positivists, that 'right' properly used does not re-
fer to powers at all. These theorists would maintain that
so-called "special" or "delegated" rights really are only
powers. They are powers accorded individuals or public
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bodies for creating, divesting or altering the legal rela-
tions and legal status of others, including the legal rights
and legal right-holder status of others. While these powers
presuppose the legal rights of those individuals and public
bodies to exercise those powers, they are not legal rights,
in any proper sense of 'rights.'
What is significant for our purposes about the re-
stated Power Position view is that its plausibility does
not rest on determining which, if either, view of legal
powers is correct--the lawyer's view that legal powers are
"special" or "delegated" rights, or the Hohfeldian view
that legal powers are not legal rights at all. The re-
stated Power Position merely claims that often legal rights
secure, guarantee or create legal powers. Its plausibility
is not affected by whether powers are described correctly
as "special rights" or as "mere powers."
The Claim Position
. The Claim Position is one of
tne most widely endorsed positions on legal rights. It is
commonplace now to distinguish "claim-rights" from mere
privileges (or, liberties), powers and immunities, also
often called "rights." Feinberg states that "nearly all
writers maintain that there is some connection between
having a claim and having a right." For a majority of
theorists, then, the question is what that connection is
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between rights and claims, and not whether there is one.
There is a second feature of the Claim Position
which makes it an attractive position. it may be that many
of the other historical positions on legal rights can be
rendered adequately in terms of the Claim Position. For
example, some of the views offered by Power Position theo-
rists actually suggest a Claim Position on legal rights.
Kocourek defines 'legal right' as "the capability to claim
an act from another." But he also defines a claim as "a
legal capability to require a positive or negative act from
another." Taken together, the suggestion is that rights
are claims. Kocourek himself encourages this rendering of
his view when he instructs that "it will be found conven-
ient to substitute for 'right' the term 'claim .'" 38
The two legal theorists Pound and Paton each sug-
gest that the Interest Position is, or could be construed
as, a version of the Claim Position. Pound argues that
both the "senses of 'legal right'" as interest, and as the
chief legal means of securing interests, can be defined
39m terms of "claim." He also argues that:
Interests are claims or demands or desires
involved immediately in the individual life
and asserted in title of that life.^O
Paton, in his discussion of "the element of interest as an
element of right," offers a similar statement about inter-
ests :
131
An interest is a claim or want of an individual
or group of individuals which that individual
or group wishes to satisfy. 41
Thus, Pound and Paton suppose that the Interest Position
can be considered a version of the Claim Position.
It already has been shown that there are reasons
for linking the Correlativity and Rules Positions with the
Claim Position on legal rights. Even the Moral Sense Posi-
tion views of Ryan and Boland invoke the notion of a claim
for identifying the moral sense of 'right.' Thus, the
Claim Position retains some of its attractiveness because
it has the umbrella feature of capturing some of the main
features of the other historical positions on legal rights.
Still, the Claim Position has been criticized on
many fronts. It is important here to consider what some
of these criticisms are, and to determine which, if any,
construal of the Claim Position survives the criticisms.
In discussions of the Claim Position, critics and
advocates alike typically distinguish between at least two
senses of 'claim.' In one sense (call it "claim^"), a
claim is an actual demand; this is the sense of 'claim' in
"to make a claim." In another sense (call it "clain^"),
a claim is a demand which, if made, would be valid, justi-
fied or at least defensible; this is the sense of 'claim'
in "to have a claim." (A third sense of 'claim' is intro-
duced later in this chapter.) On this two-sense
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distinction, having a claim is contrasted with making a
claim.
There is an important connection between having a
claim and making a claim, between claims.., and claims
. To
say that one has a claim (claim
2
) is to say that, if an ac-
tual demand (a claiir^) were made, then it (the clain^)
would be valid, justified or at least defensible. Thus,
having a claim may involve making a claim.
Critics ask whether rights are claims in either
sense of 'claim.' S. I. Benn argues that they are not.
Rights are not claims^ because persons possess rights to
things they never do or could demand as due. A creditor
has a right to be paid a debt by his/her debtor, even
though the creditor may never actually demand payment. In-
fants have rights, though they themselves are incapable of
claiming (i.e., claiming^) them. Nor are rights clairr^
according to Benn, since "this would locate the concept not
4 2m the language of description but in that of norms."
But Benn ' s criticism is spurious. No major theo-
rist holds that rights are claims^. Although many hold
that rights are claims2, this need not locate the concept
of aright in the language of norms, as Benn argues. One
could maintain, as indeed Feinberg and other claim theo-
rists do, that the characterization of rights as claims2
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links the notion of a right to a system of rules or princi-
ples. In this case, to say that a right is a claim
2
is to
say that, if a clain^ were made, it would be valid, justi-
fied or at least defensible within a system of governing
rules or principles. Here the notions of validity, justi-
fication and defensibility are no more "in the language of
norms" than when one validates, justifies or defends a
specific line in a formal proof by citing the relevant rule
of fftfs^snce used on proceeding lines to enable the deduc-
tion. Thus, the Claim^ Position withstands Benn
' s crit-
icisms .
As we have seen, McCloskey offers a different crit-
icism of claim views. He argues that rights are not
claims because rights essentially are rights to, not
rights against, and claims essentially are claims against.
But why suppose, as McCloskey does, that rights essentially
are rights to, or that claims essentially are claims a-
gainst? Rights created by contractual agreement (e.g., a
creditor's right to be paid a debt by his/her debtor) are
"rights against" and many theorists argue that non-contrac-
tual rights to something (e.g., rights to social security)
impose duties on others and, hence, are not simply "rights
to." Why suppose that the defendant's claim to impartial
treatment before the law, the landowner's claim to
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noninterference by trespassers, the beneficiary's claim to
an inheritance are not bona fide examples of "claims to"?
McCloskey's criticism of claim views is untenable.
A. M. Honore offers a third type of criticism of
the Claim Position. Like McCloskey, Honore grants that
certain claims protect rights. But he denies that rights
are identified with claims or with aggregates of claims
.
He argues:
The right unifies the claims and, very often
outlives them. It existed before some of the
claims presently recognized were evolved; it
will continue to be the same right, in an
intelligible sense, when new modes of protec-
tion are evolved. There would be no right
without some claims securing it, but the right
to bodily security is no more identifiable
with the claims now directed to securing
people's bodies than my right to £100 under
a contract is identifiable with my present
claim against the debtor for SIOO. 4 -3
Honore ' s criticism is unacceptable because it fails
to heed the distinction between the two senses of 'claim':
claim^, an actual demand, and claiir^, a demand which, if
made, would be at least defensible. It may be true that
rights exist before claims^, will outlive claims^, will
persist unchanged when the claims^ change, and are not
identified with claims^. But it does not follow that rights
are not claims^. To establish that Honore must show what




will outlive claiir^/ will persist
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unchanged when the claims^ change.
Appeals to international law and modern manifestos
on human rights provide a fourth type of argument against
the Claim Position. Two lines of criticism are offered.
The first line is that conditions of genuine human need
generate welfare rights" which are not mere claims; hence,
legal rights are not claims. The second line is that,
since people have claims to economic and social benefits
which are not yet transformed into legal rights to those
benefits, rights are not claims.
Neither line of criticism is effective against the
claiir^ view. The first line construes genuine human needs
in conditions of scarcity (e.g.
,
the needs for a nutritious
diet and adequate housing) as, or as providing grounds for,
genuine rights ("welfare" or "human" rights) which are not
mere claims. It establishes only that "welfare rights,"
if not claims at all, are not claims^. It is consistent
with this line to argue that these welfare rights are moral
claims, i.e., claims2, which, if they are not also claims^,
ought to be. That is, one could argue that welfare rights
are demands which are valid, justified or defensible on
moral grounds and which, if they are not already, ought to
be valid, justified or defensible on legal grounds. The
claiir^ view of rights is not undone by the first line of
criticism.
The second line of criticism construes genuine hu-
man needs as, or as providing grounds for, claims ("welfare
claims") which are not themselves recognized legal rights.
But the view that welfare claims are not legal rights does
not establish that rights are not claims^ A claim
2
view
defender has a legitimate counter: "Many demands which are
valid, justified or defensible on moral grounds lack legal
recognition and, hence, are not legal rights. Welfare
claims are an example of such legal claims, i.e., claims^
They are human or moral rights which are not yet legal
rights .
"
Suppose the critic persists, arguing that, al-
though genuine claims, welfare claims are not rights at
all—neither legal nor moral rights—and, hence, they are
not claims^ At best, they are "permanent possibilities
of rights." The claim
2
view defender now can offer a
different counter: "If welfare claims are not rights at
all, and, hence, are not claims
2
,
then they are claims in
some other sense of 'claim.' Either they are claims^, or,
to invoke a third, "propositional sense of 'claim'" of-
fered by Feinberg (call it "claim^"), they are claims^,
i.e., demands that one has, or should have, certain
4 4
rights. But the existence of welfare claims (i.e.,
claims^ or claims^) which are not rights (i.e., claims
2 )




rebuttal successfully defends the claim., view of rights
against the second line of criticism.
Thus, the popular view of rights as claims
2
with-
stands each of the four types of criticisms of the Claim
Position-Benn's, McCloskey's, Honore's, and the "human
need" objections. For our purposes, then, the Claim Posi-
tron on legal rights is taken to be the view that legal
rights are claimSj,- to have a legal right is to have a
claim2
.
The Correlativity Position . The Correlativity Po-
sition rarely is construed as a definitional position on
legal rights. Nearly all theorists who subscribe to some
version of the doctrine that legal rights and legal duties
are correlative define 'legal right' other than as "correl-
ative of a legal duty." For example, although Austin en-
dorses the view that legal rights and duties are correla-
tive, he seems to mean by 'legal right' a power, capacity
or advantage of extracting from another or others acts or
forbearances. in fact, Austin argues that some duties,
so-called "absolute duties" (e.g., duties to oneself, to a
sovereign, to animals) do not correlate with anyone's
rights to their performance or forbearance. This position
would be untenable for Austin if he assumed that 'legal
right' just means "the correlative of a legal duty."
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Hohfeld version of the Correlativity Position al-
so is a non-def initional view. He argues that 'right' is
an undefinable, fundamental legal term which is best ex-
plained in terms of an equivalence relation or "correla-
tivity with legal duties. Although entailment relations
hold between statements ascribing legal rights and state-
ments ascribing legal duties, he seems to deny that the
two notions are synonymous.
It is precisely for his failure to make the strong-
er definitional claim that Max Radin criticizes Hohfeld 's
correlativity position. Radin argues that Hohfeld incor-
rectly views rights and duties as correlatives, i.e., as
two distinct notions intimately connected, when they really
are synonyms. 46 Radin' s own position is one of the few
clear examples of a Correlativity Position advocate who
construes that position as a definitional one. He writes:
[Where B ought to do an act that A desires him
to do] A's demand-right and B's duty are not
correlatives because they are not separate, how-
ever closely connected, things at all. They are
two absolutely equivalent statements of the same
thing. B's duty does not follow from A's right.
The two terms are identical in what they seek
to describe as the active and passive form of
indicating an act; "A was murdered by B"; or
"B murdered A. "47
Many tangled and difficult issues are raised by the
Correlativity Position, especially ones concerning the
plausibility of thesis (T)
.
Since these require in-depth
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consideration, further consideration of the Correlativity
Position is reserved for Chapter VIII.
—
Rules Critics of the Rules Position
rgue that m general there are no entailment relations
Which hold between statements about legal rights and state-
ments about legal rules. They argue that there can be
legal rights in the absence of legal rules, and legal rules
which bear no direct relation to legal rights. Where legal
rules are related to legal rights, they argue that the na-
ture of that relation is not fixed. Some rules deny
rights; others confer or sustain rights. Typically, these
critics concede that sometimes the word 'right' is used
to state a rule of law, as is the case where 'right' in
the right of the accused to a speedy trial" is used both
to name a right and to specify or suggest a rule concerning
correct court procedure in criminal prosecutions. But they
insist that it is quite incorrect to say that in general
legal rights presuppose, or are presupposed by, legal rules
or by any other formal principles of procedure. While le-
gal rules may describe certain rights, give the conditions
under which rights hold, or state the legal consequences
which follow the infringement of rights, they are not cou-
pled with rights by any entailment relations.
Some of the Rules Position theorists, e.g., Hart
and Feinberg, would agree that 'legal right' is not defined
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in terms of legal rules. But that concession is made, not
on the grounds that there is no entailment relation which
holds between legal rights and legal rules, but on the
grounds that no formal definition of 'legal right' is pos-
sible or desirable. The Rules Position critic would insist,
and the defender would deny, that no general entailment re-
lations hold between legal rights and legal rules.
The Rules Position retains its popularity despite
the critic's objections. First, it emphasises the highly-
favored positivist view that legal rights are civil, poli-
tical rights only, that they presuppose a rule-governed
legal system. Second, it provides a way of creating new
rights, of justifying ascription of rights, and of testing
the validity of rights. Third, it accomodates theorists
who seek a generic identification of rights in terms of
which both legal rights and moral rights are rights pro-
perly so-called. The Rules Position is attractive as a
framework for analyzing rights, even if it has weaknesses
as a position on the analysis of rights. For these reasons
critics who construe the Rules Position narrowly as a posi-
tion on the meaning of 'legal right' overlook important
features of the position.
The prediction position
. The Prediction Position
is that statements ascribing legal rights are predictive
statements about what courts and other public officials
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will do m a given case. Critics argue that this view is
unacceptable as an analysis of 'legal right.' They point
out that it is not absurd to suppose that someone has a
legal right, e.g., to receive alimony, even though there
is no likelihood or expectation that a court will award al-
imony. Nor is it absurd to suppose that a certain person
can expect to receive special treatment by the courts even
though the person has no legal right to that treatment,
e.g., in cases where the courts are corrupt.
However, it is not clear that legal realists and
sociological jurists intend the Prediction Position to be
a definitional position. Certainly legal realism and
sociological jurisprudence have been heralded for their
rejection of abstract theorization about rights in favor of
talk about concrete cases, discernible official behavior
and predictable legal consequences. On a Prediction Posi-
tion account, if lawyers ask "Has my client a right to her
father’s property?” they are asking, "According to the
words used by the father in his will, made, dated and
signed by him in such-and-such a place and in conformity
with accepted legal procedure, may I demand from the trustee
or judge that the property be transferred to my client?
Is it likely that she will be awarded the property?" This
may be all that Holmes and Llewellyn intend when they argue,
respectively, that "every [legal] right is a certain
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consequence attached bv thp +-^DY ne law to °ne or more facts which
the law defines,
"
4 8 and that talk of behavior should be
substituted for talk of legal rights because the latter "is
a block to clear thinking about matters legal" while the
former is not. 49
Summary
Eight historical positions on legal rights have
been discussed. They are two strictly natural law posi-
tions (the Moral Sense and Moral Validation Positions) and
six non-stnctly natural law positions (.the Interest, Power,
Claim, Correlativity, Rules and Prediction Positions. Ex-
cept for the Moral Validation Position, each generates a
position on legal right-holders. In addition, accounts
of legal right-holders which do not presuppose any of the
historical positions on legal rights have been discussed.
This discussion has made clear just what is as-
serted by each position, separating off the plausible from
the non-plausible versions of each position. In addition,
it provided the requisite information for determining, in
succeeding Chapters, VII, VIII and IX, whether there are
any successful objections to the main thesis, (T)
,
based
on the positions in American legal theory on legal rights
and legal right-holders.
CHAPTER VII
theories of legal rights and legal
RIGHT-HOLDERS: THE HISTORICAL
POSITION OBJECTIONS
In Chapter VI, the eight historical positions on
legal rights and legal right-holders were discussed. in
this chapter, plausible objections to the main thesis, (T)
based on seven of these positions are stated and defeated.
Objections to (T) based on the eighth position, the Correl
ativity Position, are discussed separately in Chapter VIII
Unless otherwise indicated, each objection is referred to
by the name of the historical position on which it is
based. The discussion begins with the non-strictly natur-
al law position objection to (T)
Non-Strictly Natural Law Position Objections
The Interest Position Objection
. It was shown in Chapter
VI that the definition of 'legal right' as an interest or
as the chief means for securing interests in implausible.
Nonetheless, it is true and significant that legal rights
often delimit, secure and protect interests. On a non-
def initional construal of the Interest Position, then,
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there is a reasonable objection to (T)
:
"Legal rights de _
SeCUrS and *"*** interests. Legal right-holders
are carriers of interests. But natural objects such as
trees. swamps and bugs are not carriers of interests; they
have no interests to delimit, secure or protect. Hence,
they cannot have legal rights."
To determine whether the Interest Position Objec-
tion is damaging to (T)
,
three interrelated questions must
be answered: what is an interest? what is meant by ’inter
-
est’ when it is claimed that natural objects do not and can-
not be said to have interests? Why suppose that natural
objects cannot have interests? in the discussion which
follows, the answers to these questions are those given by
Benn and McCloskey. Their views are taken as representative
of Interest Position views generally. Bothare shown to be
defective against (T)
.
What is an interest? Recall that Interest Position
theorists invoke either a three-sense or a three-kind doc-
trine to describe interests. De facto interests (inter-
ests^ are what an entity, X, actually desires, wants or
likes. Prudential interests (interests^ are what it is to
X's advantage to have. De jure interests (interests^ are




Benn's and McCloskey's views are variations on this
three-sense doctrine. Benn offers a distinction between
"at least two senses of 'interest'/' roughly equivalent to
the distinction offered above between de facto interests
and prudential interests, respectively. He argues that in
one sense, "an interest organizes or gives a consistent
direction to otherwise diverse activity," the sense of
'interest' in "John is interested in music." m a second
sense, an interest is something conducive to an entity's
well-being, the sense of 'interest' in "Having one's teeth
checked periodically is in a person’s interest." McCloskey
argues that the concept of interests includes not only
what is for a person’s welfare, but also what is, or ought
to be, of concern to the person. His view is that interests
are not prudential interests only; they are also de facto
interests and de jure interests.
What is meant by 'interests' when it is claimed
that natural objects cannot be carriers of interests, and
why suppose that natural objects cannot have interests?
Consider first Benn's view. Invoking his distinction be-
tween "at least two senses of 'interest'," what I have
called de facto interests (interest^) and prudential inter-
ests (interests^
, Benn's argument is that natural objects
are not carriers of de facto interests. His argument is
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straightforward: It is proper +-0 • uto ascribe rights only to
subjects having interests which organize nruiyd o give a consis-
tent direction to activity, de facto interests or inter-
estsr But few, if any, natural objects are carriers of
interests^ certainly trees and rocks are not. Thus, it
is improper to ascribe rights to at least most natural ob-
jects. If one concedes that doing certain things is con-
ducive to the well-being of natural objects, then they may
be carriers of prudential interests, interests^ But this
concession is unhelpful in showing that natural objects
could be said to have rights.
Thus, Berm's argument is that natural objects can-
not be right-holders because proper ascription of rights
requires subjects who/which are interest-carriers
,
which
natural objects are not. His reasons for denying inter-
e°tl carrier status to natural objects involve the notion
of a "chooser." Only entities having a capacity for choice,
i.e., actual or potential choosers, properly are described
as having rights. Persons are moral persons, i.e., bear-
ers of moral rights, because of their speical status as
choosers. They are capable of making decisions, selecting
ends, and manipulating their social environment to achieve
those ends. But "choosers" are interest^-carriers
. Hence,
only carriers of interests
x
(de facto interests) are
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right-holders. According to Benn, if one allows 'right'
to range over non-choosers such as natural objects, "the
term is being devalued, losing its specificity."'*'
Benn's account is not as forceful as it may seem.
He does not deny that natural objects could be legal right-
holders. in fact, he states explicitly:






natural objects. The status ofN r r has already been extended in law from
ations ^
man eingS t0 infants and business corpor-
Rather
,
he argues that if one extends 'right' in law to
include natural objects as legal right-holders, then the
notion of a right undergoes an unwelcome conceptual shift
from its characteristic ascription to moral personalities
( choosers, interest^-carriers) to a new ascription to
non-moral entities ("non-choosers," non-interest^carriers)
An ascription of legal rights to natural objects which did
not involve such a shift would amount to a characteriza-
tion of natural objects as moral persons (choosers, inter-
es




which they are not. Thus, if one ascribes
legal rights to natural objects, one must abandon the view
of a right-bearer as a moral person, a view which "is root-
ed very deeply in our mode of perceiving ourselves in the
world, and is not to be lightly surrendered."^
Thus, Benn's argument is that in order to make
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natural objects legal right-holders, there must be a con-
ceptual shift in the notion of a right from that of
chooser" to that of "non-chooser." This shift would
"make it difficult to identify a certain type of normative
relation that exists between persons, but which cannot
exist between person and thing ." 4 He concludes that al-
though ascription of legal rights to natural objects is
possible, it requires surrendering our well-entrenched
view that rights are ascribed to moral persons.
Suppose one concedes that natural objects are not
interest^-carriers
; they are not moral agents, choosers,
bearers of moral rights. It does not follow that (a) nat-
objects cannot be ascribed legal rights, or that (b)
ascription of legal rights to natural objects requires
surrendering a deeply rooted notion of ourselves as moral
persons. Proposition (a) follows only if it is assumed
that the capacity for choice or for having interests^ is a
necessary condition for proper ascription of rights.
While this may be true for ascription of moral rights, it
is not true, at least in any literal sense, for proper
ascription of legal rights. The main feature of the doc-
trine of legal personality is that it allows for ascrip-
tion of legal rights to entities acknowledged as non-moral
persons (non-choosers, non-interest^-carriers) .
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Suppose the view that legal right-holders are car-
riers of de facto interests CL . e
. , interest^ is insisted
upon at this point. Is there any sense in which it is or
might be true that having de facto interests is a necessary
condition of having legal rights? If so, then, since arti-
ficial persons such as trusts, funds, idols, ships and cor-
porations have been recognized as legal right-holders, it
IS a condition which they satisfy. They would be said to
have de facto interests, to be moral persons. What could
this mean? Surely idols and ships are not moral persons;
they do not make choices, have desires, or exercise a will.
If they properly are said to have de facto interests or
to exhibit moral personality, it is because the law treats
them as if they had de facto interests or moral personality,
When, in fact, they lack both. In some cases, for example
where the artificial person is comprised of individual
humans (e.g., corporations), talk of the interests of the
artificial person is a convenient shorthand for talk,
however cumbersome, of the interestSl of individual humans
who comprise or represent it. In other cases, for example
where the artificial person is not comprised of individual
humans (e.g., trusts, ships, idols), talk of the interests^
of the artificial person does not reduce to talk of the
interests^of constituent human members. Thus, insofar
as some legal representative is empowered to act on behalf
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° f ^ artlflcial person
' the law attributes the acts and
Will of the representative to the artificial person, treat-
ing the latter as if it had a will or a capacity to act.
I" b° th CaSeS
' the result ls the same. Although on a lit-
eral reading, it is false that all artificial persons
themselves have de facto interests or moral personality,
on a non-literal reading, it may be true that all artifi-
cial persons which are legal persons have de facto inter-
ests or moral personality. if it is true, it is true just
insofar as the law attributes to artificial persons a cap-
acity to act or de facto interests; it is true just inso-
far as the law treats artificial persons as if they had a
capacity to act or de facto interests. And if it is true,
then the condition that legal right-holders must be car-
riers of de facto interests is a condition which arti-
ficial persons could be said to satisfy.
The case of natural objects as artificial persons
need be no different. Insofar as a legal representative
may be empowered to act on behalf of a natural object, the
natural object may be said to act. Similarly, the inter-
ests
1
of the legal representative, acting in his/her of-
ficial capacity as representative of the natural object,
may be imputed to the natural object itself. If a neces-
sary condition of an entity's having legal rights is that
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the entity has, or is capable of having, de facto inter-
ests, then, properly understood, it is a condition which
natural objects, like other artificial powers, could be
said to satisfy. Thus, even if one assumes that natural
objects are not themselves carriers of interest Sl , it does
not follow that they cannot have legal rights, proposi-
tion (a)
.
Nor does proposition (b) follow. Humans may con-
tinue to perceive themselves correctly as moral persons
without that view being jeopardized by the ascription of
legal rights to natural objects. One thing appeal to the
doctrine of legal personality suggests is that the ex-
pressions 'right' and 'person' do not have the same mean-
ing in legal discourse that they have in moral discourse.
Benn mistakenly supposes that because the expressions
right' and 'right-holder' in moral discourse apply only
to moral persons, in all discourse, including legal dis-
course, they apply only to moral persons. However, sup-
pose, as many theorists do, that there is a generic sense
of right' according to which moral rights and legal rights
are two kinds of rights. Moral persons have moral rights;
legal persons, some of whom also may be moral persons, have
legal rights. Appeal to a generic sense of 'right' and to
a distinction between two kinds of rights and two kinds of
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persons not only preserves the view that 'right' has a
common meaning when used in moral and in legal contexts.
It also explains how the view that only humans are moral
persons can be preserved if one extends legal rights to
natural objects.
Benn would reject an appeal to the doctrine of le-
gal representation as a way of explaining how natural ob-
jects, themselves incapable of making choices, nonetheless
could be said to have legal rights. He argues that a move
to empower a legal representative to make choices on be-
half of subjects themselves incapable of "natural choice"
has just the shortcoming of requiring the unwelcome con-
ceptual shift in the notion of a right-holder from that of
interest-carrier to that of interest.,
-carrier
. By al-
lowing a guardian ad litem to make choices on behalf of
natural objects, the powers of the agent are constrained
by the condition that they be exercised only for the ad-
vantage of the natural objects, i.e., for what is in their
interests (i.e.,mterests
2 )
. Since there are not similar con-
straints on a principal's exercise of his/her own rights,
appeal to the doctrine of legal representation requires




' s view is unfounded, for reasons suggested
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already. First, either it is false that a necessary con-
dition of an entity's having legal rights is that it has,
or is capable of having, interests^ or, if true, it is a
condition which natural objects could be said to satisfy,
second, one need not abandon the view that only humans are
moral persons in order to show that non-humans could be
legal right-holders. if one permits a distinction between
either two different kinds of persons (viz., moral persons
and legal persons) or two specific senses of 'person'
(Viz., a philosophical or moral sense and a legal sense),
then one is able both to preserve the view that only
humans are moral persons (moral right-holders, choosers,
interest-carriers) and to explain how non-humans meaning-
fully can be said to be right-holders, viz., legal right-
holders. Third, legal representatives may use their
powers to secure either the interestSl of the principal
(e.g., in the case of "ordinary humans") or the interests
the principal (e.g.
,
in the cases of some "non-
ordinary humans," such as infants and mental incompetents,
and of at least some "artificial persons," such as trusts
and municipalities). Thus, no clue as to whether a prin-
cipal's interestSj^ or interests
2
are secured is gleamed
from the fact that a legal representative makes claims and
choices on behalf of the principal.
154
Thus, Benn's reason for rejecting an appeal to the
doctrine of legal representation to explain how natural ob-
jects meaningfully could be said to have legal rights is
unsatisfactory. Adoption of the doctrine of legal repre-
sentation does not require abandoning the view that only
humans are moral persons, choosers, interest-carriers
,
havers of moral rights.
A reasonable, alternative inference to both (a)
and (b) is open to Benn. it is that (c) ascription of
legal rights to an entity, unlike ascription of moral
rights, does not presuppose that the entity is a moral
person, a chooser, an interes^-carr ier
. One who adopts
(c) in effect concedes that the issue of the moral per-
sonality of plants, the soil and the like need not be re
solved in order to defend (T)
.
Not only is Benn's view not damaging to the case
for (T)
;
it might even be harnessed in support of (T)
Consider the case where the law protects landlords by
permitting recovery for loss due to damage to apartment
units by tenants. The assumption is that it is to a land-
lord's advantage to be so protected. The law protects
what it takes to be in a landlord's interests, i .e
. ,
inter-
es ^ s 2‘ N°w suppose a particular landlord, a wealthy, hu-
manitarian landlord, has no desire to be so protected or
155
to so protect herself. she collects no damage deposits
from tenants, initiates no legal action against tenants
who abuse apartment units, and absorbs whatever repair
costs are incurred. The landlord has no interest^ in being
protected against damages to apartment units, even though
the law provides for the protection of the landlord's in-
terests^ This is a plausible case where the law provides
for the protection of interests.,, even though there are
no corresponding interests^
Suppose it is objected both that the reason why
we can speak truly of a landlord's having or lacking in-
terests
2
is because he/she has, or is capable of having,
interests^ and that it is because the landlord has, or
is capable of having, interests^^ that the law protects the
landlord's interests,,. Basically, this two-part objection
is that the law protects an entity's interests
2
only if
that entity has, or is capable of having, interest Sl .
This objection has no force. it is not true in
general, and Benn would deny, that having or being capable
of having interests
1
is a necessary condition of having
interests.,. Furthermore, it is not true in this particular
case that the landlord's interests
2
stem from her inter-








, it protects only those interests, of interest -




or, if there are, the case for
saying that the law protects this landlord's interests,, is




In certain cases, then, legal rights in fact pro-
tect interests
2
only. By conceding that at least some nat-
ural objects are carriers of interests
2 ,
as Benn does, one
could argue that it is possible that some legal rights for
at least some natural objects could be devised for pro-
tecting the interests,, of those objects. Of course, un-
less one holds that having interests., qualifies an entity
for having legal rights, this does not constitute an argu-
ment for ascribing legal rights to natural objects. it
merely points out that legal rights often do protect inter-
ests^ which interests at least some natural objects are
purported to have. As such, it leaves open a move for
connecting up the interests
2
of some natural objects with
legal rights of those objects to delimit, secure and pro-
tect their interests^
McCloskey
' s position does not fare much better a-
gainst (T)
. He offers two reasons for not talking of legal
rights of "things," even where a trustee properly can be
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' buildings, paintings,. ot interests in' the strict sense
of ^
te*ests
r such that we could literally speakthe trustees caring for the interest ofthing. Secondly, and partly for this reason
h
the trustee could hardly be said to be the re-s^s ?h^;s — - ***
(I am concerned here only with that part of McCloskey's
argument which is appropriate to a discussion of natural
objects specifically, not to paintings, buildings or other
artifacts.) McCloskey's two reasons are that things do
not have interests "in the strict sense," and, since they
do not, trustees cannot be said to represent the things.
What is the meaning of 'interests' according to
which legal right-holders have, but natural objects lack,
interests? McCloskey writes:
The concept of interests which is so importanthere is an obscure and elusive one. Interests
are distinct from welfare, and are more inclu-
sive in certain respects--usually what is dic-
tated by concern for a man's welfare is in hisinterests. However, interests suggest much
more than that which is indicated by the per-
son's welfare. They suggest that which is or
ought to be or would be of concern to the
person/being. It is partly for this reason--
because the concept of interests has this
evaluative-prescriptive overtone— that we de-
cline to speak of interests of animals, and
speak rather of their welfare.
^
Here the suggestions is that since natural objects do not
and cannot have concerns, they cannot have interests.
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Roughly, McCloskey's view is that- n a+- , ^ .* l nat natural objects lack the
de facto interests (interests 1 •v n
1 )
and de jure interests (in-
terests
3
) necessary both for having rights and for having
legal representatives. McCloskey grants that certain ac-
tions may be conducive to a thing's welfare and, hence,
"m its interests," interests.,. But he prefers substi-
tuting talk of what is in the thing's welfare for talk of
a thing's having interests because, properly speaking, to
have interests an entity must be capable of having or pos-
sessing things, a capacity which "things" lack.
Two things are going on in McCloskey's argument
against ascribing legal rights to "things." First, he





. They are entities who/which have or ought to have
concerns. Second, they are entities who/which can possess
things. Since natural objects can neither be said to have
concerns nor to possess anything, they cannot be said to
have legal rights.
What about, e.g., mentally incompetent persons who
do not have the concerns necessary for ascribing rights?
Does McCloskey's account require saying that they, like
n^tural objects, do not have rights? McCloskey does not
think so. Since they are "possible potential possessors
of interests," he grants that "we do attribute rights and
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and even to incurable
Part of the reason for this is the
such beings, unlike the congenital
are possibly potential possessors
Hence, until it is clear that they
really be said to have interests/







The reason why the case of natural objects is different is
that they are not even possible potential possessors of
anything
.
McCloskey is firm on the point that the possibil
ity of possessing something, particularly rights and in-
terests, is a necessary condition of ascribing rights or
interests. He states that,




McCloskey thinks it is this feature of right-holders as
possessors of things which decisively excludes lower ani-
mals from being right-holders. He asks, "Can a horse pos-
sess anything, e.g., its stable, its rug, in a literal
sense of 'possess'?" (McCloskey does not say what sense
that is.) It cannot. The case for natural objects is the
same. Since they are not possible possessors of anything,
and since interests and rights are possessed, natural ob-
jects cannot have either interests or rights.
Thus, McCloskey' s view is that natural objects are
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incapable of having the de facto interests or de jure in-
terests necessary for having rights and for having legal
presentatives. The reasons why they cannot be said to
have these interests is that they cannot be said either to
have concerns or to possess anything. The reason why ap-
peal to the doctrine of legal representation is unhelpful
is that it is extended properly only to entities which are
possible possessors of things, which natural objects are
not.
Is McCloskey's view damaging to (T) ? i do not
think so. It was argued in connection with Benn's view
that an entity’s having de facto interests is not a nec-
essary condition of its having legal rights. The same is
true for de jure interests. Setting these issues aside,
however, McCloskey’s argument fails to provide adequate
grounds for supposing that natural objects could not be
said to possess anything, particularly rights. Although
he does not provide anything like an analysis of the con-
cept of possession, McCloskey does offer some examples of
possessed things and of why we do not speak of "things" as
possessing anything. To show that McCloskey's position
fails to establish that natural objects are not possible




McCloskey thinks rights are possessed. So are
stables and rugs. These are among one's posses-
sions. Setting aside "category mistake" worries here, su E
pose McCloskey is correct so far. According to McCloskey,
Who or what can possess things, and in virtue of what do
they possess things? He states:




?" ^ ° f my P°ssessions-indeed
rights?10
possess them by virtue of my
The suggestion is that people possess things (e.g., horses
stables and rugs) because they possess rights. The rights
to possess things are what entitle one to possess those
things. Thus, only entities having rights can possess
things
.
But McCloskey 's argument is confused. The initial
reason given why natural objects could not be said to have
rights was that they could not possess anything. Here the
suggestion is that being able to possess things presup-
poses that one has rights. Since natural objects do not
now have rights, obviously, on the latter account, they
could not be described as possessing anything. Yet to be
described as possessing things, they apparently must first
be awarded rights. The circularity in McCloskey's account
looms large. It will not do to argue, as McCloskey finally
seems to do, that one cannot describe natural objects as
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right-holders because they do not possess things, and then
restrict the notion of a possessor to (present) right-
holders
.
McCloskey offers several other examples to show
that, e.g., animals cannot possess things. Two of them
purport to show "the grounds of our uneasiness" in speak-
ing of the legal rights of animals in cases where legal
claims made on behalf of animals are appropriate:
Suppose that, as a result of deliberate legal
enactment, the kangaroo came to be accorded
something like the privileged position of the
cow in India, the kangaroo having full rights
of movement, on the roads, on private property,
^ suggest that we should be reluctant to
speak of the legal rights of kangaroos. Thisis clear from our manner of speaking of nativebirds and animals in sanctuaries today. We
speak of our being obliged to leave them alone,
not of them as having legal rights, not of them
as being legally entitled to be left alone.
The law confers duties on us, not rights in
the animals . 11
Of course, that animals presently do not have legal rights
s a good reason for not speaking of them as having legal
rights. But neither their current lack of legal right-
holder status, nor our reluctance to speak of them as
having legal rights, shows that they cannot have legal
rights. What, then, is McCloskey' s reason for supposing
that our reluctance bears on whether or not animals can
have legal rights?
The answer supposedly is found in the example about
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the kangaroo. In speaking about kangaroos, just as in
speaking about birds and animals in sanctuaries, we speak
of our being obliged to leave them alone, not of their
having rights, e.g., the right to be left alone. Although
we are obliged to perform or forbear from performing cer-
tain actions regarding them, they do not have rights to
this performance or forbearance. stated in general terms,
McCloskey assumes that, where X and Y are entities, not all
duties of Y to X entail rights of X against Y . 12 However,
even if this assumption is correct (a topic discussed in
Chapter VIII), all it establishes is that an argument for
ascribing rights to natural objects cannot be based on the
view that all duties imply correlative rights. It does
not show that natural objects cannot have rights. Thus,
even if McCloskey 's description of how we do and should
talk of kangaroos and of birds and animals in sanctuaries
is correct, this does not show that natural objects cannot
be said to have legal rights.
One interesting feature of McCloskey' s example is
that it actually provides grounds for supposing what
McCloskey intends to deny, viz., that it may be appropriate
to speak of legal rights of kangaroos. These grounds are
given by McCloskey 's talk of "privileges." Hohfeld and
others have argued that ’right' " strictu sensu " ought to
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be distinguished from privileges and other "legal advan-
tages." However, Hohfeld never actually states whether
privileges are a species of rights, or not rights at all.
Max Radin attributes to him the latter view, and criticizes
Hohfeld for holding it. For Radin, Hohfeld 's distinction
between rights and privileges conflicts with accepted
usage; privileges clearly are rights. Other theorists,
e.g., Maher, argue that 'right' includes the meaning
"privilege." which view one holds bears on how one as-
sesses McCloskey's example of the kangaroo. If privileges
are a kind of right (Radio’s view), or if a legitimate
meaning of 'right' includes the notion of privileges (Maher's
view)
,
then by saying that kangaroos have certain legal
privileges, one would be conceding that they have rights,
in an acceptable sense or use of the term 'rights.
'
McCloskey's example, which construes kangaroos as having
certain privileges awarded by deliberate legal enactment,
provides grounds for describing them as right-holders.
McCloskey's second example concerns legal systems
in which animals which kill men are tried and, if found
guilty, executed:
If an animal is given an unfair trial under such
a system and its legal representative demands a
new trial, he could perhaps say that the animal
had not received its legal rights (lawyers seem
inclined to speak in this way) but it seems more
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ac curate and less misleading simply to sav fhat-
orfg Pr°PS^ °b--ed in'the*'i mal trial. Compare with a trial of a man 13
McCloskey concludes that it is "more accurate and less mis-
leading" to say in such cases that the law had not been
properly observed than to say the animal had not received
its legal rights. But has he shown this? Some theorists,
e.g., Maher, argue that where there are two ways to de-
scribe a legal situation, one which is the way lawyers
ordinarily speak and one which is not, one should opt for
the description and terminology used by lawyers. On an
ordinary lawyer's language" view, then, it would be "more
accurate and less misleading" to say that the animal had
not received its legal rights, than to use some alterna-
tive description not used by lawyers.
Why does McCloskey think the proper description is
that the law had not been properly observed? To state,
simply, that entities are not described as having legal
rights does not explain why they cannot have legal rights.
Yet this is at least part of what McCloskey does say. He
attempts to clarify why we do not speak of tried and con-
victed animals in such legal systems as having legal
rights by considering the case of "things." But this is
what he says about things:
Things do not have legal rights in our system,













is not so descr?bed"l4
t l "S havin9 le9^ eights
The question, of oourse, is whether things could be so de-
Could natural objects meaningfully be described
as having legal rights, even if they are not now so de-
scribed?
Perhaps McCloskey's reason for saying that in such
legal systems one would not describe the animals as having
had their legal rights violated is embedded in his direc-
tive "Compare with a trial of a man." if so
,
it is not
clear how the comparison helps McCloskey's case. m trials
of humans
,
to say that a trial was unfair is to complain
of injustice. it is a way of saying that a plaintiff's or
a defendant's right to a fair trial was denied, overlooked,
infringed or otherwise violated. in such cases, the par-
ty's legal right to a fair trial is not at issue. What is
at issue is whether that right was violated. On this com-
parison of the case of a convicted animal with "a trial of
a man," it would be fitting to say that the animal's rights
were denied. Since this is just what McCloskey intends to
deny, it is not clear what comparison McCloskey intends.
For these reasons, McCloskey's view that natural
objects could not be said to have legal rights because they
could not be said to possess things, and thus could not be
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lntSreStS
' iS n0t weH“founded
. McCloskey's
VSrS10n ° f ^ Interest Position Objection to (T) is im-
Plausible. Since the positions of Benn and McCloskey are
taken as representative of the positions generating rea-
onable versions of the Interest Position Objection to (T)
,
and neither poses a successful objection to (T)
, ( T ) with-
stands the Interest Position Objection to it.
—Objection. The restated, non-defini-
tional Power Position view is that legal rights often cre-
ate, guarantee or secure legal powers, and that those
powers presuppose the legal rights of those who have them
to have and to exercise them. This formulation of the
Power Position seems to generate a reasonable objection to
(T)
. Legal rights create, guarantee and delimit legal
powers. But natural objects cannot have legal powers.
Therefore, they cannot have legal rights." However few,
if any. Power Position theorists would offer this objec-
tion. This can be shown by reconsidering the "ordinary
lawyer's view" and the Hohfeldian view of legal powers.
On the ordinary lawyer's view, legal powers are
"special” or "delegated" rights. They are rights con-
ferred on persons because of their special legal status,
function or circumstances, or because of certain contrac-
tual agreements involving them. Legal powers are not
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identified with the powers of ordinary hUmans in their non-
legal capacities. S imilarly
, where the view ±s ^
certain legal powers is a prerequisite for having or exer-
cising legal rights, it is legal representatives and par-
ties to contractual agreements who/whioh constitute the
appropriate entities for having these legal powers. On
this view, natural objects are not the sort of entity to
which legal powers properly are ascribed, just as indivi-
duals in non-official capacities (i.e., when they are not
acting as legal agents or in certain contractual positions)
are not the appropriate bearers of legal powers. It is
persons in official capacities, and not represented enti-
ties or individuals in non-official capacities, who pro-
are said to have legal powers.
Given the ordinary lawyer's view of legal powers
and of who has them, extension of the doctrine of legal
representation to natural objects is an extension to the
appropriate sort of entity, viz., the legal representative,
of the requisite legal powers for safeguarding the legal
rights of natural objects. Even if it is only the legal
representative who could be said to have legal powers, it
is the legally represented entity who/which has or quali-
fies for the legal rights in question. Thus, the ordinary
lawyer's view of legal powers does not preclude ascription
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of legal rights to natural objects T +- tr , ^er . it would not endorse
the proposed Power Position Objection to (T)
.
The Hohfeldian view is that legal powers are not
rights at all in any proper sense of 'rights'. They are
powers accorded individuals and public bodies for the pur-
pose of creating, divesting or altering the legal relations
and legal status of entities, including their legal rights
and legal right-holder status. The persons or groups
g such powers are, e.g.
, lawyers, legal representa-
tives, judges and legislatures. It is persons or groups
acting in official capacities who/which are the appro-
priate entities to whom/which legal powers are ascribed.
But, surely, some such groups (e.g., judges, legislatures)
are empowered to alter the legal right-holder status of
natural objects, whether or not they elect to do so is a
separate issue. The point is that they could, i.e., they
have the legal power to do so. since, on the Hohfeldian
view of legal powers, it is these persons and official
bodies who/which properly are said to have legal powers,




Thus, on both the ordinary lawyer's view and the
Hohfeldian view of legal powers, the Power Position Objec-
tion to (T) never gets going. It incorrectly construes
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legal powers as belonging to entities other than persons
and groups acting in official capacities (e.g., other than
legal agents, judges, legislatures). Furthermore, if
having certain legal powers is a prerequisite for entering
into contractual agreements, it is a prerequisite which
natural objects could be said to satisfy by virtue of their
having duly-appointed legal representatives having the re-
quired legal powers. Even though it is the legal repre-
sentative who has the legal powers associated with making
contracts in the name of the represented entity, it is the
represented entity (here, the natural object) who/which is
said to have the legal rights in question. For these rea-
sons, the Power Position Objection to (T) carries no
weight
.
The Claim Position O b jection
. The Claim Position poses one
potentially serious objection to (T ): 15 "Rights are claims
2 ,
i.e., demands which, if made, would be valid, justified or
at least defensible. To have a legal right is to have a
legal claim
2
. But natural objects cannot have or be said
to have legal claims
2
. Thus, they cannot have or be said
to have legal rights."
Who or what can have, or be said to have, legal
claims
2
? Is it consistent with the claim
2
view of rights




so, then the Claim Position Objection to (T) fails.
Who or what can claim? The commonly accepted view
is that only humans can claim. When that view is not mere-
ly stipulated, two lines of argument typically are advanced.
The first is that only entities who/which are moral agents,
moral persons, rational or capable of choice can claim.
On the assumption that only humans are moral agents, moral
persons, etc., only humans can claim. The second line
points to the manner in which claims are asserted. For
example, Feinberg says this about claiming : 16 To make
claim to something is to "petition or seek by virtue of
supposed right; to demand as due;" "what is essential to
claiming that is the manner of assertion;" "To claim that
one has rights is to demand or insist that they be recog-
nized. The suggestion here is that to engage in claim-
ing activity is to utter sentences, issue demands, sign
petitions, or otherwise engage in observable, public be-
havior in such a manner as to affirm or insist that what
is claimed be recognized or granted. Where what is claim-
ed is a right, claiming activity consists in demanding re-
cognition of one's rights. On this line of reasoning,
only humans can claim.
Whichever line is taken, the commonly accepted
view is that only humans can claim. Suppose this is true.
172
the claim theorist distinction between senses of
'claim, which sense ( s, of 'claim' is it tree. Clearly,
first and third senses. Only humans can make claims(claimj and claim that (clai^J
, only they can make de-
mands or Claim that a right, interest or whatever be re-
cognized. if the family dog , s persistent barking ^ ^
back door correctly is described as a demand or claim made
by the dog to its owner that the door be opened and it be
let outside, it is a demand or claim in some sense other
than the performative and propositional senses of 'claim'.
If the dog's barking is not described as "claiming acti-
vity," it is because dogs do not make claims or claim that.
They cannot be said to claim in either of the two senses
of 'claim' required for their behavior to constitute
claiming activity, stated simply, dogs do not clain^ or
claim^
.
Suppose, then, that only humans can claim, i.e.,
can make claims or claim that. it does not follow that
non-humans cannot be said to have claims. To have a claim
is to have a claim
2 , and no claim theorist asserts that
having a claim entails making a claim or claiming that.
In fact, Feinberg explicitly states that one can have a
claim without ever claiming that to which one is entitled
.
17
Presumably he would also grant that, e.g., a landlord can
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have a claim to have a tenant evicted even if the landlord
never actually makes claim to that right. what claim the-
orists do assert is, in Feinberg’s words, that "having a
claim consists in being in a position to claim, that is,
to make claim to or to claim that." The relevant question,
then, is who or what can be said to be in a position to
claim?
Undoubtedly most claim theorists would argue that
since only humans can claim, only they can be said to be
in a position to claim. Thus, natural objects could not
be said to be in a position to claim. Suppose this is
true, also. Does it follow that natural objects cannot
have claims and, hence, cannot have legal rights? No, as
a reconsideration of Feinberg's position makes clear.
Feinberg's view is that having a claim entails
being in a position to claim, i.e., to engage in proposi-
tional and performative claiming. which humans correctly
can be construed as "in a position to claim"? Feinberg
offers an explicit statement of who can make claims, and
thus be in a position to claim. He states,
Generally speaking, only the person who has a
title or has qualified for it, or someone
speaking in his name, can make claim to some-
thing as a matter of right. 18









t0 make claim is to
title; in the^ther ZlTtl ctl^lTsTo^
Thus, making claims (claiming
1 ) can consist of either ex-
ercising rights one has already, or making application for
some rights. Either the entity who/which has or qualifies
for the right, or someone speaking in the entity's name,
can make claims. Thus, on Feinberg's account, an entity
or its legal representative can engage in claiming acti-
vity. on the assumption that only those who can claim can
be in a position to claim, Feinberg's position is that
only humans who represent themselves or who are the legal
representatives of other entities can be in a position to
claim.
Once again we find the doctrine of legal repre-
sentation invoked to explain which entities can be said
to meet the necessary conditions for having legal rights.
For claims theorists, appeal to the doctrine explains how
an entity can have or qualify for legal rights when it it-
self is not able to engage in claiming activity. in the
case of natural objects, it provides an explanation of how
natural objects meaningfully can be said to have legal
rights (i.e., legal claims2) even though it is their legal
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representatives who engage in claiming activity.
Surely the original Claim Position Objection to
<T) would be insisted upon at this point: "To have a legal
right is to have a legal claim. But having a claim con-
sists in being in a position to claim. Natural objects
cannot be said to be in such a position, where a legal
representative makes claims on behalf of the represented
entity, it is the legal representative, and not the repre-
sented entity, who is in the position to claim, since
natural objects fail to satisfy a necessary condition of
having a claim, viz., being in a position to claim, they
cannot have claims. Hence, they cannot have legal rights.
On a claim view of rights, (T) is false."
According to this objection, a necessary condition
of an entity's having a claim is that the entity be in a
position to claim. It is alleged that natural objects
fail to satisfy this condition. But this is not what claim
theorists do and feel they must hold. Claim theorists
agree that it is the represented entity who/which has the
legal right in question, even though it may be a legal
agent who secures the right. Thus, claim theorists accept
( 0 ) :
(8) For any entity, X, if X has a valid legal
claim, then either X or X's legal repre—
senta tive is in a position to claim.
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Yet the objection that natural objects cannot have legal
rights because they fail to satisfy a necessary condition
of having a claim, viz., being in a position to claim,
assumes that claim theorists accept the stronger proposi-
tion, (9)
:
(9) For any entity, X, if x has a valid legalclaim, then X is in a position to claim!
Since they do not, this objection fails.
It has been argued that claim theorists endorse
(8) rather than (9). if one attributes (9) to them, then
one is hard-pressed to account for their endorsement of
the doctrine of legal representation. The only way to
account for it would be to argue that by allowing x's le-
gal representatives to make claims on behalf of X, X pro-
perly is described as being in a position to claim. This
may require arguing that X and X's legal representatives
are in different claiming positions, or that X is "in a
position to claim" in a different sense than the sense in
which X's legal representative is "in a position to claim."
But it would allow one to account for a claim theorist's
endorsement of (9)
.
If, so understood, (9) properly may be attributed
to claim theorists, does the former objection against (T)




they themselves are not in a position
Consider when one might invoke (9), so interpreted.
In ordinary language, sometimes we seem to describe persons
as m a position to claim when they never actually claim
anything. For example, before his death, the wealthy,
self-exiled Howard Hughes might have been described as
being in a position to make legal claims, conduct legal
transactions, or otherwise engage in claiming activity,
even though for years only the recluse's lawyers (his legal
agents) actually engaged in the claiming activity. How-
ever, most claim theorists would deny that, e.g., infants
and mental incompetents are in a position to claim. They
are not like Howard Hughes. in fact, the doctrine of legal
representation was designed to handle just such cases. In
addition, even in the case of Howard Hughes, there is an
alternative, simpler, equally plausible description of
Hughes's position. it is to describe Hughes as having legal
claims, which claims are made on his behalf, and in his
name, by his legal representatives. It is they who actu-
ally are in the claiming position. But this description of
Hughes, which captures what was assumed in attributing (9)
to claim theorists, reduces to the description of X at (8) .
Thus, what is claimed at (9) is captured more perspicuously
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and less awkwardly by (8)
Whether one accepts my argument that claim theo-
rists accept (8) outright, or one attributes (9) to them,
the outcome is the same. The objection that natural ob-
lects cannot have legal rights because they are not in a
position to claim is not revived by attributing (9) to
Claim Position theorists.
To review, four views have been defended here.
First, even if one supposes that only humans can claim and
can be in a position to claim, it does not follow that
natural objects cannot have claims. Second, the standard
argument for why natural objects cannot have legal claims
fails. it fails because it assumes that a necessary con-
dition of X's having a claim is that X be in a position
to claim, a view which runs counter to the claim theorist's
endorsement of the doctrine of legal representation. Third,
since that argument fails, so does the Claim Position Ob-
jection to (T)
.
Fourth, appeal to the doctrine of legal
representation explains how natural objects, incapable of
engaging in claiming activity themselves, nonetheless
could be said to have claims.
The Claim Position is important to the defense of
(T) in another way. It provides suggestions of some spec-
ific legal rights natural objects could be said to have.
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For example, consider Feinberg's statement that
is ‘having a right to x ^ ?
0t (ySt) th® Same
having a case of at i»' t -
1S rather like
that one has a^igSt^S^
hearing and consideration . 20 fair
Thus, on Feinberg's account, having a prime facie case of
minimum plausibility that one has a right establishes the
right to a fair hearing and consideration. Thus, on his
account, even if natural objects have only a prima facie
case for recognition of their claims as valid, they would
have at least one right, viz., the right to a fair hearing
and consideration.
Feinberg's account suggests another right natural
objects could be said to have. He states that:










:e circumstances, thatas the right. 21
What are "appropriate circumstances?" They include occa-
sions when one is challenged, when one's rights explicitly
are denied, when one must make application for rights,
where one's rights are insufficiently acknowledged or
appreciated. Thus, if natural objects have any rights at
all, they have the right to claim they have a right.
Does McCloskey's Entitlement Position version of
the Claim Position pose any objection to (T) other than the
ones considered so far? McCloskey holds that legal rights
are entitlements to have, do or receive something which
give rise to claims against others. But if aq r • ,u r t, s Fembercj
argues,
"entitlements to" roucrhlvgniy are equivalent to "claims
to '" then entitlements are claims i n * ,- J-mo
2 ,
1 . e
. , demands which,
lf ma<3e
' W°Uld bE Valld
' justified or defensible. tn this
respect, McCloskey. s view provides no new objections to
(T)
.
Furthermore, McCloskey allows that entitlements





we are entitled, to be entitled. 22
Like Claim Position theorists generally, McCloskey assumes
that use of the doctrine of legal representation provides
an acceptable way to describe an entity who/which cannot
make claims or claim entitlements as a legal right-holder.
Use of the doctrine to explain how natural objects could
be said to have entitlements, and, hence, legal rights,
therefore is permissable.
McCloskey does state that there are limits to those
who/which can be possessors of entitlements. He argues
that natural objects are outside those limits. But it has
been shown in connection with the Interest Position Objec-
tion that McCloskey 's reasons for excluding natural objects
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fall short
. Thus, McCloskey's view, like those of claim




theorists offer very different accounts of the nature of
the connection between legal rights and legal rules. None-
theless, one basic objection to (T) could be mounted by
each of them: "Statements ascribing rights either imply,
or are implied by, statements about the existence or na-
ture of a legal rule or set of rules. But there is not
and could not be any rules appeal to which would warrant
describing natural objects as legal right-holders. There-
fore, natural objects could not be legal right-holders."
That this objection has no force against (T) can be shown
by examining the Rules Position views of Feinberg, Hart,
and Benn and Peters.
Feinberg 's position is that an entity has a legal
right when its claim is recognized as valid by the gov-
erning legal rules. Although Feinberg does not offer ex-
amples of "governing legal rules," it is not difficult to
show that some legal rules could be fashioned such that
appeal to them would warrant recognition as valid a natur-
al object's legal claims. Suppose a legal rule specifies
that if certain conditions are satisfied, an entity has a
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“ facie case for having a legal right. Suppose fur_
ther that an entity, X, has a duly-appolnted legal repre _
sentative, Y, and that Y aales claims in the name, and on
behalf, of X in accordance with correct- i P11 rect legal procedure
for so making claims mh^n _ .. T e , a sample rule schema covering
such a case would be (RSI)
:
(RSI) if an entity, X, properly is legally re-presented by an agent, Y
,
and Yuaescorrect legal procedure to petition inthe name of and on behalf of X that X berecognized as having a legal claim toometning
, (p
,







' Provided thereo countervailing reasons to overriderecogmtron of X ' S claim to * as valid,x has a valid legal claim to
<f>
.
Given the view that a legal right is just a valid legal
claim, appeal to (RSI) attests to the plausibility of say-
mg that natural objects could have legal rights
.
23
The steps for determining whether a natural object
has a legal right are fairly straightforward. First, one
determines whether the antecedent conditions are met (e.g.,
whether Y is a duly-appointed legal representative of X,
whether Y used correct legal procedure to petition that X
be recognized as having a legal claim to <j>) . if so, then
the natural object has a prima facie case that it has a
legal right. Second, one determines whether there are
overriding reasons for not recognizing the natural object's
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claim as valid. For example, are there ™ 4. •t , d n competing rules
Which are relevant in deciding the case? Does a conflict
of rights result if one recognizes the natural object's
Claim as valid? If there are countervailing reasons, do
they warrant withholding recognition of the natural object's
Claim as valid? if not, then X has the legal right in ques-
tion
.
To illustrate how (RSI) could be used as a model
for specific legal rules generating specific legal right
consider rule (Rl) and what Feinberg calls "a right to a
fair hearing and consideration":
s f
(Rl) Whenever an entity or its legal repre-
asserts a claim to some-thing, and follows correct legal procedurefor seeking legal recognition of that
claim as valid, and provides a case ofat least minimum plausibility for that
claim, then the entity has a right to afair hearing and consideration.
Whether or not (Rl) is acceptable, it is stated in terms
which capture the substance and form of Feinberg' s state-
ment of what it is to "have a claim to X." Thus, it is a
rule which Feinberg ought to accept. But, according to
Feinberg, an entity has a legal right when its claim is
recognized as valid by the governing legal rules. Appeal
to (Rl), then, permits the construal of natural objects as
having at least one legal right, viz., the right to a fair
hearing and consideration. Here Feinberg' s version of the
184
Rules Position not only poses no obstacles to the defense
of (T )
t
it helps that defense.
What about Hart's version of the Rules Position?
Hart argues that an entity, X, has a legal right if, under
the rules of the legal system and given the events which
have transpired, some person Y is obliged to do or refrain
from doing some action provided X or X's agent so chooses,
or until X or X's agent choose otherwise. A statement of
the form 'X has a legal right' is a conclusion of law in a
particular case falling under those rules. Could there be
some legal rules which oblige some person (s) to do or ab-
stain from doing some action provided the legal represent-
atives of natural objects choose that they should? if so,
then Hart's sufficient condition account of 'having a legal
right' permits one to describe natural objects as legal
right-holders.
Consider a candidate rule, (R2)
:
(R2) Where a duly appointed legal representative
of a delimited forest area is legally em-
powered to maintain that area as a recog-
nized "wilderness area," no humans may tres-
pass on or use that area for recreational,
industrial or other purposes without the




all humans except those whom the forest's
legal representatives choose to exempt are obliged not to
trespass on wilderness areas. On Hart's sufficient
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condition account of 'X has a legal right,' a wilderness
area which is legally represented by an agent so empowered
would be said to have a legal right. which legal right?
Although Hart's account provides no clues, one could de-
scribe the legal right as a right to non-interference a-
gainst any humans not specifically exempted.
Whether or not (R2) is acceptable as stated, and
whether or not the legal right in question correctly is
described as "the legal right to non-interference" is not
What matters here. what matters is that (R2) is an exam-
ple of a rule appeal to which substantiates the view that
natural objects could be said to have legal rights, on
Hart s account of 'X has a legal right.'
(R2 ) is an example of what Hart calls a "duty
imposing rule" or a "primary rule of objection." it is a
rule which requires humans to refrain from certain action,
whether or not they want to. it might be stated more
simply as (R3)
:
(R3) humans may trespass on wilderness areas.
In addition, there could be companion rules to (R3)
,
what
Hart calls "power conferring rules" or "secondary rules."
These are rules which confer powers on humans to introduce
new primary rules, to extinguish or modify old ones, or to
determine the duration or control of them. They concern
not merely physical movements and changes, but the creation
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or variation of duties. For example,
are examples of secondary rules which
in conjunction with (R 3 ) :
(R4)
,









SPeclally exempted the obliga-ot to trespass on wilderness areas.






or desi 9nated wildernesss and to confer on those representa-
k
6 P°w®rs and privileges custom-nly bestowed on legal representatives.








area is le<?allY empoweredpeak for, and in the name of, the areait represents, the court has the power to
recognize the wilderness area as having
certain legal rights; specifically, it hasthe power to recognize the wilderness area
as having a legal right to noninterference
y trespassers against any humans not
exempted by the wilderness area's legal
representative
.
(R4) identifies (R3) as a primary rule of the legal system,
(R5 ) confers powers on courts to appoint legal representa-
tives of wilderness areas, and (R6) confers powers on
courts to create or recognize legal rights of wilderness
areas
.
Hart does not specify whether it follows directly
from rules such as (R2) and (R3) that an entity has legal
rights, or whether other rules must be taken together with
rules such as (R2) and (R3) to generate that conclusion.
Nor does Hart suggest which legal rights an entity might
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said to have in any particular case. Nonetheless, what
is necessary to show that natural objects could be legal
right-holders on Hart's view has been shown, viz., that
rules such as (R2,-(R6, could be devised in accordance with
Which it is possible and meaningful to ascribe legal rights
to natural objects.
Benn and Peters offer a necessary condition account
of having a right. To say that X has a right is to imply
that there is a rule which, when applied to the case of X
and some person Y, imposes on Y a duty to X, if x chooses.
An objection to giving natural objects legal rights on
their view is that there is not and cannot be a rule which
imposes on anyone a duty to natural objects.
This objection is not very promising. a legal rule
such as (R2 ) which imposes on humans a duty not to tres-
pass on wilderness areas could be devised and interpreted
such that the duty is understood as a duty to the wilder-
ness area, imposed on would-be trespassers unless the
wilderness area specifies otherwise. in the next chapter,
Chapter VIII, it is shown that talk of legal duties to
natural objects is meaningful. Here it suffices to say
that since Benn and Peters argue only that the existence
of such a rule is a necessary condition of having legal
rights, there is a pr ima facie case for supposing that
condition could be satisfied in the
jects
.
case of natural ob-
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Suppose it is conceded that <R1 )-(r 6 ) could be le-
gal rules of a legal system, but objected that, nonethe-
less, there are no existent legal rules which could be in-
voked to show that natural objects could have legal rights.
That this objection is not threatening to the case for (T)





No human being may kill another human being.
Liability results from failure
care under the circumstances.
to employ due
(R9) Business and industry must maintain standards
of fair competition and just and reasonable
rates
.
(RIO) One must stop, look and listen where trafficis to be expected.
(Rll) Use of vehicles in this park is prohibited.
(R12) Contracts must be kept.
(R13) Creditors have a right to be paid.
Rules (R7) and (R11)-(R13) are examples of existent legal
rules which are clear-cut and highly specific. The meaning
of (R7)
,
for example, is fairly precise. Although there
are exceptions to this rule, e.g., killing in self-defense,
typically these exceptions are identifiable in relatively
straightforward terms and are taken to be exceptions to the
general rule against homocide. On the other hand, rules
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<R8)-(R10), are high ly elastic, stated in language which
permits varying degrees of latitude as to what may or may
not be included within the scope of the rule. (R8), the
basic rule of negligence law, and (R9) are stated in very
broad terms, employing the so-called "India Rubber con-
cepts of "due care," "fair standard," and "just and rea-
sonable rates." Adjudicating agencies are allowed much
leeway in determining whether or not to treat a certain
case as falling within the scope of these rules. This
point is put by saying that these rules have an "open tex-
ture or "fringe of vagueness."
It is the open texture of rules which permits new
cases to be handled deftly, and which explains how law
gradually is built from precedent to precedent. Once the
decision is made to include a case or a given set of facts
as falling under a rule, the case is treated as a prece-
dent, often establishing in effect a subordinate rule that,
in the future, similar cases or facts of a similar kind
will be included under the rule. 24 The "stop, look and
listen rule, (RIO)
,
which in some jurisdictions precludes
recovery by one who failed to stop, look and listen before
crossing a railroad track, is an example of a subordinate
rule which evolved from cases falling under the general
rule of "due care." in other situations, a rule is express-
ed in such broad terms that no subordinate rules emerge;
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each case is left to be decided 'on its own facts," i.e.,
'within the rationally possible outside limits of the ruie,'
by the discretion of the adjudicating agency. 25
In light of this discussion, why not suppose that
several of the rules given above could be invoked and
"Widened" to cover the case of natural objects as possible
legal right-holders? For example, by invoking rule (R8),
industries located in areas known to be the habitat of ani-
mals which are members of endangered species could be made
liable for failure to employ due care against endangering
the lives of these animals. where they are found liable
for failure to use due care, one could construe the animals
as having certain remedial rights against the industries
concerned. Included among these might be the right to
sue for damages. As Christopher Stone suggests, favorable
monetary awards could be paid into a trust or fund set up
in the animals' name, to be used solely for purposes which
benefit the animals, e.g., providing then increased protec-
tion, perhaps even isolation, against humans.
While it does not follow from the fact that an in-
dustry is liable where members of endangered species are
concerned that members of that species have legal rights
against the industry, it is possible to construe the ani-
mals as having legal rights in such cases. Their eligibil-
ity for legal right-holder status could be insured by
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invoking other legal rules e rr
' * g *' a primary rule such as
(R14) and a set of secondary rules, including rule (RIS): 2 *
(R14) No human being may kill an animal which isa member of the species nff , -
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deaigna ted "endangered, court has the power to grantsurvivors of the species a i 0„n y
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fc the offeading humansm ame, and on behalf, of the sur-viving members of the species.
If the claims made by the legal representatives are recog
m 2 ed as valid, the natural objects would be said to have
certain legal rights.
Similarly, one could appeal to rule (Rll) as the
basis for ascribing certain remedial rights to forests
against trespassers, e.g., rights to seek legal relief for
damages incurred as a result of the activities of the
trespassers. One legal effect of successfully invoking
existent rule (Rll) could be the conferral of legal rights
on natural objects. In this respect, appeal to proposed
legal rules (R2) - (R6) would be no different. Each
provides a meaningful, reasonable basis for saying that
natural objects could be legal right-holders.
I have argued that the idea of legal representa-
tives for natural objects is plausible. If it is, then one
function of a legal representative of, say, a pine forest
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might be to make certain kinds of contracts on behalf of
the forest with certain kinds of businesses or industries.
For instance, suppose a specific lumber company wants to
log a specific pine forest. Although other legal avenues
might be available and even preferable 27 ,^cieidoie, for any number
Of reasons an official body (e.g., a court, may choose
to designate a legal representative for the forest and to
recognize the representative as empowered to make contracts
with the lumber company in the forest's name. A contract
might specify that the lumber company is permitted to log
the forest provided that, for every tree cut down, the
company plants another pine tree in the logged area. in
case of breech of contract, the terms of the contract
specify that the company agrees to pay five times the
current market value of a pine tree of specified dimen-
sions, which money is to be deposited in a fund or trust
established for that purpose. As a party to a contract,
one could invoke rule (R12) as the basis for recognizing
natural objects as holders of certain rights. Presumably,
one right natural objects could be said to have is the
right to sue the company for breach of contract by the
company
.
It is interesting to note that rules (R12) and
(R13) have special significance in the account provided
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by Benn and Peters. They claim that appeal to (R12) and
(R13) illustrates two ways rights may be ascribed to an
entity. There can be a particular ascription of rights
which imply, but do not state, general rules, e.g., (Ri 2);
or, there can be general ascriptions of rights, stated by
general rules, e.g., (R13)
. According to the account
provided by Benn and Peters, the rules that contracts must
be kept, (R12)
, and that breach of contract by one party
to a contract gives the other party (parties) certain
rights (a rule like (R13) ) , are the appropriate sort of
rules for ascribing rights to an entity. On their account
then, appeal to a rule such as (R12) for ascribing rights
to natural objects would be totally appropriate.
This discussion suffices to show that the differ-
ent versions of the Rules Position offered by Feinberg,
Hart, and Benn and Peters fail to generate a reasonable
objection to (T)
.
in fact, the Rules Position on legal
rights can be harnessed effectively in support of (T)
.
The Prediction Position Objection
. The Prediction Position
generates one basic objection to (T)
:
"Statements ascribing
legal rights are predictive statements that, given certain
facts, certain legal consequences will follow. To say
that an entity has a legal right is to say that if certain
circumstances prevail, certain court action is likely.
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But With natural objects there is not and could not be any
likelihood that situations would arise where legal conse-
quences (e.g., remedies, benefits, compensation) for
natural objects themselves would follow. Hence, natural
objects cannot be said to have legal rights." is this
objection to (T) threatening?
Of course, in present cases involving natural
objects it is unlikely that natural objects will be singled
out as proper recipients of "legal remedies." But this
only points out the obvious, viz., that natural objects
presently lack legal rights. Previous discussions have
shown that the "facts" could be otherwise. For example,
legal rules could be devised according to which a duly
represented forest area is recognized as entitled to
compensation for damages against persons unauthorized to
trespass in the forest area; and seals could be recognized
as having legal claims against fur-seeking seal hunters
who violate legal restrictions against tracking and
killing seals for their fur. If the existence of certain
legal rules is included in the set of relevant "facts"
governing a case, then clearly court action directed at
giving natural objects themselves certain legal remedies
is possible. On the Prediction Position view of legal
rights, the possibility that such court action is forth-
coming attests to the possibility of granting legal rights
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to natural objects.
Whether or not it is likely that natural objects
Will be legal right-holders depends on whether or not
courts so construe the facts. But that they could so con-
strue the facts ensures that ascription of legal rights to
natural objects is possible. Thus, the Prediction Position
Objection to (T) fails. To use Holmes's terminology, it is
possible that "the antecedent facts which the law defines"
and the consequent legal rights attached by law to these
facts could be such that natural objects are genuine legal
right-holders
.
Strictly Natural Law Position Objections
The Moral Sense Position Objection
. The Moral Sense
Position defines 'legal right’ in terms of a moral sense
of 'right.' There is one basic objection to (T) based on
this position : 29 "Natural objects cannot have legal rights
because legal rights are rights in a moral sense of the
term rights,
' and natural objects cannot meaningfully be
said to have rights in any moral sense." The defense of
(T) against this objection is to show that it is compat-
ible with the meanings of 'right' in a moral sense given
by theorists Grotius, Pufendorf, and Ryan and Boland to
describe natural objects as havers of rights in a moral
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sense, and, hence, as legal right-holders.
AS we have seen, the views of Grotius and Pufendorf
on the meaning of 'right' are strikingly similar. They
define rights as the moral qualities (Grotius) or moral
powers (Pufendorf, of persons which enable them to have,
do or receive something lawfully or properly. On their
views, to say that legal rights are rights in a moral sense
IS to say that the quality or power which enables entities
to have, do or receive something has been lawfully or
properly acquired and held; it is recognized and secured
by a politically organized society
.
30
One could dismiss straightway an objection to (T)
based on the views of Grotius and Pufendorf, since the
cirticism given in Chapter VI of the Power Position shows
unacceptable any view of legal rights as powers, capa-
bilities or capacities. However, there is a plausible
recasting of the Grotius-Pufendorf view which does generate
a reasonable objection to (T)
.
Suppose their view is that
a legal right is a lawful (or, proper) authority or means
to have, do or receive something from another. Legal
right-holders, then, are entities who/which have this
authority or means. The recast Grotius-Pufendorf objec-
tion to (T) is that natural objects cannot be said to have
this lawful authority or means and, hence, cannot be said
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to have legal rights. Is this objection damaging to (T) ?
I think this objection fails, as appeal to the
doctrine of legal representation again shows. By appoint-
ing legal representatives for natural objects one provides
a meaningful way of saying that natural objects have the
lawful (or, proper) authority or means to have, do or
receive something, and, hence, to have rights in a moral
sense. Where the legal representative acts on behalf of
the natural object it represents, one can describe either
the legal agent or the natural object as having the lawful
authority to have, do or receive something. in either
case, it is the natural object which would be said to have
the legal rights in question
.
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The added condition that
this authority be recognized and secured by a politically
organized society could be satisfied, for example, by
appeal to a set of legal rules or principles specifying
the conditions for appointing legal representatives for
natural objects and the scope of the legal authority
ascribed to those representatives. Thus, by extending the
accepted doctrine of legal representation to the case of
natural objects, a meaningful way is provided for describ-
ing them as genuine legal right-holders on the recast
Grotius-Pufendorf view of legal rights.
What about the Ryan-Boland version of the Moral
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Sense Position? Does it pose any formidable obstacles to
establishing (T)
?
Recall that on the Ryan-Boland view a right is "an
inviolable moral claim to some personal good." when this
claim is "created by civil society," the right (moral
claim) is a legal right; when it is "derived from man's
rational nature," it is a moral right. In addition, Ryan
and Boland argue that rights are the moral means whereby
the possessor is enabled to reach some end. Could natural
objects be said to have moral claims to some personal good,
and to have the moral means to reach some end through the
possession of rights? If so, the Ryan-Boland version of
the Moral Sense Position poses no successful objection to
(T)
.
There is no significant problem in describing
natural objects as enabled to reach certain ends through
the possession of rights. For example, if the end sought
is to procure a legal injunction against certain pollution
activity by a specific industry, the possession of a right
to be party to injunctive settlements could enable natural
objects to reach that end. if there is a problem, it
lies with the notion of rights as moral claims to some
personal good, and with the description of right-holders
as entities who/which possess the moral means to reach
certain ends.
199
Recall that the philosophical view of persons is
that only humans are 'persons;" only they can set goals,
make choices, have de facto interests, be moral agents.
The notions of a "personal good" and of the attainment of
ends, like other notions involving the philosophical view
of personality, apply properly only to humans. Thus, on
the philosophical view of who/what is able to use moral
means to achieve some personal good or attain some end,
natural objects are not the appropriate sort of entity.
But we have seen that the legal view of persons is
quite different. On the legal view, the notion of a per-
son can apply to what is non-human. The cognate notion of
a "chooser," an entity having a will or a capacity to act,
applies to non-humans just insofar as there is some natur-
al person empowered to act on behalf of the non-human,
legal person, whether the non-human is a municipality,
church, corporation, trust, fund, ship or idol, the treat-
ment of them as entities having certain legal capacities
is the same. The non-human is said to act through its
legal agent, even though it is only the legal representa-
tive who engages in claiming activity, makes choices,
selects goals, attains ends.
If the Ryan-Boland view of legal rights has any
plausibility at all, it must accomodate the related doc-
trines of legal personality and legal representation. To
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do so and yet retain the definition of 'legal right' as a
"moral claim to some personal good'' they must allow talk
of some "personal good" for non-humans. Once such talk is
permitted, however, the conceptual barriers to describing
natural objects as having rights in a moral sense break
down
.
This does not end the matter, however. The Ryan-
Boland position could be revised to accomodate the two
doctrines of legal personality and legal representation by
dropping references to "some personal good" achieved
through "moral means," yet retaining the view of legal
rights as moral claims. Then their view generates a rea-
sonable objection to (T) : "Legal rights are rights in a
moral sense, i.e., moral claims. In particular, they are
moral claims created by civil society. But natural objects
cannot have moral claims; hence, they cannot have legal
rights. Is this objection successful against (T)
?
To answer this one must examine what Ryan and
Boland say about moral claims. Unfortunately, their view
is not very clear. For one thing, they hold that, although
rights are rights in a moral sense (i.e.
,
moral claims),
there are different kinds of moral claims. There are
those created by civil society (i.e., legal rights), and
those "derived from man's rational nature" (i.e., moral
rights) . Since they hold this two-kind doctrine of moral
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Claims, it is not essential to the notion of a moral claim
that it be '•derived from man's rational nature." m parti-
cular, moral claims which are legal rights need not be.
As such, the Ryan-Boland version of the Moral Sense Posi-
tion, taken by itself, does not produce the objection that
natural objects cannot have legal rights because they are
not rational beings. All that is required for an entity
to have legal rights is that it have moral claims "created
by civil society," not that it have moral claims derived
from its nature as a rational entity.
For another thing, it is not clear whether their
account is a necessary or a sufficient condition account.
Sometimes it seems to be merely a sufficient condition
account: An entity, X, has a legal right to something, $
,
if the civil society creates a moral claim to <j> and
recognizes X as having that claim. But if this is their
view, it is impotent against (T)
. Even if natural objects
could not be said to have such claims, it would not follow
that they could not be said to have legal rights. At
other times, their account seems to be a necessary condi-
tion or definitional account. If it is, they must allow
that such legal rights as a creditor's right to be paid,
a contractor's right to goods and services contracted for,
a plaintiff's right to sue for damages incurred by
another's acts are genuine examples of moral claims, viz.,
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those created by civil society. But if these are moral
claims
, there is no special problem describing natural
objects as having moral claims.
For these reasons. The Ryan-Boland position is not
problematic for the defense of (T)
. Having defined 'right'
as "moral claim," their distinction between legal rights
and moral rights as two kinds of moral claims is given in
terms of the source, rather than the nature
, of a moral
claim. A moral claim created by civil society is a legal
right. This makes the central issue in determining whether
natural objects could be said to have legal rights that
of determining whether they could be said to have state-
created moral claims, or, alternatively, whether the state
could be said to create moral claims for them. Whether or
not natural objects could be said to have moral claims
beforehand
,
so to speak, is not at issue. Insofar as, e.g.,
a plaintiff's right to sue, is an acknowledged legal
right, it must count as a state-created moral claim. But
natural objects could be said to be recipients of such
claims. Thus the Ryan-Boland version of the Moral Sense
Position Objection fails.
The Moral Validation Position Objection
. The Moral Valida-
tion Position is the view that natural law or moral prin-
ciples provide the mark, test, or justification for ascrip-
tion of valid legal rights. The distinctive feature of
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this position is that it is a view on the validity of legal
rights, and not a view on the nature of legal rights ger
— ' “ dOSS n0t Pres«PP°se any particular thesis about
the meaning of 'legal right' or about the conditions under
Which statements of the form 'X has a legal right' are
true. It is open for advocates of this position to con-
cede the possibility of ascribing legal rights to natural
obgects. What they might deny is that the legal rights
one could ascribe to natural objects are valid, that their
ascription is justified on natural law or moral grounds.
Properly speaking, then, any objection generated by the
Moral Validation Position would be directed at the view
that natural objects could be said to have valid legal
rights, not to the view that they could have legal rights.
The Moral Validation Position is a good example of
a position which generates which I call "objections con-
cerning (T) ,
"
rather than "objections to (T) .
"
if an
objection challenges the truth of (T)
,
it is an objection
to (T)
.
if an objection challenges the significance of
establishing (T)
,
and not the plausibility or truth of (T),
it is an objection concerning (T)
.
Since the Moral Vali-
dation Position is a position on the validity of rights,
it does not address the issue whether ascription of legal
rights to natural objects is possible. Hence, it is not




concerning (T) does it suggest?
The most promising Moral Validation Position ob-
jection concerning (T) turns on the notion of a moral law
or principle
: "A valid legal right is a positive right
which is recognized as binding, de iure legitimate, in
accordance with natural law or moral principles. But
there are no such principles which could be used to justify
recognition of natural objects as legal right-holders.
Hence, natural objects could not be said to have any valid
legal rights. Any rights they might be said to have would
be at best invalid, imperfect, unenforceable rights."
The threat of this objection is more apparent than
real. A moral or natural law principle specifies what
actions or kinds of actions are right, wrong or obliga-
32tory. The following are two paradigm examples of moral
principles
:
(MPl ) Killing humans is wrong.
(MP2) Acts which injure humans are wrong.
Although both (MPl) and (MP2) may be unacceptable as stated
requiring modification or clarification, each is a moral
principle. Appeals to them constitute the grounds for
justifying an individual's claim against being killed, an
instance of a more general claim to personal freedom and
security. Claim position theorists often suggest that if
a human has a claim against being killed or a claim to
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freedom from bodily or other injury, the recognition of
these claims as valid is called for by these (and perhaps
Other) moral principles. They are examples of moral prin-
ciples, appeal to which validates a right.
Could moral principles concerning natural objects,
analogous to (MP1) and (MP2)
, be framed such that appeal
to them provides grounds for recognition of a natural
object's claim to certain rights as valid? Suppose it is
meaningful to speak of harm or injury to natural objects,
e.g., to seals and to wilderness areas. Then the following
would be meaningful moral principles:
(MP3) Killing seals for their fur is wrong.
(MP4) Acts which cause irreparable injury (harm)to wilderness areas are wrong.
Like principles (MP1) and (MP2 )
,
principles (MP3) and
(MP4) may require modification or clarification to be
acceptable. Still, they are genuine moral principles.
Furthermore, as in the case with (MP1) and (MP2)
, appeal
to them could establish a prima facie case for saying that
ascription of legal rights to natural objects is justified
on moral grounds and, hence, that they could be said to
have some valid legal rights. These could be construed
as rights against being killed or rights to freedom from
certain kinds of damage or injury.
Certainly there are details to work out in order
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to show that appeal to (MP3) and (MP4) validates a claim
made on behalf of seals and wilderness areas, respectively,
just as there are details to work out to show that appeal
to (MP1, and (Ml?
2
) justifies a human's claim against being
killed and to freedom from bodily injury, respectively,
still, on two popular views of legal rights, viz., the
Claim and Rules Positions, appeals to (MP3) and (MP4) pro-
vide the basis for such a case. Suppose seals and wilder-
ness areas are regarded for purposes of the law as having
claims to non-interference against fur-hunting seal
killers and trespassers, respectively. On Feinberg’s
view, these would be claims of seals and wilderness areas
against physical injury, the recognition of which as valid
might be called for, at least in part, by appeal to (MP3)
and (MP4), respectively. Appeal to (MP3) and (MP4) attests
to the possibility of construing natural objects as having
valid legal rights.
This account is sketchy. Just what is the connec-
tion between a moral principle and a legal right such that
the former "calls for" recognition of the latter as valid?
Is it sufficient that appeal to moral principles provides
some justification for ascription of rights? What counts
as acceptable justification and how specific must the
statement of a moral principle be? Ryan and Boland do not
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say. The important point here i
this account befalls accounts of
s that the sketchines
rights for humans as
s of
well.
If appeal to (MP1, and (MP2, provides a case for ascribing
Valid legal rights to humans, then, on the Ryan-Boland
account, appeal to (MP3) and (MP4) provides a similar case
for ascribing valid legal rights to natural objects.
Whatever difficulties there
between a legal right and a
these difficulties arise in
are in clarifying the relation
governing moral principle,
the case of humans as well.
Summary
Plausible objections to thesis (T) based on seven
of the eight historical positions on legal rights and
legal right-holders have been stated, discussed and de-
feated. As such, a strong case for (T) already has been
made. What remains to be shown is that there are no
successful objections to (T) based on the eighth historical
position, the Correlativi ty Position, or on non-historical
position views about legal right-holders. This is the
task in the succeeding two chapters of the dissertation,
Chapters VIII and IX.
CHAPTER VIII
THE CORRELATIVITY POSITION
in Chapter VII, objections to (T) based on seven
Of the eight historical positions on legal rights were de-
feated. In this chapter, the Correlativity Position Ob-
jection to (T)
,
based on the eighth historical position,
is defeated. In addition, an objection to (T) based on the
view that all legal right-holders are legal duty-bearers
defeated. By refuting these two objections, it is
shown that appeals to the notion of what a legal duty or
legal duty-bearer is, and to the relations presumed to
hold between legal rights and legal duties, fail to under-
mine the plausibility of (T)
The Correlativity Doctrines
It often is said that rights and duties are corre-
lative. However, it is not always clear just what this
claim means. In this section, I identify three separate
doctrines of the correlativity of rights and duties, what
I call the logical, moral and legal correlativity doc-
trines. Each doctrine advances distinct theses about what
it means to say that rights and duties are correlative.
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By separating off correlativity theses accepted by Correl-
ativity Position theorists from other correlativity theses,
pinpoint just what is meant by saying that legal
rights and legal duties are correlative.
Theological and moral correlativity doctrine. In The
Right and The Good, W. D. Ross offers a helpful framework
identifying various claims about the meaning of the
statement that rights and duties are correlative. 1 Ross
claims that the statement may stand for any one, or any
combination, of four logically independent statements.
Using Ross's schema, we get the following four statements:
d°) If A has a right against B, then B has aduty to A. ~ -
(11) If B has a duty to A, then A has a riqht
against B. “ ~ y
(12) If a has a right against B, then A has aduty to B. ~ -
(13) If A has a duty to B, then A has a riqht
against B. ~
What is asserted at (10) is that if an entity, A,
has a right to receive something from another entity, B,
then B has a duty to A to provide that something; the con-
verse is asserted at (11) . What is asserted at (12) is
that if A has a right to receive something from B, then A
also has a duty to provide something else to B; the con-
verse is asserted at (13)
.
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Nearly all, if not all, theorists who accept some
thesis about the correlativity of rights and duties accept
(10). Ross claims that (10) "appears unquestionably true." 2
Feinberg claims that where right’ means "claim-right,"
U0) is "logically unassailable." 3 Markby's view that no
right can exist unless there is a duty exactly correlative
to it, and Korkunov's view that every right necessarily
presupposes a corresponding obligation are endorsements of
(10)
. If the statement that rights and duties are correl-
ative meant simply (10)
, then not only would there be no
disagreement among theorists about the truth-value of that
Statement; there would not be any confusion about the
interpretation of that statement.
However, many theorists mean something more by the
statement that rights and duties are correlative than the
interpretation given at (10) . For example, Marcus Singer
interprets the statement to mean both (10) and (11) . He
writes
:
If A has a right against B, then B has a dutyto A, and if B has a duty to A, then A has a
right against B. This is a pattern of correl-
ativity that seems unassailable .
5
Legal theorist Salmond takes the same position:
There can be no right without a corresponding
duty, or duty without a corresponding right,
any more than there could be a husband without
a wife, or a father without a child. 6
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Following Feinberg, Benn and Peters, 7 I refer to
'the logical correlativity doctrine" as the doctrine which
endorses (10) and (11)
. Theorists who hold either (10) or
(11) but not both hold a specific version of the logical
correlativity doctrine.
Some theorists subscribe to the quite different
correlativity theses given at (12) and (13). For example,
T. P. Neill holds that an entity's rights are conditional
upon its bearing a duty, (12). He writes:
Each of these rights [rights man enjoys as a
member of political society], of course, in-
volves an obligation on the part of all others
r
?5 Pf
Ct it ‘ But each of these rights, it
should be remembered, is also founded on a
corresponding duty on the part of its possessor.The right to freedom of religion, for example,is based on the duty to worship God, just asthe right to work is based on the duty of self-preservation and self-perfection.
^
Feinberg disagrees with Neill. Feinberg argues that it is
conceivable that an entity has a genuine right to some-
thing, X, but no corresponding duty to respect the X's of
9anyone else. if what Feinberg calls "dutyless rights"
are conceivable, then (10) is true even though (12) is
false
.
Again following Feinberg, Benn and Peters, I refer
to the moral correlativity doctrine" as the doctrine which
endorses both (12) and (13). Theorists who hold only (12)
or only (13) are said to hold a specific version of the
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moral correlativity doctrine. If there are ,dutyless
rights," then the logical correlativity doctrine may be
true even though the moral correlativity doctrine is false.
Whether or not a theorist concedes "dutyless
rights" and, hence, affirms or denies (12), turns on wheth-
er or not the theorist grants that non-ordinary humans
(e.g., infants, mental incompetents) or non-humans (e.g.,
animals) have rights. Defenders of (12) argue that an
entity's ability and willingness to shoulder responsibil-
ities is a prior condition for recognizing or ascribing
rights to it. The rationale in support of (12) is that
acceptance of duties is the price an entity must pay to
have rights. Entities without moral natures, then, do not
qualify as right-holders. Thus, appeal to (12) often is
the grounds for supposing that animals cannot be said to
have rights. However, if one holds that infants and ani-
mals have rights though, lacking a moral constitution, they
have no duties, then one denies (12). A concession of
dutyless rights" in certain cases is an admission that
ascription or recognition of rights may be appropriate even
if the entity in question fails to satisfy certain moral
conditions
.
The non-controversial proposition, then, is (10).
Part of the task involved in assessing various correlativity
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theses about rights and duties i ^ Hofo • •u r s determining which of
(11)
-(13) also are true. This is no easy matter. It in-
volves resolving some fairly knotty issues. Ross's dis-
cussion of propositions (10)
-(13) provides an instructive
case in point. Ross assumes (10) is true. He also assumes
that we have duties to animals, though they have no duties
to us. if Ross's assumptions are correct, then proposi-
tions (10) and (13) cannot both be true, since together
they imply that our duty to animals involves a duty of
animals to us. Given Ross's assumptions, (13) must be
false. For similar reasons, given Ross's assumptions,
propositions (11) and (12) cannot both be true. Together
they imply that our duty to animals involves a duty of
animals to us, contrary to the initial assumption. De-
ciding which of (11) and (12) is true is not so easy, how-
ever. Should we say that although we have duties to ani-
mals they have no rights against us, in which case (11) is
false? Or, should we say that animals have rights against
us but no duties to us, in which case (12) is false? If
one denies (11)
,
then one eliminates not only the possibil-
ity that animals have rights, but the added possibility
that so-called "duties of beneficence" generate rights to
beneficent treatment. If one denies (12), then one con-
cedes that there may be "dutyless rights." which is the
correct view?
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Theorists disagree. Austin denies ( 11 ), arguing
that there are duties to which no rights correspond, viz.,
absolute duties" or "duties of imperfect obligation"
(e.g., duties to God and to animals). Benn and Peters






(12 >] raaY true in most
it is 'not
t
e certainly. some cases in which
idiot= a attribute rights to infants,and even animals, to whom it would beabsurd to attribute duties. 10
Ross's solution has it both ways. Arguing that animals
have neither rights nor duties, but that duties of bene-
ficence do generate rights to beneficent treatment, Ross
concludes that (11) is false when A is not a moral agent
and true otherwise. Since his doubt about (12) turned on
whether or not animals have rights, and since he resolves
that they do not, Ross concludes that (12) is true. Thus,
(12) is true and (11) sometimes is true.
Clearly, then, part of the task involved in dis-
cussing correlativity theses is to determine which of (10)-
(13) are, or are thought to be, true. A separate task is
to determine which of (10)
-(13) is advocated when it is
claimed that rights and duties are correlative. For exam-
ple, which pair of propositions is intended when it is
claimed that rights and duties are "opposite sides of the
same coin, "the same relation viewed from different
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perspectives"? Which is intended when it is claimed that
"rights and duties cannot exist without the other"?
The problem of identifying which correlativity
theses claims are intended often arises because correl-
ativity theses are asserted in conjunction with other the-
ses. For instance, Korkunov argues that since duties can-
not exist without corresponding rights in a definite per-
son, "it is impossible to derive all legal relations from
the assertion of a right." 11 Claims about the derivation,
the logical priority, or the justification of rights or of
duties frequently are asserted as part of correlativity
packages. This often makes it difficult to determine just
which proposition of (10)
-(13) is intended.
Propositions (10)
-(13) provide a general schema
for identifying different correlativity theses. So far,
two logically independent correlativity doctrines have
been discussed, the logical and the moral correlativity
doctrines. Consider a different correlativity doctrine,
one for the specific case of legal rights and legal duties.
The legal correlativity doctrine . The Correlativity Posi-
tion on legal rights asserts that legal rights and legal
duties are correlative. Just what does this mean? By
adapting propositions (10)
-(13) to the case of legal rights
and legal duties specifically, one gets an account of what
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might be meant by saying legal rights and legal duties are
correlative, analogous to the account given of rights and
duties generally:
(10 ) If A has a legal right against B, then Bhas a legal duty to A. ~ -
(H ) If B has a legal duty to A, then A has alegal right against B.
(12') if a has a legal right against B, then Ahas a legal duty to B. ~ -
(13’) If A has a legal duty to B, then A has alegal right against B. ~
All theorists who hold that legal rights and legal
duties are correlative hold (10'). They agree with Austin
that every legal right presupposes a legal duty incumbent
on a party other than the party entitled. 12 Although some
theorists (e.g., Hohfeld, Feinberg) hold that (10') is
true only when 'right' is used in its proper sense, they
agree that when 'right' is used correctly, (10') is true.
Thus, all Correlativity Position advocates hold (10').
However, some Correlativity Position theorists ar-
gue that (11') also is true, and that (10') and (11') taken
together capture what is meant by saying that legal rights
and legal duties are correlative. This is Hohfeld 1 s posi-
tion. Of his proposal to describe a right in terms of "its
correlative," duty, Hohfeld writes:
In other words if X has a right against Y that
he shall stay off the former's land, the correlative
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x“o say^f^hi place?13Y 12 Und6r a duty to™rd
where 'right' is used in the proper sense of "claim-right,"
Hohfeld states that:
another Phase of the same relation ,
-that isthe whole riqht-dutv" >-oi = 4--; , na 1S '
from differen? angles. 14
may ® viewed
Hohfeld 's position is adopted by legal theorist
Holland, who argues that the pair of correlative terms
'legal right' and 'legal duty' express, in each case, "the
same state of facts viewed from opposite sides." 15 Both
Hohfeld and Holland accept the conjunction of (10') and
(11') as what is meant by the claim that legal rights and
legal duties are correlative.
Julius Stone grants that bilaterality, or the en-
dorsement of (10') and (11')
,
generally is regarded as a
mark of a legal system. 16 However, Stone's own view is
that it is conceivable that a legal order could be framed
so as to impose only duties on members of society. (Simi-
lar views are advanced by Kelsen and Feinberg.) Stone
concludes that the issue whether or not a particular duty
has a right in some other person correlative to it, i.e.,
whether or not (11') is true, cannot be decided on concep-
tual grounds alone. It "turns on interpretation or policy
it 17or both.
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Other theorists argue against
( 11 ') Dn the grounds
that, in faot, there are legal duties which do not corre-
any rights of determinate persons. For example,
C. K. Allen argues that duties imposed by criminal law of-
ten have no corresponding legal right:
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^U les ln Austin's sense, imposed bythe organized power of the State in the generalinterests of society. 18
The legal duty not to possess certain sorts of objects
(e.g., counterfeiting and burglary equipment) and the duty
to hang a condemned criminal frequently are cited as ex-
amples of legal duties for which there is no correlative
legal right vested in any determinate person (s).
Markby advances a view similar to Allen's. Citing
the examples of the legal duties to abstain from cruelty to
animals and from certain acts of immorality, Markby con-
tends that "there are, in fact, many duties to which there
are no corresponding rights," even though "no right can
exist unless there is a duty correlative to it."^ Like
Allen and Markby, theorists Gray, Holmes and Kelsen also
affirm (10') but deny (11'). 20
What about propositions (12') and (13')? Many le-
gal theorists hold that legal right-holders also are legal
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duty-bearers, and vice versa. They accept the view that
entities having legal rights also have at least one legal
duty, and entities having legal duties also have at least
one legal right. But notice that neither view is what is
asserted at (12') and (13'). what is asserted at (12') is
that if an entity. A, has a legal right to something a-
gainst another entity, B, then A also has some legal duty
to B; the converse is asserted at (13'). Thus, it is open
for theorists who accept the view that all legal right-
holders are legal duty-bearers, and vice versa
,
to deny
(12 ' ) or (13
' ) .
Furthermore, neither (12*) nor (13
•) is what Cor-
relativity Position theorists mean by the statement that
legal rights and legal duties are correlative. As the
quotes cited indicate, what is meant by that statement is
either simply (10'), or (10') and (11') taken together.
Correia tivity Position theorists would distinguish between
claims which they accept as true about legal right-holders
and legal duty-bearers, and claims which they offer as in-
terpretations of the statement that legal rights and legal
duties are correlative. Thus, even if (12') and (13') are
true and accepted as true by Correlativi ty Position theo-
rists, the Cor rela t ivi ty Position on legal rights is not
identified in terms of them.
All Correlativity Position theorists endorse (10');
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some, but not all, endorse (11
, as well
. For Qur
then, the Correlativity Position is characterized in terms
of (10'): A given position on legal rights is the Correl-
ativity Position if, and only if, it endorses (10'). i
refer to "the legal correlativity doctrine" as the doctrine
Which endorses ( 10 ') and (11'); theorists who subscribe to
only (10') endorse a specific version of the legal correl-
ativity doctrine. Thus, while the Correlativity Position
on legal rights is characterized in terms of the specific
legal correlativity thesis given at (10'), some Correla-
tivity Position theorists subscribe to the stronger, gen-
eral legal correlativity doctrine given as the conjunction
of theses (10 ' ) and (11
' ) .
To review, there are three separate doctrines of
the correlation of rights and duties: the logical, the mor-
al, and the legal correlativity doctrines. Theorists who
claim that rights and duties are correlative may mean by
that claim any one, or any combination, of the six state-
ments given at (10)
-(13), (10') and (11'). Some theorists
accept specific versions of all three doctrines; other ac-
cept only versions of the logical or legal doctrines;
others, viz., theorists who deny the meaningfulness
Oj. non-legal right', may accept only a version of the legal
correlativity doctrine.
A discussion of all three doctrines, and not just
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of the legal correlativi tv doctrine ^ •y , is important to the
defense of (T)
. It enables one to isolate oorrelativity
theses about legal rights and legal duties from other cor-
relativity theses. it also enables one to clarify just
What is, and what is not, endemic to the Correlativity
Position on legal rights.
Two Objections to (T)
There are two basic objections to (T) which in-
volve the notion of a legal duty. The first, what I call
"the Correlativity Position Objection," assumes the legal
correlativity thesis given at (10'): "Natural objects can-
not have legal rights because we do not and cannot have
legal duties to them." The second, what I call "the Legal
Duty Objection," assumes a connection between being a
legal right-holder and being a legal duty-bearer not given
by any of the correlativity theses (10')
-(13'): "Natural
objects cannot have legal rights because they cannot have
legal duties. ' Both are plausible objections to (T)
The remainder of the chapter is a defense of (T)
against both objections. The discussions of the first
three sections help to set up the arguments against the
Correlativity and the Legal Duty Objections, advanced in
the last two sections, respectively. Even though
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the discussions of all three sections are relevant to both
Objections, the discussion of the first section ("duties
to" versus "duties concerning") is of particular importance
to assessing the Correlativity Position Objection. it fo_
ouses on a familiar distinction which is invoked in argu-
ments designed to show that humans cannot have duties to
non-humans, and that non-humans can have neither rights
against, nor duties to, humans.
duties to" versus "duties concerning ." Theorists often
distinguish between "duties to" (or, toward) and "duties
concerning" (or, regarding, involving, relating to, in
respect of) in discussions of the correlation of rights
and duties. Only duties which are "duties to" correlate
with another person's rights; statements of "duties con-
cerning" others neither entail, nor are entailed by, state-
ments of the other's rights. So, for example, Bernard
Mayo argues that the doctrine of the correlativity of
rights and duties does not extend to all duties the dis-
charge of which involves a specific persons or persons.
There must be a duty to that person in order for the per-
son concerned to have a right
.
21
Quite naturally, the distinction between "duties
to" and "duties concerning" also features in arguments for
the rightlessness of non-humans. It is argued that since
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not have any duties to non-humans, even though we
may be said to have duties concerning them, they have no
rights against us. For example, Kant argues that we can-
not be said to have duties to animals distinct from what-
ever duties we have regarding them:
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a duty toward these bilngs. 22 9 n
For Kant, "duties to animals" actually are just "duties
to humans .
"
Some theorists suppose that even the expression
duty to" is ambiguous; only some "duties to" correlate
with rights of others. Feinberg, for instance, argues
that 'to' in 'B has a duty to A’ is ambiguous and obscures
a crucial distinction between two distinct offices A could
be said to occupy, the office of claimant (creditor, pro-
misee) or the office of mere beneficiary (i.e., a party
who/which stands to benefit from performance of an owed act
but who/which is not a claimant). 23 A duty is something
owed another. When it is said that B owes A something,
whether or not A has a right to what is owed depends on




then B's duty to A generates a right of A's to
the owed act. However,
beneficiary, then A has
while it always follows
claimant that it has a
when A occupies the office of mere
no rights to the owed act. Thus,
from the fact that a party is a
right to what is owed, it does not
always follow from the fact that a party is an intended
beneficiary that it has a right to what is owed. Only
eficiaries who/whioh also are claimants have rights to
promised acts.
ben-
Hart offers a similar line of reasoning about the
ambiguity of the preposition 'to' to show that we should
not extend to animals and babies whom it is wrong to ill-
treat the notion of a right to proper treatment. While
animals and babies are affected by our ill-treatment of
them, and may stand to benefit by the performance of any
duties we have not to ill-treat them, the office they oc-




Feinberg, Hart suggests that it is only where 'to' in 'B
has a duty to A' indicates that A occupies the office of
claimant that A correctly can be said to have a right.
The view which emerges, then, is that rights are
correlative with duties only where duties are "duties to
claimants," and not where they are "duties to mere benefi-
ciaries" or "duties concerning." Since what sometimes is
expressed as "duties to" natural objects really are only
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"duties to mere beneficiaries"
ural objects," natural objects
us
.
or "duties concerning nat-
cannot have rights against
The question here is whether humans could be said
to have legal duties to natural objects. One way to put
this is to ask whether natural objects ever could be said
to occupy the office of claimant. if so
, then the sugges _
tion is that they could have rights to owed acts. what has
been said already in connection with the Claim Position on
legal rights suggests that they could be so described, i.e.,
they could be said to have claims against us. Is there an-
other way of showing that humans could be said to have
legal duties to natural objects? m order to answer this
question, m the next two sections I consider the kinds of
duties commonly accepted as instances of genuine "duties
to" and the notion of a legal duty.
Kinds of duties
. In his essay "Duties, Rights, and Claims,"
Feinberg identifies ten kinds of duties. He argues that
only seven of these necessarily are correlated with rights
of others. Since Feinberg' s account is as complete and re-
presentative as any offered, the discussion of kinds of
duties which follows is limited to the account he gives.
The ten kinds of duties identified by Feinberg are
what he calls duties "of indebtedness," "of commitment,"
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of reparation," "of need-fulfillment " "ofi ument, reciprocation,"
"of respect," "of community membership,"
"of compelling
appropriateness," and "of obedience." He argues that the
first five necessarily are correlated with other people's
— Eersonam rights (i.e., rights against some specific,
nameable person (s) requiring performance of some act). The
duties of respect and of community membership necessarily
are correlated with other people's in rem rights (i.e.,
rights which bold, not against some specific, nameable per-
son (s)
,
but against "the world at large"). The remaining
three kinds of duties are not necessarily correlated with
other people's rights. Each of the first seven kinds of
duties permits talk of one party owing something to an-
2 6
other. if one accepts Feinberg's account of which kinds
of duties are, and which are not, necessarily correlated
with rights of others, then only a discussion of the first
seven kinds of duties is relevant here.
"Duties of indebtedness" are duties arising out of
contracts and are the most familiar case of one party's
owing something to another. In the relation between debtor
and creditor, the debtor is said to owe something to the
creditor, who has a right to what is owed.
"Duties of commitment," being based on promises,
provide another case of owing. A promisor is said to be
obligated to a promisee, who has a right to the services
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or goods promised. Where duties ofS commitment are obli ga -
tions to mere benefirTat-ioc LLciaries, the intended beneficiaries
have no rights against the promisor.
The third kind of duties »^„+.
, duties of reparation,"
are duties to repair harm done or to otherwise make good a
loss caused by "negligence, recklessness, carelessness,
dishonesty, malevolence, or the like... The duty-bearer is
said to owe reparation to the claimant.
"Duties of need-fulfillment" are less obvious oases
of owing. Feinberg describes them as "duties abundance
owes to need." His example is from an advertisement for
a set of recordings by Winston Churchill. According to the
advertisement, Churchill "feels that he owes this legacy to
the world." Feinberg construes this as a duty of need-ful-
fillment Churchill has, giving rise to in personam rights
in others
.
"Duties of reciprocation" are related to duties of
gratitude except that reciprocation does, while gratitude
may not, require action. if a benefactor once freely gave
his/her services to a beneficiary in need whose circum-
stances now put the beneficiary in a position to help the
former benefactor, then the beneficiary is said now to owe
the former benefactor his/her services. According to
Feinberg, the ex-benefactor has right to receive help now




"duties of respect" and
'duties of community membership" necessarily are corre-
lated with other people's in rem rights. Duties of respect
typically are correlated with "negative rights," i. e .,
rights to other people's abstentions, forbearances, or
noninterference. Duties of respect are duties to refrain
from obtruding upon or interfering with the person or pro-
perty (including the privacy) of others. They are typi-
fied by the duty we all have to stay off a landowner's
property. "Duties of community membership" typically are
correlated with "positive rights," i.e., rights to another's
performance of some act rather fhanpul, n t to mere omissions.
Duties of community membership include the "duty of care
that every citizen is said to owe to any and every person
m a position to be injured by his negligence" and the duty
to come to the aid of accident victims. Feinberg calls
these duties, and the rights correlative to them, duties
and rights of community membership because "it is their re-
cognition, more than anything else, that molds a society
into a cohesive community ."
^
On Feinberg' s account, where a duty is an instance
of one of these seven kinds of duties, statements of duties
entail statements of other person's rights, and statement
of rights (i.e., rights of indebtedness, of commitment, of
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reparation, of respect, and of con^unity membership) entail
statements of other people's duties. Thus, to say they
"are necessarily correlated with rights of others" is to
endorse the logical correlativitv doctriney a nne, the conjunction
of (10) and (11) .
Femberg is among the many theorists who accept
both the logical and the legal correlativity doctrines.
Where right refers to "claim-rights" and 'duty' refers to
something one party owes another, Feinberg endorses both
sets of propositions (10) and (11), and (10') and (11').
It is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that Feinberg 's
description of the kinds of duties which necessarily are
correlated with rights of others can be extended to cover
legal contexts. Do examples of genuine legal rights and
legal duties bear this out?
Legally binding contracts or promises generate le-
gal rights and legal duties which fit Feinberg 's descrip-
tion of rights and duties "of indebtedness" and "of commit-
ment." Negligence law permits legal reparation for harm
and injury due to another's carelessness, generating legal
rights and legal duties falling under Feinberg' s classifi-
cation of rights and duties "of reparation." Legal rights
of landowners against trespassers, and legal duties of tres-
passers to stay off another's land, provide examples of
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what Feinberg calls right and duties „Qf respect „
tive nuissance doctrine imposes legal duties on parties for
to use due care against injured other parties,
generating remedial rights of injured parties. These’ rights
and duties fit Feinberg
' s description of rights and duties
"of community membership." The only questionable cases are
Whether there are legal rights and legal duties fitting
Feinberg description of rights and duties "of need-ful-
fillment" and "of reciprocation." However, whether or not
there are these other kinds of legal rights and duties, it
is clear that legal contexts provide examples of at least
five kinds of duties which, according to Feinberg, neces-
sarily are correlated with rights.
The notion of
__a_l egal duty
. There is not the variation in
accounts of legal duties that we have seen in accounts of
legal rights. The pattern has been to focus on analyses
of 'legal right' and to characterize a legal duty as what
one party owes another, viz., a right-holder. Despite dif-
ferences among theorists on the meaning of 'legal right',
they all agree that a legal duty is what one party is re-
quired (compelled, commanded, obligated, bound) by positive
law to do or forbear from doing. This is illustrated by
considering a sampling of views on legal duties offered by
different rights position theorists.
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Austin's view is that to have a legal duty is to be
liable to a legal sanction in the event of disobeying a
command. Parties who/which are commanded to do or for-
bear from doing acts covered by the sanction are said to
"lie under a duty."
Power theorist Gray offers virtually the same view:
societv'Vm ^°Jebearances which an organizedciety will enforce are the legal duties of
enforced?29
Wh° Se 3CtS and f°rbearances are
Power theorist Holland argues that whenever one is entitled
to have others act or forbear, and the other's performance
is enforced by the power of the State, then these acts and
forbearances are the other's legal duties. 30 Holland ar-
gues that it does not matter whether one describes these
compelled acts or forbearances as one party's legal duties,
or as another party's legal rights:
...when the State will compel B to carry out,
either by act or forbearance, the wishes of
A, we may indifferently say that A has a legal
right, or that B is under a legal duty.^i
Thus, Gray's and Holland's views are that legal duties are
those acts or forbearances which an organized society will
require and enforce.
Salmond ' s version of the Interest Position is that
a right is "any interest, respect for which is a duty, and
the disregard of which is a wrong. " A legal duty is "an
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act the opposite of which should be a legal wrong ." 32 To
say an entity has a legal duty is to say it is legally
wrong for the entity not to act in certain ways.
Consider two more examples. Rules Position theo-
rists Benn and Peters describe a legal duty as what a legal
rule requires a party to do to some other party, vis., the
icjht - holder-
. Thsy write:




33 , t at 'requires'
An entity is said to have a legal duty insofar as there is
a legal rule which requires that it do some act to some
other party.
On Feinberg's claim view of rights, a legal right-
holder is a claimant, one who has a claim
2
against some
other party to something owed. A legal duty is what is
owed to a claimant, and a legal duty-bearer is the party
who/which owes something to a claimant. since ascription
of legal rights and legal duties is governed by legal
rules, an entity has a legal duty when, according to the
governing legal rules, it owes something to others (i.e.,
claimants)
.
These examples suffice to show that the notion of
a legal duty as what an entity is required by positive law
to do or forbear from doing is accepted by theorists of
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different historical positions on legal rights. A legal
duty-bearer is the entity who/which is so required.
Two questions arise. First, could humans be said
to have legal duties to natural objects? Second, could
natural objects be said to have legal duties to humans?
If the answer to both questions is "yes," then both the
Correlativity Position and the Legal Duty Objections to
(T) fail.
Legal duties are
of one party owing another party something. Enti-
ties have legal duties when positive law requires that
they act or forbear in certain ways. Are there plausi-
ble examples of legal situations where persons could be
described as owing something to natural objects, or as
required by positive law to act or forbear in certain
ways? That is, could humans be said to have legal duties
to natural objects? If so, then the Correlatively Pos-
ition Objection to (T) has no force.
In Chapter VII it was argued that one could mod-
ify existent legal rules, or fashion new rules, accord-
ing to which natural objects could be construed as legal
right-holders. Some of those rules also provide a basis for
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g that humans could be said to have legal duties to
natural objects. For instance, reoonsider ^rule (R3) and accepted legal rule ( R8 ) :
<R3) N° hUmanS








e t0 US<5 dUS
one way to interpret (R3, is aS a duty-imposing rule
, a
rule which requires humans to act or forbear so as not to
P s on wilderness areas. The duties imposed could be
described as duties of noninterference owed by humans not
specially exempted to wilderness areas. These are duties
which fit Feinberg's description of "duties of respect."
Appeal to (R3), then, could provide the basis for con-
struing humans as having certain legal duties to wilder-
ness areas, viz, a legal duty not to trespass on wilder-
ness areas
.
This example shows that one could speak meaning-
fully of "duties to natural objects" and do so while
leaving open the question whether natural objects can have
legal rights. Of course, if (11*) is true, as many
theorists hold, then the example does also show that
natural objects could be said to have (legal) rights. But
neither the Correlativity Position nor the Correlativity
Position Objection assumes (11*). Each assumes (10') only.
Hence, where the view is that (10') is true and that
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natural objects cannot have rights because „e cannot^
any duties to them, the example shows this view incorrect.
It is incorrect because talk of duties to natural objects
is meaningful and plausible in at least the case where the
ascription of legal duties is justified by appeal to
governing legal rules.
Take another case. Suppose a particular forest
contains a stand of a rare species of tree and that, in the
area where these trees grow, it is clearly marked that all
humans should use exceeding care in trespassing in the
area. Suppose further, that a particular group of hikers,
through "negligence, recklessness, carelessness," and the
like intentionally destroy large portions of the stand of
trees. By appeal to the basic rule of negligence law,
(R8), a proper authority (e.g.
,
an administrative agency,
a court) may find them liable for failure to use due care
under the circumstances. In particular, they could be
construed as having what Feinberg calls "duties of repara-
tion" and as owing this reparation to the forest to repair
damages done. of course, this is not how the legal
situation presently would construe the facts; but it could
so construe them. Humans could be construed as having
duties of reparation" to natural objects.
Two objections might be advanced at this point.
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first is that the argument for saying humans could be
described as having legal duties to natural ^
because it simply assumes that natural objects have legal
rights and that is the question at issue. This objection
misses the mark, however. Of course, it is true that by
providing an account of why humans could be said to have
legal duties to natural objects one also thereby provides
reasons for supposing natural objects could have legal
rights. This is true, but not because the question of
rights for natural objects is begged. it is true because
there is an important connection between the notions of a
legal right and a legal duty. That is what the Correla-
tivity Position is all about. Some theorists (e.g.,
Salmond) put this by saying that the relation between
right' and 'duty' is like the relation between 'husband'
and 'wife.' By providing reasons for supposing a woman is
a wife one also provides reasons for supposing someone else
is a husband. But it does not follow that an argument for
saying that a particular woman is a wife merely assumes
that someone else is a, perhaps her, husband. Appeal to
the meaning of 'wife,
' to tests for identifying women as
wives, to particular facts about the woman in question
together provide reasons for saying a particular woman is
a wife. By analogy, by providing reasons for supposing
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that we could be said to have legal duties to natural
objects one also provides reasons for supposing that
natural objects could have legal rights. But it does not
follow that the argument given here for why „e could be
said to have legal duties to natural objects merely assumes
they could have legal rights. Appeal to the meaning
of 'legal duty,' to examples of legal duties, and to legal
^ tu.3. t ion s where fhp l •n t e legal relation properly is described
as a case of one party's owing something to another to-
gether provide reasons for saying that humans could be
said to have legal duties to natural objects.
The second objection is that the proper descrip-
tion of the relation between natural objects and indivi-
dual humans in the examples given is not that of one party
owing something to another, as I have maintained. Rather,
it is of one party being obliged to act in certain ways
with regard to natural objects. But such statements about
being obliged do not entail statements about having duties.
Thus, the objection goes, we may be obliged to act in
certain ways where natural objects are concerned, but we
have no duties to act in those ways towards natural
objects
.
The second objection involves a distinction between
being obliged and having a duty. What is it to be obliged?
Some theorists suggest a distinction between different
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senses of 'oblige.^ Inonesense (call it .QbUge
_to be obliged is to be ordered or threatened. To saj a
party is obliged
1
is to say that the party is given an
order backed by threats. A person forced at gunpoint to
hand over his/her wallet is obliged, to do so. Xn a secoi*
sense (call it "oblige,"), to be obliged is to have a
moral duty, to be morally bound. To say a party is
iged
2
is to say the party has a moral duty. Being ob-
liged
2
to keep one's promises is having a moral duty to do
SO. Statements that someone is obliged, do not, though
statements that one is obliged., do, entail statements about
one's duties. it is only where 'oblige' is "oblige," that
persons have duties to act or forbear.
Using this distinction, the objection is that
although we may be obliged
1
to act or forbear in certain
ways where natural objects are concerned, we are not
obliged
2
to do so, i.e., we are not morally bound to do so.
Thus, we have no duties to natural objects.
The second objection also fails, and it fails for
an important reason. The distinction between the two
senses of 'oblige' is a distinction between being ordered
or threatened to do something and having a moral duty to
do something. The sense of 'oblige' according to which
statements about being obliged entail statements about
having a duty is the second sense, oblige
. As such, the
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duties referred to are m^ duties. But the Correlate,
Position and the argument g iven here against its objection
(T) make no claims about whether humans have moral
duties to natural objects. Even if we have no moral duties
to them, and, hence, are not obliged 2 to treat them in
certain ways, it is still open whether we could have legal
duties to them.
This rebuttal raises a crucial issue. Certainly
it is suspect whether we have moral duties to natural
Objects, and whether they have moral rights against us.
But arguments intended to show that we have no moral duties
to them do not show, as so many theorists mistakenly have
assumed, that we could not be said to have legal duties to
them. This would be the case only if it were assumed in
law that a person’s having legal duties to another pre-
supposes that the person has moral duties to the other,
i.e., (14):
(14) If b has a legal duty to A, then B has a
moral duty to A. ~ -
Proposition (14)
,
taken together with the claim that we
have no moral duties to natural objects, does yield the
conclusion that we have no legal duties to them. But few,
if any, legal theorists hold (14) . This is because all
theorists who hold some correlativi ty thesis about legal
rights and legal duties hold (10'). But (10') and (14)
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taken together imply (15) :
(15) If a has a legal right against B, then Bhas a moral duty to A. £ -
And few, if any, legal theorists hold (15). Thus, they do
not, and would not want to, hold (14)
.
Similarly, the claim that natural objects have no
moral rights supports the Correlativity Position Objection
that humans cannot have legal duties to natural objects
only if proposition ( 16 ) is assumed:
(16) If B has a legal duty to A, then A has amoral right against B. ~
Proposition (16)
, taken together with the claim that
natural objects do not have moral rights, does yield the
conclusion that we have no legal duties to them. But few,
if any, legal theorists hold (16). This is because they
hold (10 ) , and (10') and (16) taken together imply (17)
,
which few, if any, of them hold:
(17)
If A has a legal right against B, then A
has a moral right against B.
Thus, they do or would reject (16)
.
What this points out is that, in discussions of
correlativity theses and duties to non-humans, one must
keep separate the moral positions and the legal positions.
While it may be significant and true that humans and
natural objects cannot be parties to a moral right-duty
relationship, this does not show that they cannot be
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Parties to a legal right-duty relationship, if what I
said so far is plausible, it is possible that they could
be parties to legal right-duty relationships.
The Legal Duty Object . on ^ (t)
is that natural objects cannot have legal rights because
they cannot have legal duties. 35 Could natural objects be
said to have legal duties? That is, could they be required
by positive law to act or forbear in certain ways?
Consider again the view that appeal to legal rules
provides a justification for ascription of legal duties to
entity, and the legal rule that contracts must be kept,
(R12). (R12) is an example of what Hart calls a "primary
rule of objection" or a "duty imposing rule." in effect
It stipulates that parties to contracts are obligated by
law to keep the terms of contracts into which they enter.
By introducing "secondary rules" or "power conferring
rules," one can make explicit the content of primary rules
such as (R12). Secondary rules (R16)
,
(R17) and (R18),
for example, might be introduced in connection with rule
(R12) :
(R16) Rule (R12) is recognized as a primary rule
of obligation of the legal system which
imposes on parties to contracts the obli-
gation to act or forbear in the ways
specified in the contract.
The courts and legislatures have the powers








Whl °h are rec°9ni^d asto contracts have the obliaatinn +•«£ contract^ ^^
(R16) identifies (R12) as a primary rule of the legal
system, (R17) confers powers on courts and legislatures to
create legal duties for natural objects, and (R18) speci-
fies that natural objects which are parties to contracts
have certain legal duties. However, by appeal to rules
(R12) and (R16)-(R18), a means is provided for recognizing
natural objects as genuine legal duty-bearers. 36 As
parties to contracts, they could be required by positive
law to act or forbear in certain ways.
Perhaps it will be objected that this argument
fails because natural objects cannot act or forbear, that
"acts" properly understood are what philosophers call
actions, i.e.
,
willed events, and that only humans can
perform actions. Since legal duties are described as acts
or forbearances required by law, natural objects cannot
have legal duties.
This objection has no punch. When it is said that
a condition of an entity's having a legal duty is that it
be able to act or forbear, it is assumed that all legal
persons satisfy that condition. Either they themselves
have that capacity, or their legal representatives have it.
243
m either case, as Markby says of corporations,
-so far as
it is possible that acts should be done through a repre-
sentative it will be presumed that a corporation may do
these acts ." 37 Thus, if one extends the doctrine of legal
representation to cover natural objects, the condition that
legal duty-bearers have the capacity to act or forbear is
a condition which natural objects could be said to satisfy.
The Legal Duty Objection is not saved by any argument
which supposes otherwise.
Summary
Two objections to (T) have been stated and de-
feated, the Correlativity Position Objection and the Legal
Duty Objection. it has been shown that humans could be
said to have legal duties to natural objects, and that
natural objects could be said to have legal duties to
humans. The discussion of this chapter completes the
first of the two moves in defense of (T)
,
viz., the move
to defend it against reasonable objections based on the
historical positions on legal rights and legal right-
holders. The task in the next chapter, Chapter IX, is to
complete the second move in defense of (T)
,
viz., the move
to defend it against non-histor ical position objections.
CHAPTER ! x
remaining objections
In this Chapter plausible objections to and con-
cerning (T) which do not presuppose any particular histor-
ical position on legal rights and legal right-holders are
stated and defeated. These are objections which could be
advanced by theorists of any of the eight historical posi-
trons. By defeating them, the case for (T) is complete.
Non Historical Position s on Legal Right-Holders
The Moral Person and the Moral Rights Positions The Moral
Person Position is the position which affirms any of the
following as necessary conditions of an entity, X, having
legal rights: X is a moral person, a moral agent, subject
to moral law; X is rational, capable of choice, has a
will. Typically, then, the Moral Person Position, is
construed as an endorsement of (18)
:
(18) For any entity, if X has legal rights, then
X is a moral person.
The Moral Person Position is related closely to
another position, what I call "the Moral Rights Position"
on legal right-holders. Typically, it is construed as an







yh^tity ', X '. if * has le?al rights,rn X as moral rights. ^
On the assumption that all and only moral persons
have moral rights, ( 18 , and (19) are logically equivalenfc
However, it is possible that a theorist might deny the
existence of non-legal, "moral" rights, yet affirm that
there are moral persons, i.e., persons capable of choice,
of acting, of willing. For this reason, whatever connec-
tions do hold between them, the two positions are treated
separately here.
The Moral Person and the Moral Rights Positions
seem to generate the following two objections to (T)
,
re-
spectively: "Natural objects cannot have legal rights be-
cause they are not moral persons"; "Natural objects cannot
have legal rights because they cannot be said to have
moral rights." According to the Moral Person Objection,
natural objects are not the appropriate sort of entity to
have legal rights; they are not moral persons. According
to the Moral Rights Position Objection, moral rights are
not the sort of rights natural objects could be said to
have. Is either objection damaging to (T) ?
The Moral Person Position Objection . The Moral
Person Objection is that natural objects cannot have legal
rights because they are not moral persons. It assumes that
the moral personality of non-humans must be established if a
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move to give natural objects legal rights ls to be taken
seriously. Even Christopher Stone seems to make this
assumption when he defends the natural object more, N0M,
by arguing that natural objects have wants and needs. He
writes, "natural objects can communicate their wants
(needs) to us"; we can say, for example, that the smog-
endangered stand of pines want^P s the smog stopped, or that
"the lawn wants water.
But all such arguments are misguided. They incor-
rectly assume that in order to show that non-humans could
be legal right-holders one must show that they are moral
persons. Indeed, if non-humans were moral persons that
would be good reason to extend legal rights to them. And,
surely, our reluctance to extend legal rights to non-humans
may be explained in part by our association of rights with
moral persons. But, as the doctrines of legal personality
and legal representation make clear, neither the non-moral
person status of non-humans, nor our reluctance to ascribe
rights to non-humans, establishes that non-humans cannot
have legal rights. Trusts, funds, idols, ships and muni-
cipalities are not moral persons, though they have been
treated as legal persons, bearers of legal rights and
duties. In order to accomodate these two doctrines, then,
the Moral Person Position, like other positions on legal
rights and legal right-holders, must abandon (18) in favor
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of (20) :
(20) For any entity, X if y n ,
then X or X's lecral ™ h legal rights '
moral person?
9 representative is a
As long as there is some moral person (e.g., a legal re-
presentative) in a position to act on behalf of natural
objects, natural objects could be said to have legal
rights
.
Thus, insofar as the Moral Person Position adopts
) rather than (20) it affirms something about legal
right-holders which is false; hence, it fails to generate
a plausible objection to (T)
.
if the position is revised
to accomodate the doctrines of legal personality and legal
representation, abandoning (18) in favor of (20), it poses
no objection to (T)
. in eithert me case, the argument for (T)
is secure against the Moral Person Position.
The Moral Right s Position Objection
. The Moral
Rights Position Objection is that natural objects cannot
have legal rights because they cannot be said to have mor-
al rights. It fails for the same reason the Moral Person
Position Objection fails. To accomodate the accepted
doctrines of legal personality and legal representation,
it must adopt (21) in lieu of (19) ;
(21) For any entity, X, if X has legal rights,








If it is at all plausible that a moral rights
must be satisfied for proper recognition or as
of legal rights, then it is the condition given
and not the condition given at (19)
,
„hi C h is
plausible. As such,
Moral Person Position
the Moral Rights Position, like the




. other less frequently asserted views on
the necessary conditions for an entity, X, to have legal
rights are that X is a member of a community, X is capable
of self-movement, X has a soul, X is subject to natural
law, and X is capable of being party to a lawsuit. Clear-
ly/ the latter poses no serious problems for (T)
. The
argument that natural objects could be said to have legal
rights on each of the eight historical positions on legal
rights provides a basis for saying that they could be
parties to lawsuits. But what about the other four posi-
tions? Are they problematic for a defense of (T)
?
Each of the remaining four views is a variant on
the Moral Person Position. As such, objections to (T)
based on them are defeated by defeating the Moral Person
Position Objection. The assumption underlying the view
that only entities which are members of communities can
have legal rights is that the existence of rights requires
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mutual recognition. since such recognition is possible
only among rational beings, only they can be "members of
communities." Hence nnh,, o ly they can have rights. Natural
objects, non-rational beinas ug , cannot be members of commun-
















e 'CyCle inVOlVeS "ll ?°ur of
that'thf K 15 essential to a communityt the members of it have common interests
fantffffr"^ 1 obli9ations, then men,P nts, animals and soil do not form a community. 2
Since this view assumes that 'community' means "moral
community" or "community of moral, rational beings," it is
a version of the Moral Person Position.
The view that legal right-holders must be capable
of self-movement also is a Moral Person Position view.
It has been stated in various ways: Only entities "capable
of exercising their own motion," "capable of rational
self-determination," or "capable of initiating action-
can be legal right-holders. it is not a view about sen-
tient beings, or about any entities who/which exhibit
behavior. it is the view that only agents capable of
choice or action can have legal rights. Only they can
will movements, choose ends, initiate actions. As such,
it is a Moral Person Position view.
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The case is the same for the related views of le-
gal right-holders as "havers of souls" or "subjects of
natural law." Entl ties having souls and subject to natural
law are rational entities, moral agents, i.e., moral per-
sons. Like the other two views, theses two views reduce
to the Moral Person Position stance that only moral per-
sons can have legal rights. They qener^P noy erate new or dam-
ping objections to (T)
Thus, none of the non-historical positions on
legal right-holders subscribed to in the American legal
tradition poses a successful objection to (T)
. On all the
manor views in American legal theory on legal right-
holders, natural objects could be- described as legal right-
holders.
Remain ing Objections Concerning (T)
The distinction between "objections to" and objec-
tions concerning" (T) was introduced in connection with
the Moral Law Validation Position Objection, in Chapter
VII. If an objection raises reasonable doubt about the
significance of establishing (T)
,
it is an objection con-
cerning (T)
.
if it questions the truth or plausibility of
the case for (T)
,
it is an objection to (T)
.
in the re-
mainder of this chapter I consider three objections
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concerning
( T, . ln the order in which they are discussed
they are the Conflict of Legal Rights Objection, the
"Which Rights?" Objection, and the Social Value Objection.
Tj^pnflict of Legal Rights_Objection. Often legal rights
in a given situation. On a claim view of rights,
X's and Y's rights to something,
*, conflict when X's and
Y ' S claims to * cannot both be recognized. On a rules
view of rights, x's and Y's rights to <j> conflict when the
rule (s) governing recognition of X's right as valid and
the rule governing recognition of Y's right as valid can-
not both be realized.
The fact that legal rights often conflict is the
basis of a reasonable objection concerning (T) : "if one
gives natural objects legal rights, situations will arise
where rights of natural objects and rights of humans will
conflict. Some of these conflicts will involve some basic,
inalienable rights of humans, e.g., the rights of liberty
and of property. Recognition as valid rights or claims of
natural objects would require that humans give up some of
their basic rights and that basic human liberties be re-
stricted. But these rights and liberties are absolute and
nonsacrif iceable; there is no reasonable justification for
restricting them. Thus, in the only really important cases
where talk of rights matters—cases where rights conflict—
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t^e is no reasonable ground fQr recognizing a rlght ^0lalm ° f 3 natUral « ‘“Ving priority over a basic
right or liberty of humans."
The Conflict of Legal Rights objection raises two
related issues: First, in casec:ses where rights of natural
objects and rights of humans conflict, would recognition
as valid rights or claims of natural objects require that
we abandon the well-entrenched view that certain rights of
humans are absolute and inalienable? Second, are there
any reasonable grounds for restricting the rights or lib-
erties of humans and, thereby, for giving rights or claims
Of natural objects priority over rights or claims of
humans? Both issues must be addressed in order to defeat
Conflict of Legal Rights Objection concerning (T)
.
In what follows 1 argue that, first, the view that
some rights of humans are basic, absolute, or inalienable,
properly understood, is not sacrificed by recognition of
some rights or claims of natural objects as having prior-
ity over some rights or claims of humans; second, the
lustification for restricting the rights and liberties of
humans where natural objects are concerned need be no
different than the justification for restricting the rights
and liberties of humans where other humans are concerned.
For these two reasons, the Conflict of Legal Rights Objec-
tion does not undermine the significance of showing that
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natural objects could have legal rights
, (T) _
Certainly the ascription of legal rights to natur-
al objects will involve llmitations Qn ^ exerc . se of
many rights and liberties of humans. But such restrictions
are a feature of any legal system in which rights are as-
cribed, and not a peculiar feature of a system in which
rights are ascribed to natural objects. Furthermore, no
rights are "absolute" in the sense that they always have
priority against any competing claims and never involve
any restrictions. All rights are limited by rights of
others or by duties imposed on right-holders. For example,
A's right to use and enjoy his/her property does not per-
mit A to dispose of the property in any way A chooses, or
to build any structures which fit A’s fancy on the pro-
perty. Fire, health, building and zoning regulations, to
cite a few, all restrict ones "right to obtain and enjoy
property." Even traditional natural rights theorists
admit these limitations on alleged basic, inalienable
rights of humans. Although they maintain that all humans
have certain absolute, inalienable rights, they qualify
this by saying that there are restrictions on the exercise
of those rights. These are restrictions "necessary to




Thus, the accepted view is that no right always has
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priority over competing claims, that the exercise of any
right is subject to limitations. This point ofte„ is put
by saying that "the right to *" always is understood as
a "prima facie right," i.e., a right to * unless a strong-
er, competing claim (right) is recognized as valid. Typi-
cally, theorists who persist in describing an actual right
as "absolute" mean by that, that in the situation at hand,
there is no competing claim which overrides recognition of
the right as valid. Thus, whether one calls actual rights
''prima facie rights" or "absolute rights ," the accepted view
is that all rights are such that they may be overriden by
competing claims (rights)
, or their exercise may be re-
stricted.
Since it always is possible that basic rights of
humans may be restricted or overridden by competing claims
(rights)
,
the view that some rights are "absolute" or
"inalienable," when properly understood, need not be sac-
rificed by recognition of some claims (rights) of natural
objects as having priority over some claims (rights) of
humans. The case of natural objects would be just another
example of what already is acknowledged about "absolute"
or inalienable" rights, viz., they can be restricted or
overridden. The pertinent question, then, is whether
there are grounds for restricting or overriding claims
(rights) of humans in order to recognize as valid competing
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claims (rights, of natural objects. l8 there any justi-
fication for restricting the rights and liberties of humans
where natural objects are concerned?
Consider two principles which frequently are offer-
ed as justifications for restricting the freedom or liber-
ty of humans. These are what Feinberg calls "the Private
Harm Principle” and "the Welfare Principle," 4 (22) and (23),
respectively:
( 22 ) Restriction of a person's libertieslustrfied to prevent harm (inju^T
(The Private Harm Principle)
is
to
(23) Restriction of a person's lijustified to benefit others.(The Welfare Principle)
bertie s is
According to Feinberg, these two liberty-limiting princi-
ples specify "kinds of reasons that are always relevant or
acceptable in support of proposed coercion, even though in
a given case they may not be conclusive." 5
Although endorsement of one principle does not
commit one to endorsing the other, often the Private Harm
and Welfare Principles are endorsed together. The reason
for this has to do with the notion of a harm. Typically
a harm is considered to be an invasion of an interest.
Human-inflicted harms are considered injuries to a person's
interest, to "something in which he has a genuine stake." 6
One way to harm persons is to deprive them of what they
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need. According to Feinberg, to claim twJ hat persons need
certain things is to rlaimc that they cannot get along very
well in the end without them
.
7
one way to prevent or
remedy a harm, then, is to provide people with what they
need, i.e., to benefit them. Thus, interference with the
liberties of some has been justified often both in order
to prevent harm (injury) to oth^s and to benefit others.
The related concepts of harm and benefit have been
invoked in support of the move to give natural objects
legal rights. Some theorists (e.g., Benn) argue that
natural objects could be said to have prudential interests
(interests
2 ) . Certain human activities affecting natural
objects could be considered conducive to their well-being
( in their interests”) and others harmful to their well-
being ("not in their interests"). That is, certain human
activities could prevent or remedy harm (injury) to the
interests
2
of natural objects, other theorists (e.g., c.
Stone) put this by saying that natural objects themselves
are harmed (injured) or benefited by certain kinds of
human activities. Rivers are harmed (injured) by the pre-
sence of toxic pollutants, and benefit from efforts to
remove or stop the discharge of toxic pollutants. Evidence
of this harm and benefit, respectively, might be the
river's loss of fish and plant life when the pollutants
are present and their return when the pollutants are
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treated or removed. The viewn which emerges is that certain
Kinds of human activity directly harm ( injure) either ^
interests
2 of natural objects or the natural objects them-
and that, certain kinds of human activity benefit
natural objects.
Some theorists (p n r de.g., C. stone, Douglas) take the
argument one step further. They argue that there are
moral grounds for recognizing natural objects as legal
right-holders, grounds based on the view that the natural
environment ought to be valued for its own sake, and not
merely for its use-value to humans. They include moral
reasons among the reasons for conferring on natural ob-
jects certain legal-operational advantages, e.g., the right
to initiate court action. Given the notion of an interest
as an advantage which, on moral grounds, an entity ought
to have (i.e., interest
3
or de ^ure interest), their view
amounts to a construal of natural objects as entities
which have, or ought to be recognized as having, such
interests
.
Harms clearly are invasions of de facto interests
(interests^
. But many theorists would argue that they
also may be invasions of prudential interests (interests.,)
and de j ure interests (interests^)
. One can harm an entity
by depriving it of certain things which are to its
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advantage to have (i e hv ^
•
' by d° ln9 lnjury to its interest
)
°r by depriving it of cert-ain ^t advantages which, on moral
grounds, it ought to have (i.e., by doing injury fco itg
interests^. if this is so, then at least some theorists
would argue that certain kinds of humans activities do or





If talk of harm (injury) or benefits to natural
objects is plausible, then a reasonable case can be made
for restricting the rights or liberties of humans by appeal
to extended versions of the Private Harm and Welfare





3 person ’ s liberties towardobjects is justified to prevent
^ S
arm ^injury) to them.(The Extended Harm Principle)
(25) Restriction of a person's liberties to-ward natural objects is justified tobenefit them.
(The Extended Welfare Principle)
use Feinberg s language, appeals to principles (24) and
(25) would "always be relevant or acceptable in support of
proposed coercion, even though in a given case they may
not be conclusive."
Consider a case where a river is or could be said
to have a claim to be free from irreparable damage incurred
by human pollution activity, or to have a claim to seek
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redress for damages so incurred. The river's exercise of
that claim may interfere with some liberties or rights of
humans. To justify. or at least provide a prima facie
case for. that interference, one could appeal to the
Extended Harm and Welfare Principles. Not only do they
Provide reasonable grounds for justified restriction of the
liberties and rights of humans where natural objects are
concerned; they provide the sort of justification which
theorists accept as appropriate for restricting the lib-
erties of humans generally.
The argument advanced here is not that evidence of
harmful (beneficial) human activity towards natural objects
establishes that they have rights. It is that, if one
allows that talk of harm (benefit) to natural objects is
meaningful, appeal to the Extended Harm and Welfare Prin-
ciples provides a plausible justification for restricting
the liberties and rights of humans. Furthermore, it is
reasonable to suppose that some claims of natural objects
(e-g., a river's claim to be free from irraparable damage
due to the presence of toxic pollutants) could be given
priority over some claims of humans (e.g., an industrial
polluter's claim to have the right to pollute). This would
not interfere with the claim, properly understood, that
some rights of humans are "absolute." For these reasons,
260





ining the significance of establish-
What I call the "which
Rights?" Objection challenges the significance of estab-
lishing ( T ) from a different angle:
"Suppose natural ob-
jects meaningfully could be said to have legal rights.
Which legal rights could they be said to have? They could
only be said to have inconsequential procedural rights;
there are no substantive legal rights which could be con-
ferred on them. Consequently, natural objects could not
be said to have any rights which matter. This makes es-
tablishing (T) rather unexciting." Is there any force to
this objection?
The "Which Rights?" Objection appeals to a dis-
tinction often used in classifying rights, viz., the
distinction between "substantive" ("primary," "antecedent")
rights and "procedural" ( "secondary ,» "remedial
" ) rights.
In the case of humans, "substantive rights” are associ-
ated with personal freedoms (e.g., rights to express one-
self, to associate and assemble) and with privacy and
security (e.g., rights to be let alone, to have one's body
unharmed, to have one's reputation undamaged). So-called
rights to equal treatment and consideration" (e.g., rights
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to vote, to be free of raclal and sexual discriminafcion)
often are classified as substantive rights. .. Procedural
rights" are associated with the legal means for vindi-
cating substantive rights. They include rights associated
With "due process of law" (e.g., rights to counsel, to a
trial, of appeal) and with legal remedies (e.g., rights to
be parties to injunctive settlements, to sue for damages).
The main issue raised by the "Which Rights?" Objection is
whether natural objects could be said to have substantive
rights or to have procedural rights of any consequence.
Could natural objects be said to have any rights "which
makes a difference"?
That they could be said to have rights which matter
seems evident from previous discussions. There are many
procedural rights natural objects could be said to have.
These include "due process" rights, such as the rights to
initiate court action, and to appeal agency and judicial
decisions affecting them; rights to seek redress for dam-
ages, to be parties to injunctive settlements and to re-
ceive relief which benefits them; the rights to be parties
to contracts, to a fair hearing and consideration. But
surely these are rights which matter. For one thing, if
natural objects have the rights to initiate court proceed-
ings and to receive legal awards in favorable judgments,
then they have access to the legal machinery necessary for
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ensuring legal and non-legal remedies fn • •or injury to them.
For another thing, whether or not thev h,r n y ave such rights
matters to how we treat them. Our behavior toward them
would be subject to legal sanction, rather than to public
censure or moral sanction alone.
The case is the same for substantive rights. So-
called "rights to noninterference" by others are standard
examples of substantive rights which humans have. They
are construed either as "active rights," rights to do or
not to do something, or as "passive rights," rights to have
something done or not done by others. For humans, rights
to noninterference include the general rights to privacy
be let alone ) and to physical security. But it was
argued previously (in Chapter VII, in connection with the
Claim and Rules Positions) that natural objects could be
described as having rights to noninterference. These
rights could be construed as prima facie rights of natural
objects to be let alone, or to be physically unharmed.
There are other "rights" natural objects could be
said to have. Some of them are called "rights" by lawyers,
though they are called "privileges," "powers," or "immun-
ities by many legal theorists. Whichever expression one
adopts, their conferral on natural objects would have
tangible significance. For example, natural objects could
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be accorded immunity from prosecution fQr aamages ^ ^
the occurrence of
..natural disasters,.. e. g ., floods
, earth.
quakes
, droughts. Like humans, they could be accorded
freedoms from 'bills of attainder.' and from "ex^ factolaws .
"
one might give natural objects a right for which
there is no analogue yet among rights of humans, a "right
to freedom from ecocide." This would be a non-interfer-
ence right where relief for injury is sought along lines
used in traditional negligence law. Certain natural ob-
jects could be construed as having a "right to freedeom
from ecocide," imposing on humans a duty to use care
against endangering the lives of those natural objects.
For failure to use due care, offending persons could be
liable. The natural objects, in turn, would have certain
remedial rights against the offending persons.
The terminology "right to freedom from ecocide" is
borrowed from traditional negligence law. "Failure to use
due care" often is cited as the grounds for making a per-
son, B, liable for some action performed against another
person, A. Roughly stated, when B takes action against A,
it is a case of "assault." if B strikes against A, it is
"battery." if A dies as a result, it is "homocide." Now
suppose A is a natural object, e.g.,
a
member of an endan-
gered species. One could argue that when persons perform
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certain actions against certain natural objects such that
they, or some of them, die as a result, the action is
ecocide." The offending persons could be made liable for
having committed acts of ecocide, where recovery is sought
on grounds of the offending person's failure to use due
Care. The antecedent ("substantive", right of the natural
objects would be the "right to freedom from ecocide."
Thus, both subtantive and procedural rights "which
make a difference" could be ascribed to natural objects.
As such, the "Which Rights?" Objection concerning (T)
fails
.
The Social Value Objection
. Many theorists emphasize the
"social value of rights." What I call the Social Value
Position generates a plausible objection concerning (T)
:
"Legal rights are not ascribed indiscriminately. It is
appropriate to grant legal rights to entities only where
there is some social value or end served by doing so. But
there are no social values served by awarding natural ob-
jects legal rights. Hence, ascription of legal rights to
them is at best inappropriate." is the Social Value Ob-
jection threatening? is there any social value or goal
served by giving natural objects legal rights?
That reasonable social values or goals are served
by conferring legal rights on natural objects can be shown
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by defending two claims: first, social values or goals
are served by providing a legal means for protecting
natural objects against certain types of behavior, second
the conferral of legal rights on legally rightless enti-
ties provides a legal means for protecting those entities
against certain types of behavior.
HOW can one establish the first claim? The evi-
dence is voluminous that there is an "environmental
problem." Most people view this problem as a type of
social problem, the control of which is presumed to be
desirable for the society as a whole. Generally it is
agreed that, although there are fuzzy cases, there are
Clear-cut cases of avoidable, unacceptable behavior af-
fecting natural objects, e.g., the wholesale destruction
of swamp lands, the discharge of toxic materials into the
air and water, the indiscriminate slaughter of seals,
wolves and moose. it also is agreed that efforts to con-
trol adverse human activities towards natural objects are
ineffectual without supportive legal principles and reg-
ulation. Behavior which threatens the survival of natural
objects, and the lack of legal protection of natural ob-
jects against such behavior, are viewed as socially un-
desirable; the converse behavior, and provisions for legal
protection of that behavior, are viewed as socially
desirable. On the assumption that what TOlmy desir .
able (or, is desirable for the society as a whole, has
social value or serves social goals, it is agreed that
providing such legal protection of natural objects has
S°ClalValUe °r SerVSS SOcial The first claim,
then, is widely accepted.
Of course, this is not to say that there are no
difficulties in specifying what counts as behavior ad-
versely affecting natural objects, in identifying and
assessing such behavior, or in specifying and evaluating
the social values or goals at issue in any given case.
Human ignorance accounts for some of the difficulties.
Often our activities destroy species we know nothing
about, or are harmful to natural objects in ways of which
we are unaware. But much of the difficulty is because
there are viable, alternative and sometimes incompatible
perspectives for describing and valuing both natural ob-
jects and behavior acknowledged as affecting natural ob-
jects. For example, from an industry's perspective, a
forest may be described and valued as a replenishable
resource for the production of lumber and paper products,
for human consumption. So conceived, one might describe
and assess behavior affecting forests according to whether
it increased, decreased or had no effect upon the pro-
ductivity of forests. From a recreational perspective.
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a forest may be described and valued as a space providing
opportunities for various sorts of sporting activities,
e.g., hiking, camping, picnicing. so conceived, behavior
affecting forests might be described and assessed according
to whether it enhances, obstructs or has no effect upon
the recreational possibilities of forests. From an aes-
thetic perspective, a forest might be described and as-
sessed to a "work of art," invoking feelings of awe and
wonder in those who view it. So conceived, behavior
affecting forests might be described and assessed according
to whether it increased, reduced or left unaltered the
"natural beauty" of the forest. The pattern is clear.
Depending on the perspective from which natural objects
and behavior affecting them is described and valued, one
may get different, even incompatible, views about whether
the behavior itself, or the legal protection of or against
that behavior, has social value or serves social goals.
Similarly, there are difficulties associated with
clarifying what a social value or goal is, and with
choosing social values and goals. For example, the eco-
nomic (social) goals of maintaining levels of unemployment
no higher than 4% and of making housing available and
affordable for all Americans may conflict with the social
value or goal of protecting more "green areas" from indus-
trial development, or with the goal of reducing all forms
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Of Pollution activity. Still, ln spite of such disagree _
meats about social goals and which behavior serves or dis-
serves these goals, it is agreed that providing legal pro-
tection of natural objects against behavior adversely af-
fecting them does serve some social values and goals. As
such, the first claim stands.
What about the second claim, viz., that the con-
ferral of legal rights on an entity provides a means of
legally protecting the entity from certain types of beha-
vior? The truth of this claim can be shown by reconsid-
ering what some of the historical positions on legal
rights say about legal rights. According to the Moral
Sense Position, legal rights enable entities to do or
receive something from another lawfully. According to the
Interest Position, legal rights protect interests, both
what an entity actually wants or needs, and what it is to
an entity's advantage to have. The Power Position main-
tains that legal rights create and secure powers, allowing
properly empowered individuals or bodies to create or alter
the legal relations of other entities. According to the
Correlativity Position, legal rights impose duties on
others to act or forbear in certain ways. The combined
Claim and Rules Positions describe legal rights as claims
validated by appeal to governing legal rules, which
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rules also oblige others to do or abstain from doing cer-
tarn actions. On the Prediction Position view, statements
ascribing legal rights are predictive statements that if
certain circumstances transpire, certain court action will
follow. Each of these positions construes legal rights as
legal instruments for safeguarding legal right-holders
against various types of behavior affecting them. Each
acknowledges that the conferral of legal rights on an en-
tity is one way to provide that entity with the legal
means for protecting itself against certain kinds of be-
havior. As such, the second claim also stands.
This discussion establishes that the conferral of
legal rights on natural objects could serve some social
values or goals. The conferral of legal rights on hitherto
gaily rightless entities is, in an important respect, a
mechanical way of providing those entities with a means for
gaining access to certain legal protections. This is true
because of the nature of legal rights, and not because of
the nature or individual characteristics of right-holders.
By giving natural objects legal rights, one provides them
with a means for gaining access to certain legal protec-
tions, protections which have or could have social value.





No non-histoncal position on legal right-holders
poses any insurmountable objection to (T)
.
Furthermore,
the significance of establishing (T) is not damaged by the
Conflict of Legal Rights, the "which Rights?" or the
Social Value Objections concernina m umng (T)
. Having established
the significance of defending (T)
,
and having defeated all
reasonable objections to (T)
,
the only task which remains
IS to bring together the argument for (T)
.
That is done




The main thesis of this dissertation was that as-
cription of legal rights to natural objects such as
forests, rivers and seals is compatible with American
legal theory on legal rights and legal right-holders,
thesis (T). no attempt was made to defend the stronger,
normative claim that natural objects should have legal
rights, thesis (S)
.
As such, no effort was made to consi-
der the disadvantages of giving natural objects legal
rights, or to provide a full-scale account of how that
move might be accomplished. Thus, many practical details
and important normative considerations, so vital to an
adequate defense of { S )
,
were not addressed. What the
argument did establish was that objections to giving nat-
ural objects legal rights based on theories of what a
legal right is and on who or what meaningfully can be
said to have legal rights were unfounded. In this respect,
the argument provided clears the way for any argument
designed to establish thesis (S)
.
The defense of (T) involved two basic moves. One
move was to defend (T) against objections to it based on
the prima facie exhaustive historical positions in
271
272
American legal theory on legal rights and legal right-
holders. These were two strictly natural law positions
(the Moral Sense and Moral Validation Positions) and six
non-strictly natural law positions (the Interest, Power,
Claim, Correlativity, Rules and Prediction Positions)
.
The other move was to defend (T) against objections which
did not presuppose any particular historical position,
objections which could have been advanced by theorists of
any of the historical positions. These were objections
based on proposed necessary condition accounts of 'X has a
legal right' and included the Moral Person and Moral
Position Objections.
In addition, (T) was defended against objections
which called into question the significance of establishing
(T)
,
rather than the truth of (T)
.
These so-called objec-
tions "concerning" (T) included the Conflict of Legal
Rights Objection, the "Which Rights?" Objection, and the
Social Value Objection.
It may be helpful to review the development of the
argument for (T) according to chapters. In Chapter I the
main thesis of the dissertation, (T)
,
was stated and the
two-move strategy for defending (T) was outlined. In
Chapter II, "Why Give Natural Objects Legal Rights?,"
concerns which motivate the move to make natural objects
legal right-holders were discussed. This discussion
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showed how the issue " rights for natural objects „
and set the stage for the argument, offered in subsequent
Chapters, that natural objects meaningfully could be said
to have legal rights.
The notions of a legal person and a legal repre-
sentative were discussed in Chapter III. This discussion
laid the groundwork for the argument, made repeatedly
throughout the dissertation, that theorists cannot hold
the positions they do, and feel they must, hold regarding
the doctrines of legal personality and legal representa-
tion and deny the possibility of ascribing legal rights
to natural objects.
In Chapter IV, "Legal Fictions," it was argued
that it is compatible with accepted legal theory on the
nature, purposes and justification for proper use of a
legal fiction to suppose that the notion of environmental
personality is, or involves, a legal fiction. Thus, if
ascription of legal rights to natural objects is, or in-
volves, a legal fiction, the argument for (T) is not
damaged by it.
In Chapters V and VI, the various positions in
American legal theory on legal rights and legal right-
holders were discussed. in Chapter V it was argued that
theories of legal rights can be divided into two camps,
strictly natural law theories" and "non-strictly natural
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Strictly natural law theories affirm what
non-strictly natural law theories deny, viz., that there
IS a necessary connection between legal and non-legal
rights, the nature of which is given by appeal to natural
law or moral principles. In Chapter VI the eight histori-
cal positions on legal rights and legal right-holders-two
strictly natural law positions and six non-strictly natural
law positions—were discussed.
The discussions of Chapters V and VI furnished the
background material necessary for the main thrust of the
argument for (T)
,
advanced in Chapters VII and VIII. m
these chapters it was shown that none of the eight histori-
cal positions poses a successful objection to (T)
.
m
addition, it was shown that several of the positions, in-
cluding the favored Claim and Rules Positions, provide
suggestions of specific legal rights natural objects could
be said to have.
Remaining objections were stated and defeated in
Chapter IX. These were non-historical position objections
to (T)
,
as well as objections concerning the significance
of establishing (T)
.
In conclusion, the defense of (T) against the
different kinds of objections to it, and against various
objections concerning it, establishes that ascription of
legal rights to natural objects within the American legal
275
framework is neither absurd nor impossible. Furthermore,
that defense shows that several of the positions provide
not only positive grounds for supposing that natural ob-
jects could have leqal ricrhts hnf _... , .y gnt , but suggestions of rights
which might be ascribed to them Thnc v,un . i us, having removed the





and offered additional reasons for
supposing that natural objects meaningfully could be
described as legal right-holders, the case for (T) is com-
plete. The move to give natural objects legal rights
ought not be delayed because of any intuitive feeling that
it is absurd, impossible or unreasonable to speak of natur-
al objects as legal right-holders. That feeling this
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< T )' viz., that natural ob-j c not ave legal rights or legal representativesbecause either they cannot be said to have needs (in anyliteral sense) or, if they can, a guardian could not judgetheir needs ( Should Trees Have Standing?
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rt °n which theory of corporate personalityo e accepts. There are three basic theories of corporatepersonaiity, the Fiction, Bracket and Realist theories.The Fiction theory is that a corporation is a person forlegal purposes only; the personality of corporations is a
mere legal fiction. Corporations have no real will or
capacity to act; they have only fictitious wills and
capacities to act. The Bracket theory regards the members
of a corporation as the actual bearers of legal rights andlegal duties, which, for reasons of convenience only, are
attributed to "the corporation." it is as though brackets
_
Parentheses are placed around the members of a corpor-
ation to which a name, the name of the corporation, is
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Fuller s views that the truth of a statement is a question
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-LFie etymology of the word 'person' is interest-mg in this regard. The word 'person' derives from the
word persona,
' a word originally used to describe the
mask through which an actor's voice was sounded in clas-
sical Greek drama. Gradually, for example in Roman law,it came to have the meaning associated with 'legal per-
sona,' bearer of legal rights and legal duties. According
285
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For example, legal positivist H. L. A. Hart
^
lassiGal natural law theory in terms of theLaw Validation Thesis, (2). He writes,[lheories of Natural Law posit] that there are
certain principles of human conduct, awaitingdiscovery by human reason, with which man-madelaw must conform if it is to be valid. (TheConcept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971)
p. 182 . '




. .is the view which denies the
possibility of a rigid separation of the is
and the ough
t
, .... (The Law in Quest of Itself
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 5. )
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Their discussions suggest that Hart offers (2) and Fuller
offers (3) as a necessary condition of a natural law
theory. In addition. Fuller explicitly denies that (2)
is a necessary condition of a natural law theory. He
argues that a natural law theorist might concede the valid-
ity of 'bad law.
"
What the theorist will not concede is
that there is "a hard and fast line between natural law
and ethics" (Ibid., p. 6); i.e., the theorist will not
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s.v.ociology of Law," by Philip Selznick. N. S. Timasheff
o ers a similar statement in a commentary on H. Kantoro-
wicz s definition of the sociology of law. Timasheff
writes
,
H. U. Kantorowicz gives a correct, but too
narrow, definition of the sociology of lav/:
it is to be an investigation of social life
in its relation to law, especially the
investigation of correlations between law
and other social domains— economics, politics,
techniques, art, religion, etc. ("What is
"Sociology of Law’?" p. 225).
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on Problems of duties rather than prob-lems of rights— duties owed by individuals to a landlord,king, church or God. Not until the seventeenth and eight-eenth centuries did the notion of rights, particularly ofirthrights or "natural rights," gain attention. Modern
analyses of the expressions 'legal right' and 'legal
right-holder' are just that-- modern analyses. The advent
of legal positivism with Bentham and Austin in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is the beginning
of any
. sustained attempt to clarify legal terminology.
Thus, in formulating definitions from pre-nineteenth cen-tury natural law doctrine, especially definitions of 'legal
right, one is imposing on that tradition an approach un-
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ls to° strong for the case presented Thef°h 1S ^different between being legally protectedand not being legally protected. She has neither a dlsireto be protected, nor a desire not to be protected Henceshe has no relevant, actual interests a • '
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McCloskey, "Rights," p. 126
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. ,Ibid., p. 125.
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.
I am assuming that McCloskey uses the notions
of joeing obliged and having a duty interchangeably. I
assume this because McCloskey says we speak of being ob-lged to leave birds and animals in sanctuaries alone and
of having legal duties (presumably, to leave them alone),
though
. not of their having rights or of their being legal-
ly entitled to be left alone. However, perhaps McCloskey's
view is that we are obliged to leave them alone, though
we have no duties to do so; hence, they have no rights
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' th^d ?tatements ab°utVIII.) So interpreted, McCloskey’s' ^w"- V" Chapterof the proposition ttat all duties of Y tn y° 2 r^ ectjonof X against Y. Rather if i c +.u o X entail rights
construed, ouh so-called duJe, ^ V*” that ' ProPerly
sanctuaries rPa iiv J








n tSS - °Itedo: s9nStrshow ST
K Zu
ob J ects cannot have rights. since it is possibleboth that we are obliged to act in certain ways regirdingnatural objects and that, on independent grounds ?hev
are so^bvVd haVe legal righta a?ainsb ™ lLt «e
legal righ£!









Note that some Claim Position theorists hold
at if an entity, X, has a claim-right to something, <f>
,
then another entity, Y, has a duty to X to do or forbear
with regard to <j). Since this view amounts to a view about
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(RS1) would be insisted upon by
_ Ll1 ? i P? theorist who holds that one can havea legal claim which is not a legal right.
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If (R14) is not already a legal rule of the
system, it easily could be, since what it says is consis-
ent with current and proposed regulations governing ac-tions concerning members of "endangered species." Further-
more, the structure and language of (R14) is like that of(R7)
,
an acknowledged rule of the system.
27 .Since I am arguing only for thesis (T)
,
and not
for the very different thesis (S)
,
I do not discuss
whether or not situations could arise where one should
make natural objects parties to contracts.
2 8
For a discussion of some reasons motivating NOM,
the natural object move, see above. Chapter II.
29 Perhaps it will be objected that there really is
a second Moral Sense Position Objection to (T)
,
viz., that
natural objects cannot have legal rights because legal
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have moral rights The positi
"® tural objects cannot
not have moral rights LI ?atural ob 3 ects can-
to (T) (which position and^biprK & plausible objectionChapter IX) r It o jection are discussed in
morai righto, Tn aly l*9
* 1 Pghts a« J»stSense Position objection to IT) t eparat®' second Moralthe meaning of "moral ?icrh?” ^' tv, ? °” that ' consid®r
rights arejust “ral IlghL Etow IS” that le?almoral right’ and ’legal right’ ale Lkel ®xpJesslonsor they are not taken to be equivalent r^v-h® e<3uivalent '
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e
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esignates a generic sense of 'right ' accordinato wnich both moral rights and legal rightl are Visi -on this interpretation, while all righto ale toghto il
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on this interpretation, the pro-p e objection is not a separate Moral Sense PositionObjection, since it is defeated by defeating the statedMoral Sense Position Objection. The claim that natural
objects cannot have moral rights entails the claim that
natural objects cannot have rights in a moral sense. By
showing that natural objects could be said to have "rightsin a moral sense," then, however counterintuitive or oddthat claim may seem, one shows that they could be said
to have "moral rights."
Thus, the proposed, second objection either is
not a Moral Sense Position Objection or, if it is, it isdefeated by defeating the stated Moral Sense Position
Objection. The upshot is that only the Moral Sense Pos-ition Objection given initially warrants consideration
here
.
Here, and throughout the dissertation, 'entity'
is substituted for 'person' or 'human' where, by not so
296
question "whether non-Wns ' the
rights is begged.
numans could be said to have legal






















i P ciples, appeal to which could justify recoa-tion of natural objects as entities having the capacity
Princlol^
S" ing * That the^ are o/could be suchL Moral Valid K n Connection with the discussion of
20®;
ation Position Objection, below, pp . 204 -




-9-r Hobbes) seem to construe
h t f
a
Y Principle as a descriptive statement abouta m
>
fact occurs. So construed, the view that validlegal rights are identified or justified by appeal to
natural, law principles would not be a Moral ValidationPosition view; it would not be a view which endorses thelghts Necessity Thesis, (4). Accordingly, the designa-tion of natural law principle' used by Moral ValidationPosition theorists construes natural law principles as,
or as implying, moral principles.
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S F Wr°n9 ° r We« not to ill-rea .them. With animals and babies, such moral ex-pressions are substitutable for ’Animals and babies have
f°
pr°per treatment’; hence, it is improper tospeak of rights of animals and of babies.
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142 .
Feinberg, "Duties, Rights, and Claims," pp. 137-
26
*According to Feinberg, what distinguishes thefirst seven kinds of duties mentioned from the remainingthree is that the former do, and the latter do not, permittalk of one party owing something to another. Although he
concedes that, for example, we often speak of a duty to a
commanding authority (e.g., a policeman or parent) as
owed, Feinberg argues that the authority here, the party
to whom one "owes" obedience, is not a claimant. It is
simply one who may command performance of a duty and apply
a sanction in case of failure. Feinberg argues that the
last three kinds of duties either are not owed to anyone
at all, or are "owed" to parties who are not claimants
"in the manner (say) of a creditor." Thus, they are not
necessarily correlated with rights of others.
In the case of the first seven kinds of duties,
Feinberg cautions that some duties are more naturally
spoken of as "owed" than others. For example, he says of
the duty to stay off another's land (a "duty of respect")
,
"I don't think we would naturally speak of this duty as
something "owed" to the landlord, although I admit the law
doesn't hesitate to speak that way" (Ibid., p. 139). He
also says that some duties (e.g., duties of need-fulfill-
ment) are "two steps away from the example of indebtedness,
"
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the clearest case of owing. still
of the first seven kinds of duties'party owing something to another.
he claims that each
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Social Principles and the
Hart, The Concept of Law, pp.
35Note that the Legal Duty Objection is not an
endorsement of (12'):
(12') If A has a legal right against B, then A
has a legal duty to B. ~ ~
Proposition (12') says that every legal right an entity,
A, has against another specific entity, B, presupposes
some legal duty of A to that entity B. The Legal Duty
Objection to (T) states that all legal right-holders arelegal duty bearers, i.e., if an entity. A, has a legal
right, then A also has at least one legal duty.
36_Of course, it could be argued that if natural
objects are recognized as parties to contracts, then they
are recognized as legal right-holders, as well as legal
duty-bearers. Yet, even if this is true, it does not show
that appeal to rules (R12) and (R16)
-
( R1 8 ) fails to estab-
lish that natural objects could be legal duty-bearers.
The example provided does not assume that natural objects
are legal right-holders. Nor does it assume that (11')
is true; it does not presume that because natural objects
can be said to have at least one duty, they can be said to
have legal rights. It merely provides a case where talk
of "duties of natural objects" makes sense, and, hence,
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true






d tD have legal rights, be membersg community of right-holders, and whether wecould be said to have legal duties to them.
. ., _




Cltl zen, cited in David G. Ritchie, Natural Rights:


















Aquinas St. Thomas. Basic
Edited by Anton C.
gica. I, i, 90-97.
Writings of St. Thoma s Aquinas.
Pegis. Vol
. II: Summa Theolo-
New York: Random House, 1954
.




lf IV. Translated by B.




on the Laws of England
.






Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel
.
The John Hopkins Press, 1949 .
~
Cicero. De Legibus. Book III. Translated by C. W. Keyes.Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961.
' De Re Publica
. Book III. Translated by C. W.
^
es> Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
Entreves, A. P. d'. "The Case for Natural Law Re-Examined."
Natural Law Forum 1 (1956) : 27-46
.
.* Natural Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy.
London: Hutchinson and Co., 1970 . “
Freidrich, Carl Joachim. The Philosophy of Law in Histori -
cal Perspective
. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1958.




• The Morality of Law
. Revised ed . New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1969.
Gierke, Otto Friederich von. Natural Law and the Theory of
Society: 1500-1800
. Translated by Sir Ernest Baker.








Belli et Pacis. T.ihH Tres
J ,
ted bY F. W. Kelsey




Charles Grove. The Revival of




Hall, Jer°me, ed. Readings in Jurisprudent
.



































Ancient Law: its Connection with the
of Society and Its relation to
London: Oxford University Press,
Montesquieu, Baron de
. The Spirit of Laws
clopedia Brittanica, 1955.
Natural Law Forum (Journal)
Chicago: Ency-
Pollock, Frederick. . "A History of the Law of Nature." in
Es says in the Law . Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books,
19 69 .




. Translated by F. G. Moore.




John W. "Law of Nature. " Law Quarterly Review 2
(1895) :121-143.
Stammler, Rudolph. The Theory of Justice
. Translated by
Isaac Husek. New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1969.
Suarez, Francisco, De Legibus, ac Deo Legislatore
. Book II.
Translated by G. L. Williams et al . Edited by
Classics of International Law. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1944.
303




J°h£- Lectures on Jurispni^nr
of Positive Law
. London: John





Province of Jurisprudenc e












-* The Limits of Jurisprudence nPfin^
Columbia University Press, 1945.
New York:











. 2 vols. Edited by











John Chipman. The Nature and Sources of the Law. 2nd
ed
. New York: Macmillan Co., 1921
.
Hart, Herbert Lionel Adolphus. The Concept of Law. Oxford-Clarendon Press, 1971.
—




Hans. General Theory of Law and State
. Translatedby Anders Wedberg. New York: Russell and Russell,
19 61
.
• Pure Theory of Law . Translated by Max Knight.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.




Brown and Co., 1930 .
~~
304


























-* The Province and Function of
















Jerome. Law and the Modern Mind.
Publishing Co., 1936 . "
’ New York: Tudor
Fuller, bon /-/American Legal Realism." University ofPennsylvania Law Review 82 (1934) :429-462.
Gilmore, Grant. "Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure." YaleLaw Journal 70 (1961) : 1037-1048
.
Gray, John Chipman. The Nature and Sources of the Law. 2nd
ed. New York: Macmillan Co., 1921 . ~
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, Jr. The Common Law . Edited by MarkDeWolfe Howe. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1961.
.
"Law in Science and Science in Law." Harvard Law
Review 12 (1899) : 442-463
.
—
Learning and Science." In Readings in Jurispru-dence
, p. 669. Edited by Jerome Hall. Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1938.







. EditedCambridge: Cambridge Universi
by
ty












JdenC e; Realism in Theory and Practiceago. University of Chicago Press, 1962.
- "A Realistic Jurisprudence -














Contribution to the Science
Review 34 (1921) : 449-453
.
wu
, John C H. "Juristic Philosophy of Mr. Justice Holmes "Michigan Law Review 21 (1923) :523-530
American Sociological Jurisprudence
Aronson M. H. "Cardozo's Doctrine of SociologicalP^dence." Journal of Social Philosophy 4
Juris-
(1938) :
Cairns, Huntington. Law and the Social Sciences. New York-Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1969.
Cardozo, Benjamin Nathan. The Growth of the Law . New Haven:Yale University Press, 1921.
* The Nature of the Judicial Process
. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1921.
_
* The Paradoxes of Legal Science
. New York: Colum-bia University Press, 1928.
Encyclopedia of Philosophy
, 1972 ed
. S.v. "Sociology of
Law," by Philip Selznick.





“897, ;i5?-4?8 h ° f ^ LaW '"
Kocourek^aibert An Introduction to the Science of Law .oston. Little, Brown and Co
. , 1930 . —
LaPaulle, Pierre. "The Function of Comparative Law, with a
t -d^ •




Lumley, F. E. Means of Social Control
. New York- TheCentury Co., 192 5 . in
Pound
,
Roscoe. "The Call for a









(1937) : 5 5 7




-* Introduction to the Philosophy ofHaven: Yale University Press, 1972.
.• Jurisprudence
. Vol




"Juristic Science and the Law." Harvard Law Re-
view 31 (1917-18) :1047-1063
.
" The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence."
Green Bag 19 (1907 ): 607-615
.
The
. "Scope and Purpose
dence." Harvard Law
25 (1912-13) : 14 0-168
of Sociological Jurispru-
Review 24 (1911-1912) : 591-619
,
and 489-516.
"A Survey of Social Interests." Harvard Law Re-
view 57 (1943-44) :l-39.
-• Social Control Through Law. Hamden, Conn.: Archon
Books, 1968.
Stone, Julius. Social Dimensions of Law and Justice
.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965
.
Timasheff, N. S. An Introduction to the Sociology of Law .
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Committee on
Research in the Social Sciences, 1939.
307














jable Rights and the EighteenthColumb ia Law Review 20 (1920) : 183-195
H. B. "Symposium on 'Rights'
Aristotelian Society Supp.
.
" Proceedings of the
vol~ 24 (1956) : 95-110
.
Henry David. "Rights, Human
Monist 52 (1968) : 501-520.




Commentaries on the Laws of England
.




Ralph Mason. "On Natural Rights."




Jr. "Inalienable Rights "





Edmund. The Philosophy of Edmund Burke. EditedLouis F. Bredvold and Ralph G. Ross. Ann ArborUniversity of Michigan Press, 1960
Carr itt ,
.




"Natural Rights and Justice in Liberalism."Political Theory and the Rights of Man




Cohen, Morris R. "Jus Naturale Redivivum. " Philosophical
Review 25 (1916) : 761-777
.
~
Cooley, Thomas M. A Treatise on the Constitutional Limita-
tions . 8th ed . 2 vols. Boston, Little, Brown and
Co., 1927.
Corbin, Arthus L. "Legal Analysis and Terminology." Yale
Law Journal 29 (1919-20) : 163-173
.
Corwin, Edwards. "The 'Higher Law' Background of American
Constitutional Law." Harvard Law Review 42 (1928-9):
149-185, and 365-409.
308
Cranston, Maurice. "Human Rights,
Political Theory and t h*'
Edited by D. D. Raphael.
Real and Supposed." in
Rights of Man
, pp. 42-53.






htS: A to Professor Raphael " inPolitical Theory and the Rights nf Man, pp . 95-100
1967?
Y °* D ’ RaP^ael * London: Macmillan and Co.,






Encyc lopedia of Philosophy






, the State, and World Govern-
—r
t New York: Macmillan Co., 1947
Fawcett, J. E. S. The International Protection of Humanlghts. in Political Theory and the Rights ofan, pp. 19 133. Edited by D. D. Raphael. LondonMacmillan and Co., 1967.
Feinberg
, Joel. "Duties, Rights,
Philosophical Quarterly 3
and Claims . " American
(1966) :137-144~
_.
"The Nature and Value of Rights."




. Cha. 6. Englewood Cliffs,
N. J..- Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973 .







Will iam K. "The Concept of Universal Human
Rights." In Science, Language, and Human Rights
,
pp. 189-207. Philadelphia: American Philosophical
Association, Eastern Division, 1952.
.
Natural and Inalienable Rights." Philosophical
Review 64 (1955) : 212-232
.
“
Golding, Martin P. "Towards a Theory of Human Rights." The









" The Law of Nature in State and
1 Decisions." Yale Law Journal 2 5
•
* The Revival of Natural Law


























Fefn^ancl Tonnies - London: Frank Cass
,
Li td
. , 19 6 9 .




Holmes, Oliver Wendell, Jr. "Natural Law "





Manley 0. "Advisory Opinions of National
-tronal Courts." Harvard Law Review 37
and Inter-
(1924) :9 7 0-
Jessup, Henry wynans. The Bill of Rights and It s Destruc-
-
lo n by Alleged Due Process of Law . Chicago;
Callaghan and Co., 1927.
Kaufman, Arnold S. "A Sketch of a Liberal Theory of Funda-
mental Human Rights." The Monist 52 (1968) : 595-
Keeler, John E. "Survival of the Theory of Natural Rights
in Juridical Decisions." Yale Law Journal 5 (1895)*14-25. — '
Lamont, W. D. "Symposium on 'Rights'." Proceedings of the




Peter, and Runciman, W. G., eds. Philosophy
,
P°litics and Society . New York: Barnes and Noble,
1967.
Lauterpacht, Hersh. International Law and Human Riqhts
.
New York: F. A. Praeger, 1950.
310




1966?‘ ^-Id6a °^ g£- London: Macgibbon and Kee,
McC1°skey
i9
H.)J.i»Rigbts.-- PMlosophical Quarterly 15
McGovney, D. D. is the Eighteenth Amendment Void Because
499-518
°n SntS? ' Columb ia Law Review 20 (1920):
Macpherson
, C . B "Natural Rights in Hobbes and Locke.” in1
“
Th60ry and the Right s of Man
, pp. 1-26.
1967
Sd bY RaPhael - London: Macmillan and Co.,
.* Possessive Individualism:
York : Oxford University Pre
Hobbes to Locke. New
ss, 1970.
Maritain Jacques. The Rights of Man and Natural







_ Are Human Rights?" in Political Theo-
£y and the Rights of Man
, pp . 68-8 0“ Edited by D.
D. Raphael. London: Macmillan and Co., 1967.
Melden
,
A. I. "The Concept of Universal Human Rights." InScience, Language, and Human Rights
, pp. 167-188.
Philadelphia: American Philosophical Association,
Eastern Division, 1952.
.* Rights and Right Conduct. Oxford: Basil Black-
well, 1959.
Moskovitz, Moses. The Politics and Dynamics of Human




Neill, Thomas P. Weapons for Peace . Milwaukee: The Bruce
Publishing Co., 1945.





"Symposium on 'Riaht=;' " Pv-
Polin, Hg-ond.
-The Rights of Man in Hobbes and Locke. -
26 "TT-itf u
Tj^X,aj2^jthe Rights of Man
, pp. i6 -
Co . r 1967.
^ * * Raphael
* London: Macmillan and
Pound, Roscoe. "The Theory of Judicial Decision " Harv.rH
|f^
Revle
^ 36 (19231 : 641-642; 802-825;
Radm, Max. "Natural Law and Natural Rights." Yale LawJournal 59 (1950) : 214-237
.
——
Raphael D. D. "Human Rights, Old and New." In PoliticalThegry and the Rights of Man
, pp. 54-6 7T
9
Edited byO. u. Raphael. London: Macmillan and Co., 1967.
—
* Rroblems °f Po litical Philosophy
. New York
•
Praeger Publishers, 19 7 1 . '
—
*
" Tde Rights of Man and the Rights of the Citi-
zen
- * n Political Theory and the Rights of Man ,
pp. 101-liy
. Edited by D. D. Raphael. London:Macmillan and Co., 1967.
* ed * Political Theory and the Rights o f Man.
London: Macmillan and Co., 1967.
Reeder, Robert
_ P . "Constitutional and Extra-Constitutional
Restraints. University of Pennsylvania Law Re-
view 61 (1913) : 441-457
.
Ritchie, David G. Natural Rights : A Criticism of Some
Political and Ethical Conceptions
. London : George
Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1884.
Rommen
, Heinrich A. The Natural Law . Translated by Thomas
R. Hanley. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1957.
Ryan, John A. and Boland, Francis J. Catholic Principles
of Politics . New York: Macmillan Co., 1940.
Schoetz
,
Max. "Natural and Inherent Rights Protected by
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the
Constitution of the United States." Marquette Law
Review 7 (1922-23) : 154-158
.
312
Singer, Marcus. "The Basis nf











. The_ChieL iWbrk s of Benedict dc
StraUSS





n and Sa°Pa °f the American
view 7 (1893) : 129-156?°
nal LaW '" ^rvard Law Re~
UNESC
°'





Willoughby westel Woodbury, An Examination of the NaturetJle State . New York: Macmillan Co., 19n . ~
Wright, B. F., Jr
.
.
"American interpretations of Natural
324-b47
~~
er 1Can Polltica l Science Review 29 (1926) :
"Natural Law in American Political Theory."
-?
al Md S°° ia l Science Quarter -
On Legal Rights
Ben tham, Jeremy. The Theory of Legislation







Brown, W. Jethro. "Re-Analysis of a Theory of Rights."
Yale Law Journal 34 (1925) : 765-768
.
Cardozo, Benjamin Nathan. Selected Writings of Benjamin
Nathan Cardozo
. Edited by Margaret E. Hall. New




"Jural Relations and Their Classifioa-
'
-
Yale Law Journal 30 (1921) : 226-238
.
.
Legal Analysis and Terminoloav " y^Ip t=tt t
nal 29 (1919-20) : 163-173
.
gY ’
What is a Legal Relation -5 "
terly 5 (1922) :50-52
.
Illinois Law Quar—
Feinberg, Joel. "Duties, Rights,
Philosophical Quarterly
and Claims." American
3 (1966) :137-144^ ~~
-•




. Cha. 4 .











The Nature and Sources of the Law
.
Yorh: Macmillan Co., 1921
.
Hall, Jerome. "Analytical Philosophy and
Ethics 77 (1966) : 14-28
.
Jurisprudence II
Hart, H. L. A. JjThe Ascription of Responsibility andRights." in Logic and Language
,
n.s., pp. 151-173Edited by Anthony Flew. Oxford: Basil Blackwell,1952 . '
-
* Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence." LawQuarterly Review 70 (1954) :37-60
.
Hearn, W. E. The Theory of Legal Duties and Rights. London:
Trubner and Co., 1883. "
Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb. Fundamental Legal Conceptions
.
Edited by Walter Wheeler Cook. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1964.
Holland, Thomas Erskine. The Elements of Jurisprudence.
12th ed . Chas. 7 and 8 . New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1917.
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, Jr. The Common Law . Edited by Mark
DeWolfe Howe. Boston: Little, Brown and Co./ 1961.
314
Husik
, Isaac. "Hohfeld's Jurisprudence." University ofPennsylvania Law Review 72 (1929)7263-277 ^
~







. 8. London: John
Kelsen
, Hans. General Theory of Law and SfaBo Translated
?9 6f!
wedberg. NSTy5?inTSi5iTT-aJ Russel
.* The Pure Theory of Law
Berkeley: University of
. Translated by Max Knight.
California Press, 1967.





















The State and Evil." Ethics 69 (1959) :182-195.
Maher, K. H. "The Kinds of Legal Rights." Melbourne
University Law Review 5 (1965) :47-75
.













• "Legal Rights." International Journal of Ethics
26 (1915-16) : 92-116:





Of the Nature of Jurisprudence and of




Roy L. "An Analysis of Hohfeld "




, Henry T. "Duties
, Rights, and Wrongs." American BarAssociation Journal 10 (1929) :123-128
Vrnogradoff Paul Commgn-Sense in Law
. 3rd ed
. London:oxford University Press, 1959.
. "The Foundations
Law Register, n.s.
of a Theory of Rights."




Theses Stated in the
(T)
(S)
rights and legal right-holders. Y 91
Matura! objects should be ascribed legal rights.













r^ connection between positive law
° ' aW ® s
4.;
t ls) and morality (or, law as it ought
appeal tn ^ n^re ° f that connec tion is given by9 natural law or moral principles.(The Law Necessity Thesis)
All and only positive law which conforms to naturalor moral law is valid.
(The Law Validation Thesis)
There is no strict separation between positive law
and morality.
(The Law Non-Separation Thesis)
There is a necessary connection between legal rights
and non
-legal rights (natural or moral rights) andthe nature of that connection is given by appeal to
natural law or moral principles.
(The Rights Necessity Thesis)
All and only legal rights which are based on natural
or moral law are valid.
(The Rights Validation Thesis)
There is no strict separation between legal rights
and non-legal rights (natural or moral rights)
.
(The Rights Non-Separation Thesis)
The meaning of 'legal right' is given in moral terms.
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If A has a right against B, then B has a duty to A.
If B has a duty to A, then A has a right against B.
If A has a right against B, then A has a duty to B.









a 16931 dUtY the
" * has a legal tight
<12
’’
dut| to SB? 16931 rlght against S' then A has a legal
(13 ) If A has a legal duty to B,
against B. ~
then A has a legal right
(14) If B has a legal duty to A, then B has a moral duty
dS) If A has a legal right against B, then B has a moralduty to A. ~ -
d 6) If 5 has a le 9al duty to A, then A has a moral right
against B. ~
(17) If A has a legal right against B, then A has a moral
right against B. ~
(18) For any entity, X, if X has legal rights, then X is
a moral person.
(19) For any entity, X, if X has legal rights, then X has
moral rights.
(20) For any entity, X, if X has legal rights, then X or

















. a person ' s libertie
(injury) to others.
Harm Principle)
s is justified to
benefifo?he?s.




obSririuL?fPTr S liberties toward natural
(injury) to^them PreTCnt irreP^able harm
(The Extended Harm Principle)
Restriction of a person's liberties toward natural
?m^
eCtS 1S Justified to benefit them.(The Extended Welfare Principle)
Rules and Rule Schema Stated in the Dissertation
(RSI) If an entity, X, properly is legally represented byan agent, y, and Y uses correct legal procedure topetition m the name of and on behalf of X that X be
recognized as having a legal claim to something, *,and Y provides a case of at least minimum plausibil-ity that X has a legal claim to <j> , then, providedthere are no countervailing reasons to override
recognition of X's claim to
(f> as valid, X has a validlegal claim to <j>
.
(Rl) Whenever an entity or its legal representative has
or asserts a claim to something, and follows correctlegal procedure for seeking legal recognition of
that claim as valid, and provides a case of at least
minimum plausibility for that claim, then the entity
has a right to a fair hearing and consideration.
(R2) Where a duly appointed legal representative of a
delimited forest area is legally empowered to main-
tain that area as a recognized "wilderness area," no
humans may trespass on or use that area for recrea-
tional, industrial or other purposes without the



















No humans may trespass on wilderness areas.
thehegal 35 3 Primary rUle ° f


















SentatiVe ° f a desi9>«ted wilder-
the name of the




1Ze the wilderness area as havingin legal rig ts; specifically, it has the powerto recogmze the wilderness area as having a legalright to noninterference by trespassers Igainst anvmans not exempted by the wilderness area's legalrepresentative. x d s r
No human being may kill another human being.
DDD results frora failure to employ due careunder the circumstances.
Business and industry must maintain standards offair competition and just and reasonable rates.
One must stop, look and listen where traffic is tobe expected.
Trespassing in this forest is prohibited.
Contracts must be kept.
Creditors have a right to be paid.
No human being may kill an animal which is a member




If a human kills an animal which is a member of an
officially designated "endangered species," a court
has the power to grant survivors of the species a
legal representative and to empower that representa-
tive to make claims against the offending humans in
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the name, and on behalf, of thethe species. surviving members of
»*• o< »u.
to contracts the obl-irUt--
w
^
lch lmPoses on parties
ways specified in the contract.




The courts and legislatures
















Killing humans is wrong.
Acts which injure humans are
Killing seals for their fur
Acts which cause irreparable
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